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Some Antecedents of Leibniz’s Principles 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Martinho Antônio Bittencourt de Castro 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
School of History and Philosophy 
University of New South Wales 
Sydney, Australia 
 
 
 
 April 2008 
 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge 
it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or 
substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any 
other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where 
due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by 
others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged 
in the thesis. 
 
I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, 
except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception 
or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Date: 12 June 2008  
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
Leibniz considered that scepticism and confusion engendered by the disputes of different 
sects or schools of metaphysics were obstacles to the progress of knowledge in philosophy. 
His solution was to adopt an eclectic method with the aim of uncovering the truth hidden 
beneath the dispute of schools. Leibniz’s project was, having in mind the eclectic method, 
to synthesise a union between old pre-modern philosophy, based on formal and final 
causes, and new modern philosophy which gave preference to efficient causes. The result 
of his efforts is summarised in the Monadology. But the question remains: to what degree 
was Leibniz successful in this enterprise? An objective of this thesis is to 
investigate whether philosophical tradition can justify or support some of the arguments 
that are at the basis of Leibniz’s system (for example, monads have no window to the 
exterior world, a phrase that summarises the structure of Monadology). I shall demonstrate 
how Leibniz reflects the concerns and the positions of his key predecessors. Thus, the aim 
of the thesis is to explore key antecedents to Leibniz’s central doctrines. The thesis argues 
that Leibniz carried out a logical development of some principles in the eclectic system of 
Plotinus, which resulted in the structure of Monadology. Whether Leibniz’s project was 
successful or not will depend on how we view those principles. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the philosophical system of the German philosopher of the 
seventeenth century, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He was a person of encyclopaedic 
knowledge and his readings covered as much as was possible for one person; thus the span 
of influences on him is very broad and we can cite only some of them: Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Descartes, Augustine, Galileo, Kepler, Francis Bacon, Suarez, Hobbes, Spinoza, Gassendi, 
van Helmont, Malebranche and Lullus. This broad span of interest is perhaps due also to 
the philosophical method that he acquired by contact with some eclectic scholars like 
Johann C. Sturm.1 In his book Eclectic Philosophy, Sturm presented as the goal and method 
of philosophy the idea that it was necessary to examine all significant intellectual traditions, 
and, by means of a proper critical analysis, to separate what was the genuine truth from 
what could only be considered merely the dogma of a sect. The fact, however, is that the 
search for synthesis or for a Perennial Philosophy that was beyond dispute was a task 
established well before Sturm. We can find this preoccupation in the Renaissance with 
Ficino and even before, for example, in the effort of the Neo-Platonists to merge the 
philosophies of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.2 
 Leibniz followed this tradition and considered that both scepticism and the confusion 
and disputes between the different sects of philosophy were obstacles to the progress of 
knowledge. His solution was the adoption of an eclectic method of uncovering the truth that 
was hidden beneath the dispute of schools: “It is not surprising therefore that throughout his 
life Leibniz studies a wide range of authors, that he is inclined to force comparisons 
between his own view and those of others thinkers, and that he often uses terms and 
philosophical jargon from odd collection of sources to express his own ideas.”3 Mercer and 
Sleigh also point out the importance of two of Leibniz’s teachers: Jacob Thomasius of 
                                                 
1Mercer and Sleigh in JOLLEY, N., The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, p. 69. Leibniz was in contact with Sturm by correspondence but the Sturm’s book was 
published only in 1686.  
2 The search for a perennial philosophy by Ficino is discussed in KRISTELLER, P., The Classic and 
Renaissance Thought, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955.  
3 Mercer and Sleigh in JOLLEY, p. 70. 
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Leipzig and Erhard Weigel of Jena. Those two teachers stressed to Leibniz that the 
philosophy of Aristotle was already a basis or foundation for this eclectic enterprise. After 
the removal of distortions added by Scholasticism, this philosophy could be made 
consistent with the new findings of modern mechanics. 
 But the science of Aristotle has as a central notion the concept of teleology, of final 
causes. It is an attempt to explain nature as penetrated by an effort to develop not yet 
existing forms. Any change or movement would be an expression of this trend, which was a 
kind of progress toward a goal. This notion was precisely the target of attack by the new 
science. The opposition to teleology was based on the fact that it seemed to close off the 
prospects for an explanation in terms of efficient causes, which was considered the true 
causal explanation. Moreover, teleology was also condemned for introducing an occult and 
non-observable factor, the entelechies or souls. Indeed, in the seventeenth century, modern 
thinkers started to consider Aristotelian science as a barrier to the progress of knowledge. 
 In this direction, the founders of the modern science, Galileo and Descartes, 
suggested that the instrument most adequate to investigate nature was mathematics. In this 
movement Descartes contributed to the exclusion of final causes by substituting the 
Aristotelian entities (the entelechies) for a more simple reality, subject to mathematical 
treatment, extension (the res extensa).4 Cartesian reason, as applied in the res extensa, was 
founded in constant relations of mathematical language. It was, at least theoretically, 
reversible and consequently time had no place there. 
 This created, however, a clear dualism: on one side the world of the spatially 
extended, geometric bodies, res extensa, knowable entirely by mathematics, and on the 
other side, the realm of mind, without extension, res cogitans, whose essence is thought 
and whose activity was mainly mathematical deductive operations. Descartes seemed not to 
be very interested in res cogitans; and he never appealed to final causes to explain what 
happens in the realm of the mind.5 The passivity of matter is a consequence of this 
Cartesian dualism. This led to the creation of the mechanist ontology: matter was 
considered perfectly inert and deprived of any sensibility or conscience; movement is no 
                                                 
4 This discussion appears in Meditations 5 and 6. DESCARTES, R., Meditation on first philosophy, trans. J. 
Cottingham, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986. It appears also in DESCARTES, R., Principles of 
Philosophy, trans. V. R. Miller and R. Miller, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983, Part 1 section 
53. 
5 BURTT, E. A., As Bases Metafísicas da Ciência Moderna, Brasília, Editora UnB, p. 95. 
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longer a symptom of inherent life, and is not guided by telos any more, but is a 
consequence only of external circumstances, basically the result of shocks or impacts. 
 Leibniz saw as his project the task of synthesising a union between the old pre-
modern philosophy, based on formal and final causes, and the new philosophy which gave 
preference to efficient causes. In this regard this was consonant with his eclecticism. He 
valued the mechanistic mode of explanation, but he affirmed with emphasis that this 
method has its foundation in the proper final doctrine of the cause. Finally, Leibniz 
considered that the same reconciliation of the two methods would be of great advantage for 
the proper scientific and particular knowledge of things. 
 But the question remains as to what degree Leibniz was successful in this enterprise. 
The result of his effort is summarised in the Monadology. It is my objective to investigate 
whether the philosophical tradition can justify or support some of the arguments that are 
basic to the system of Leibniz (for example, that the monads have no window to the 
exterior word, a phrase that summarises the structure of Monadology). 
 In following this historical enquiry I have also been led by some consideration of the 
Italian philosopher Rodolfo Mondolfo. As a member of the historicist school, Mondolfo 
stressed that the constitution of any reality can be found and reveals itself in its process of 
formation. To defend this point, Mondolfo quoted the founder of the modern philosophy of 
history, G. Vico, who discussed in his work Politics the necessity of genetic study for the 
understanding of reality: “the nature of things is their birth” and “in any field … we would 
get a better intuition of reality, if we considered the things in their process of development 
and beginning with its first origin.”6 These notions are basic to historicism, that is, the 
doctrine that reality is historical and consequently all knowledge is historical knowledge. 
  In this direction Mondolfo condemned as error all non-historical attitudes of 
philosophers, and insisted on the necessity of historical reconstruction as the foundation 
and previous condition for theoretical investigation. This kind of investigation will follow 
the development of the problem, its multiple aspects, the many possible solutions that were 
attempted in order to solve it and the consequences that these solutions produced. Mondolfo 
also recalled that an historical enquiry was not only valuable to show the discoveries and 
                                                 
6 MONDOLFO, R. Problemas e Métodos Investigação na História da Filosofia. São Paulo, Editora Mestre 
Jou, 1969, p. 35. 
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truths expressed by the antecessors but also for the recognition of their mistakes, and even 
the process that led to these mistakes, because these are also useful ways to knowledge. 
Furthermore, in retracing the tradition we can identify some of Leibniz’s hidden 
assumptions. This is important because as Mercer and Sleigh stated: “Leibniz neither states 
his most fundamental assumptions nor explains how he arrived at his conclusions.”7 
 Concerning the historical method, it is necessary to remember that Vico was a strong 
anti-Cartesian. In fact, there is a coincidence between Vico’s anti-Cartesian views and 
Leibniz’s criticisms of Descartes, Leibniz being a probable influence on Vico himself.8 It 
was Leibniz who re-introduced the entelechies of Aristotle, which he called monads, as the 
ultimate foundation of reality. These entities retain the traces or memory of everything that 
happens to them. Therefore time is essential to this conception of ultimate reality. Thus the 
historical research method that we are using is itself related to a conception of reality, 
which is itself evolving. 
  
                                                 
7 Mercer & Sleigh, in JOLLEY, p. 71. 
8 CABRAL , R .in Logos, Enciclopedia Luso-Brasileira de Filosofia, v.5, Editorial Verba, Lisboa, p.483. 
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Chapter I – Context of this Thesis and Rationale for the 
Philosophers Chosen 
 
 
In the introduction I presented my reasons for choosing the historical method as my 
approach to Leibniz’s philosophy. In this chapter I want to briefly outline the situation 
regarding recent historical studies on Leibniz, mainly among English-speaking scholars. I 
also present an explanation for my selection of the philosophers whom I examine as 
antecedents of Leibniz  
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell wrote one of the best 
studies about Leibniz, renewing the interest in that philosopher. But Russell initially 
considered the picture presented in the most famous work of Leibniz, the Monadology, as a 
“kind of fantastic story of fairies, coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary.”9 Wilson explains 
his reaction: “Why a theory which is so obviously false, which is probably the falsest 
theory in the history of philosophy, should be the basis of the fame of a great man was a 
question which Russell, at the beginning of this century, realised and demanded an 
answer.”10 
 This riddle demanded an explanation but Russell rejected using the historical 
approach to solve it. In the preface to the first edition of his work, Russell explained that 
the process of development by means of which the philosopher reaches his opinion 
constitutes an important and interesting problem, but it is irrelevant in respect of the 
discovery of the degree to which his opinion is correct. The successive philosophies, he 
says, can be compared with few or no consideration regarding their meaning; the influences 
can be demonstrated without any comprehension of the system whose causal relations are 
under discussion. Russell concludes that the “philosophic truth or falsehood, in short, rather 
than historical facts are what demand our attention in the inquiry.”11 
                                                 
9 RUSSELL, B., A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
1964, p xiii.. 
10 WILSON, C., Leibniz’s Metaphysics: a Historical and Comparative Study, Princeton N. J., Princeton 
University Press, 1989, p. 321. 
11 RUSSELL., p. xx. 
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 After reading Discours de Metaphysique and the letters to Arnauld, Russell 
formulated an interpretation that regards logic as the core of his metaphysics, and 
consequently argued that Leibniz’s theory of substance proceeds from his logic. Russell 
conceived that the entire system could be rigidly deduced from a few simple premises or 
axioms. Basically, the main premises are that every proposition has a subject (such a 
subject is called a substance) and a predicate, and that the predicate (the consequent) is in 
the subject (the antecedent). Couturat presented a view very similar to Russell’s only one 
year later.12 Consequently, the Russell–Couturat account gained strength and became very 
influential. 
 Against the Russell–Couturat position, two important historical studies of Leibniz 
have recently appeared in English: Catherine Wilson’s Leibniz Metaphysics- a historical 
and comparative study (1989) and Christia Mercer’s Leibniz’s Metaphysics – Its Origins 
and Developments (2001).13 Both philosophers considered the insufficiency of Russell’s 
approach  
 In this respect Catherine Wilson’s “governing assumption” is that the words of a 
philosopher so distant from us in time “cannot be determined by an internal inspection of 
his texts” because this method “leaves too much undecided”.14 The resolution of 
indeterminacies, insofar as it is possible, requires historical and comparative analysis. 
Wilson follows the evolution of Leibniz’s metaphysics while considering how a wide range 
of great philosophers and minor figures contributed and influenced Leibniz’s project.  
 For Mercer the Russell–Couturat interpretation “sheds virtually no light on the 
motivation behind Leibniz’s metaphysics” and she insisted that we will not grasp the 
elaborate metaphysics of Leibniz without a “good deal of historical and textual work. In 
this direction, Mercer claimed to provide “the first systematic account of Leibniz’s 
philosophical development”. She emphasised the fundamental importance of theological 
considerations and his Platonism, and placed less importance on Leibniz’s engagement with 
mechanistic philosophy. In part one of her work she stressed the eclectic method that 
Leibniz adopted from his teachers Jakob Thomasius and Johann Adam Scherzer. In part 
                                                 
12 COUTURAT, L. La Logique de Leibniz: d'après des Documents Inédits, Paris, Alcan, 1901. 
13MERCER, C., Leibniz’s Metaphysic – Its Origins and Developments, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
14 WILSON p. 2. 
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two she discussed the “Metaphysics of Substance” of Aristotelian character, and in part 3 
she stressed Leibniz’s Platonism. Precisely here she found further evidence for the eclectic 
methodology ascribed to Leibniz in part one, since this system “handsomely combines”, in 
her view “Platonist assumptions about unity and diversity [...] with Aristotelian 
assumptions about causal self-sufficiency”15  
 The stress on Leibniz’s Platonism also appears in Wilson. But in her view, Leibniz 
appears as a Neo-Platonist. Plotinus, she said, is his “closest philosophical relative”: the 
two share the fineness of analysis and “a vision of the hidden and multiple perfections of 
the world.”16 But it is clear that the Neo-Platonism was not a monolithic building itself. In 
this sense Leibniz considered that modern Neo-Platonists like Cudworth had distorted the 
original Platonism. Thus it was valuable to see, in the fifth chapter of Wilson’s book, 
reference to Leibniz's debate regarding the plastic natures of the Platonists of Cambridge, 
Cudworth and More.17 
 From what I have already said in the introduction to this thesis it should be clear that 
I share with Wilson and Mercer the emphasis on the need for an historical perspective, and 
I consider that this was the great shortcoming of Russell’s work on Leibniz. That work 
seems to suggest that Leibniz’s theories developed simply out of his own mind and that he 
was not trying to solve problems proposed by the philosophical tradition. For as Wilson 
said, “what a philosopher means to say can only be grasped in the light of the choices 
actually open to him, and these are defined by his relation to past and present authors”18 
 However I did not see the need for a careful study of the development of Leibniz’s 
ideas in his own lifetime since this work has already been done very well by Mercer and 
Wilson. My focus was rather on the comparison with great schools, concerning the relation 
of the doctrine of One and its relation with the problem of vitalism. I agree with Wilson’s 
contention that Plotinus is his “closest philosophical relative” But I differ from Mercer, 
because I make a clear distinction between Plotinus and Plato. This distinction is essential 
in my objective of investigating whether the philosophical tradition can justify or support 
some of the arguments that are basic to Leibniz’s system of (for example, that the monads 
                                                 
15 MERCER, p. 378. 
16 WILSON, p. 4. 
17 WILSON p. 160. 
18 WILSON, p. 2. 
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have no window to the exterior word, a phrase that summarises the structure of the 
Monadology). 
          In writing a philosophical monograph it is a common practice to choose a specific 
problem of a certain philosopher and then proceed to analyse it. In this particular work I 
could not follow this strategy too closely and narrow the focus of attention to a single 
problem because my problem was how to exactly understand how Leibniz built the eclectic 
structure of his system; how he joined parts and ideas that he took from other philosophers 
and schools. This task, by its own nature, leads to the problems which come from anti-
specialisation, because the objective here is to show how Leibniz managed to harmonise the 
parts in a whole. However, due to Leibniz’s encyclopaedic erudition, I obviously could not 
cover all his background and influences, and even those that I do consider could not be 
treated exhaustively. For my objective it was not necessary to cover the entire span of 
influences that we can find in the work of Leibniz.  
 My guiding idea was to make a selection of what is most relevant and necessary to 
reveal the structure of his system. Thus, I discuss only the key concepts at the basis of his 
system and, to achieve this objective, the strategy was to review some of the key influences 
on Leibniz in such a way that the key steps of the construction of the Monadology could be 
revealed. 
 In addition, because my interest is mainly the doctrine of the One and its relation to 
the vitalism of the Monadology, other parts of his philosophy, for instance, the theories 
about the Universal Characteristic or the details of his physics will not be treated, although 
I am fully aware that Leibniz considered everything linked in a system. 
 My focus was solely the main figures of the Neo-Platonist tradition and, for this 
reason, I found it necessary to include the two first chapters to expose the foundations of 
this tradition. For this reason I have not included a detailed discussion of Descartes, who 
was an important influence on Leibniz, nor Spinoza or even Bruno, even though I do refer 
to them when their work is relevant to the issues under discussion. 
 The philosopher I regard as the single most important influence on Leibniz was 
Plotinus, and for this reason the chapter dedicated to him is the most important. Thus, I 
have devoted the third chapter to Plotinus who, in my view, expressed a system that is most 
similar to the Monadology. Leibniz’s final system, which was exposed in a summary form 
14 
 
of that short treatise, has as its main structuring doctrine the Neo-Platonic notion of “All in 
All”, an adage which can mean that each part of the universe represents the whole or that 
each part is a micro-cosmos that reproduces the totality of the cosmos in a contracted way. 
This doctrine is not prominent in the writings of Aristotle. However, for the Neo-Platonists, 
it was the coherent solution for the problem of One–Many; it was presented more explicitly 
by Plato in the Timaeus and supported by the discussion in the Parmenides dialogue. 
Accordingly, it is perhaps in Neo-Platonism, more precisely in Plotinus, that we will find 
the eclectic system beneath Leibniz’s philosophical system.  
 The first two chapters are necessary then for an understanding of both Plotinus and 
Leibniz. The first chapter deals with a discussion of the precise meaning of unity, a process 
that originated with the Pythagoreans. The Neo-Platonists were said to be very interested in 
the Pythagoreans’ doctrines, and the Timaeus is said to be a Pythagorean work of Plato. 
The discussion that Parmenides and the atomists achieved in the Pre-Socratic period 
regarding the conceptualisation of the One is also important. In this chapter I mention the 
figure of Melissus who clearly understood the paradoxical character of the notion of unity. 
 In the second chapter I will deal with the philosophy of Aristotle, an important source 
of the theory of substance and the pan-vitalism of Leibniz, that is, the notion that the last 
constituents of reality are units endowed with life and perception. In this part of this chapter 
I used Merlan’s interpretation of some aspects of the notion of substance. My choice of 
Merlan’s interpretation rests in the fact that he posits the notions of Aristotle as a crucial 
contribution to the Neo-Platonist doctrine. The importance of Aristotle is also found in 
Leibniz’s use of the logic of predicates and his stress on the principle of contradiction. The 
interest in Merlan’s interpretation of Aristotle is not that it is superior to others, indeed, I do 
not think that it is. However, what is striking in his reading is the way that Aristotle is read 
in a manner that suited the later developments of his views by the Neo-Platonists, who were 
as much Neo-Aristotelians as Neo-Platonists. This reading of Aristotle is the one from 
which we see the characteristic doctrines of the Neo-Platonists as developing naturally and, 
moreover, leading further to the doctrines we see in Leibniz himself. 
 But the philosophy of Aristotle is not totally consistent with Leibniz’s system of and 
some aspects are in opposition to it. Somehow, some aspects of Aristotle are compatible 
15 
 
with the theories derived from Neo-Platonism that were in direct opposition to the 
philosophical choices made by Leibniz.  
 Thus, in the fourth chapter I discuss a movement that departs from the ideas of 
Leibniz, with some Neo-Platonic ideas, Proclus, which leads to the theories of Platonists of 
Cambridge (which includes Clarke), who are in direct opposition to Leibniz. 
 In the fifth chapter, I discuss the tradition of philosophical studies in optics which 
probably provided Leibniz with his famous metaphor that monads are mirrors of the 
universe. This tradition is also in debt to Aristotle and Proclus and consequently here again 
we have a problem of consistency with Leibniz’s project  
 The sixth chapter is a concluding chapter and compares Leibniz with the Renaissance 
Neo-Platonist Nicholas of Cusa. Why the choice of Cusa here and not any other figure of 
that period, for example, Ficino? Cusa is important in this work because he consistently 
derived consequences from the Neo-Platonic central doctrine of All-in-All that Leibniz 
avoided. In some sense Cusa re-stated the notion that was already asserted by Melissus in 
ancient times, that the concept of unity is necessarily paradoxical, otherwise we fall again 
into a certain dualism. Thus, if we want to explain the ultimate unified reality, which 
implies going beyond dualities, it is necessary to accept the doctrine of the coincidence of 
opposites. The doctrine presented in Learned Ignorance is essential, I consider, to a proper 
analysis of the Monadology of Leibniz. The work of Cusa, properly corrected by Bruno, is 
also important for understanding the path that leads to Spinoza. 
 The aim of the thesis, then, is to explore the key antecedents to Leibniz’s central 
doctrines and to show that some unresolved tension in that tradition resulted in the structure 
of Leibniz’s system.  
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Chapter II – Pythagoreans and Leibniz 
 
 
The problem that we intend to address in this chapter is the question of the definition of the 
philosophical concept of unity. Unity is the most central concept in Leibniz. In fact, one of 
his central terms, “monad,” or unity, possibly has its origin in the Pythagorean sect. I want 
to present here a short summary of the views the Pythagoreans had about unity and the 
subsequent discussion on the nature of the discrete and the continuous made by the Eleatics 
and the Atomists. The Pythagoreans developed theories about the origin of objective unity 
which are not only mathematical but also biological and cosmological at the same time; 
thus the discussion of unity has consequences for these other fields. I argue in this chapter 
that it was from this discussion that the Neo-Pythagorean concept of unity appeared and it 
is different in important ways from the original Pythagorean notion. It is this Neo-
Pythagorean concept of unity that is the basis of Leibniz’s idea of monad.  
  A second question that is treated in this chapter, which is closely connected with the 
first objective, is the problem of how to connect a mathematical vision of reality with a 
vitalist understanding of nature (which historically was exemplified by the philosophy of 
Aristotle). Leibniz tried to theorise a deep connection of these two approaches. In this his 
inspiration may have come from Pythagorean tradition. This task was facilitated by the fact 
that Aristotle also made a profound study of the Pythagoreans and he is one of our main 
sources of information about the Pythagoreans. Leibniz, in his own praise of the 
Pythagoreans states their concern both with the science of the soul (life) and mathematics: 
 
I have the highest opinion of Pythagoras, and I almost believe that he was 
superior to all other ancient philosophers, since he founded not only 
mathematics, but also the science of incorporeal, having discovered that famous 
doctrine, worthy of a whole hecatomb, that all souls are eternal.19 
 
                                                 
19 ROSS, G. M. “Leibniz and Renaissance Neoplatonism”, In WOOLHOUSE, R. S. (ed.) Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz – Critical Assessment, London, Routledge, vol. IV, p. 500. 
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 His high praise for the Pythagorean doctrines emphasises aspects we will explore 
below. 
*** 
To ascertain whether Leibniz was faithful to the Pythagoreans, we need to review some of 
their basic theories. This review is also important because the Pythagoreans are at the root 
of the entire Western Philosophy. To do this it is necessary first to recognise that the 
information we have is fragmentary. 
 It is well known that Pythagoras did not leave any written work or even fragments of 
a work. The teaching in the Pythagorean sect was carried out orally and the members were 
required to remain silent and to respect the secrecy of the doctrines. As a consequence, all 
that we know today about these doctrines is very conjectural, and many misunderstandings 
that have occurred in ancient Greece and also today can be, in part, attributed to this 
demand for secrecy. Thus it is rather difficult to give a coherent description of the 
Pythagorean cosmology and we have more than one version of the explanation of unity. 
Besides Plato, our main early sources are the expositions in the works of Aristotle (who 
was unsympathetic to their claims) and a few fragments of the pre-Socratic Pythagorean, 
Philolaus.  
 It seems also that the Pythagorean cosmology has some resemblance to the Milesian. 
It was Anaximander who first said that everything and all the worlds arise from an eternal 
substance which he called infinity or apeiron (Unlimited). This substance was supposed to 
be the source of eternal motion, because it was alive and immortal. It was this motion that 
separated the pair of opposite powers (Light and Night) whose later interaction produced 
the creation of worlds. 
 We can relate the thesis of Pythagoras also to that of the other Milesian, Anaximenes, 
who called this primary substance air (pneuma). Like Anaximander he considered this 
substance not only divine and in eternal motion but also one and unlimited. But the air was 
also the psyche or the “breath of life”, both of humans and of the universe as a whole, as we 
can see by one of few fragments that has been passed down to us: “just as our soul, being 
air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole universe.”20 
                                                 
20 FREEMAN K., Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948, p. 19. 
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 From this short account of the Milesian view we can observe some relationship to the 
Pythagorean cosmology. Thus we know that for the Pythagoreans the world is a divine and 
living creature, with the form of a sphere, which grows breathing in the air from the infinite 
or Unlimited which surrounds it. The visible universe also inhales time and the void of the 
Unlimited. There is also evidence that the Pythagoreans considered the cosmos as formed 
of the five elements, as stated by Philolaus: “The bodies (physical elements) of the cosmic 
Sphere are five: the Fire in the Sphere, and the Water, and the Earth, and Air, and fifth, the 
vehicle (hull) of the Sphere.”21  
 In fact, in the Pythagorean picture of the universe, the air of Anaximenes and the 
apeiron of Anaximander can be translated as the fifth element or aither. This is the 
surrounding pre-cosmic substance, which will form the cosmic egg (the hull of the sphere) 
from which the other elements were hatched and produced by different proportions. In 
ancient thought the fifth element is also compared with mind (whose eternal motion is a 
circular movement) and also with time (Aion or eternity), and even space. We have a 
variety of expressions to refer to this same substance, which is what makes Guthrie’s 
comparison pertinent:  
 
This ‘surrounding’ was of pure and higher nature, everlasting, alive, and 
intelligent – in fact divine, this description applies to the aperiron of 
Anaximander, the air of Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia, perhaps also 
to the logos-fire of Heraclitus. The Pythagoreans held that the cosmos ‘breathed 
in’ from an infinite breath outside it, and there are grounds for thinking that the 
dogmatic basis for Orphic or similar religious systems was the same.22 
 
 In some interpretations of the Pythagorean cosmology we will find the source of 
unity and order of the created cosmos in the element of fire, the first element generated by 
                                                 
21 FREEMAN, K., p. 75. Aetius, based on Theophrastus, explains this matter better. He ascribes to Pythagoras 
the idea that the element earth was made from a cube; the element fire from a pyramid, the air from 
octahedron; the water from the icosahedrons and from the dodecahedron is made the container for the other 
four, and this is equated as the sphere of the whole. In the Timaeus of Plato we find the idea of the 
equivalence of the elements with the solids and that the fifth is equivalent to the universe as a whole. 
GUTHRIE, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, 
p. 267. 
22 GUTHRIE, p. 272. 
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the progenitor fifth element. Guthrie stresses the centrality of this first element and the 
formal aspect that it assumes in relation to the material aspect, which turns out to be the 
fifth element. The masculine and formative element presents itself as a fire-unit (the origin 
of the term focus) that develops itself as a seed in the womb of a receptive substance. 
Therefore the universe as a living being grows from a seed and from the centre outwards: 
 
… for the Pythagoreans the centre was occupied by fire. The unit-seed, then, 
physically considered, was of the nature of fire, and we can see what lay behind 
the brief doxographic statement in Aëtius that ‘Pythagoras derived the world 
from fire and fifth element.’ The active or formative element was the fiery unit; 
the living material on which it fed was identified with air or breath, but was in 
fact that substance embracing or cradling the world in which most of the Pre-
Socratics believed, and which later cosmologists distinguished as a separated 
fifth element.23 
 
 But Burnet said that Pythagoras identified the Limit with fire (and the Boundless with 
darkness).24 In fact, the Limit (to peras) with the Unlimited (to apeiron) formed the two 
contrasting principles of reality that we find in the fifth-century B.C. Pythagorean, 
Philolaus: “Nature in the cosmos was fitted together from the Unlimited and the Limit, the 
order of all as well as everything in it.”25According to the previous quotation from Guthrie, 
the central seed of cosmos was made of fire. However, Burnet tells us that Limit is 
identified with fire. From the above we notice the following equivalence: the principles of 
limit were identified with the formal unit (or the seed) and the Unlimited with the material 
aither. Thus we have two theories: Philolaus’ pair of opposites: Limited and Unlimited and 
a theory of derivation of a unit from the Unlimited, a process that implies that they are of 
the same kind. 
                                                 
23 GUTHRIE, p. 281. 
24 BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, London, Adam Charles Black, 1971, p. 109. 
25 “All existing things must necessarily be either Limiting, or Non-Limited, or both Limiting and Non-
Limited. But they could not be merely Non-Limited (nor merely Limited). Since however it is plain that they 
are neither wholly from the Limiting nor wholly from the Non-Limited, clearly then the universe and its 
contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Non-Limited.” FREEMAN, K., p. 73. 
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 Guthrie referred in another way to the existence of these two schools of 
Pythagoreans:  
 
… it is not to be doubted that for all Pythagoreans alike the unit stood for what 
is limited in opposition to the infinite or undefined (apeiron). The only 
difference between the two schools is that whereas one of them identified it 
with the active principle of limit itself, the other saw it as the first product of 
that principle imposing itself on the undifferentiated mass of apeiron …26 
 
 The first part of Guthrie’s account of is more properly a dualist theory and it is 
probably the origin of the account of number that appears in Aristotle. This account is 
based on the table of opposites, and puts the unit on the side of the principle of Limit only 
(it is not a product of the two principles). Aristotle presented two columns that show the 
two principles and their respective manifestations on different levels of reality (Met. 
986a22)27:  
 
    Limit  Unlimited 
    odd  even 
    one  plurality 
    right  left 
    male  female 
    resting  moving  
    straight  curved 
    light  darkness 
    good  bad 
    square  oblong 
. 
                                                 
26 GUTHRIE, p. 247. 
27 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, ed. Ross, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966 (I present the two columns as they 
appear in Guthrie).  
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 This account seems to be equivalent to Euclid’s definition of number, wherein the 
unit was not properly a number but rather the source or origin of numbers.28 The unity is 
what sets limits to the unlimited to create different numbers. Thus, a number is only a 
multitude limited by the unity. This seems to be what Sextus meant when, explaining the 
Pythagorean doctrine, he said: “all numbers fall under the One, since 2 is a single 2 and 3 is 
one particular thing, and 10 is a single compendium of number.”29 Basically, Sextus 
presented the idea of numbers as a category in which, by participation in the one, the many 
are said to be one – which is the same as saying that the one limits the many.  
 But the dialectical interplay of the opposites, Limit and Unlimited, goes beyond the 
creation of the number series. The Pythagoreans held that cosmology runs parallel to the 
birth of mathematical concepts. Both begin in the unit-seed. The following passage of 
Guthrie describes this arithmo-bio-cosmogony:  
 
The cosmic nucleus starts from the unit-seed, which generates mathematically 
the number-series and physically the distinct forms of matter. 
To do this it feeds on the Unlimited outside and imposes forms or limit on 
it. Physically speaking this Unlimited is unformed matter, imaged as breath or 
air; mathematically it is extension not yet delimited by number or figure.30  
 
  In this sense also, Cornford confirmed that Pythagoreans incorporated older 
biological terms in their mathematical language. Thus they had χροία (skin) for surface, 
δύναμις (power) for square, αὕξ·η (growth) for dimension, σῶμα (body) for solid:  
 
These terms are applied to numbers as well as to figures. They were taken from living 
things and fit with the Pythagorean conception of the unit as the ‘seed (σπέρμα) or eternal 
roots (ῥίζα) from which ratios grow or increase   (αὕξονται) reciprocally on either side’. 
                                                 
28 Euclid's Elements, Book VII, Def. 1 and 2, T. L. Heath (translator), Dover, 1956.  
29 Quoted in CORNFORD, F. M., Plato and Parmenides, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958, p. 16 – the 
source of the quotation is adv. phys. Ii, 255–262. 
30 GUTHRIE, p. 340. 
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The unit contains potentially (δυνάεμει) all the forms of even and odd number, ‘as being a 
sort of fountain  (πηγή ) or root (ῥίζη) of both kinds.’31 
  
 The difficulty in this whole conception is the idea of the unity-seed considered as 
Limit. The Limit, regarded as the unit, can account for the appearance of multiplicity. But 
how can it explain the appearance of the first unity? The one considered only as limit or 
formal source of unity of numbers cannot be itself that on which the limit is imposed, that 
is, the material cause of the number one. Thus two is a number because it has a unity 
imposed in its two elements, but what is it that imposes the limit to create each of its 
forming unities? The word “limit” implies something to be limited. If the one is non-
dimensional, it cannot be split like a seed, because it is not composed of multiplicity, which 
it is supposed to generate. Thus the idea of limit regarded as a seed seems to be wrong and 
this is the basis of the objection of Aristotle: “Does number come then, from its elements as 
from seed? But nothing can be excreted from what is indivisible” (Met. 1092 a30). The idea 
of a unit regarded as an indivisible principle which imposes a limit on the Unlimited does 
not enter into this kind of objection, for the limit here means the indivisible formal cause of 
a certain number. Aristotle may be right in saying that the indivisible point cannot generate 
multiplicity in the way a seed does. But it is doubtful that it was this notion that this school 
of Pythagoreans proposed. The growing of the number series was due to the participation of 
the Unlimited in the process, which should account for the use of the biological metaphor. 
 The idea of Limit considered as telos can provide a better understanding of this 
biological conception. The Pythagoreans saw that the whole process of the generation of 
the number series was not strictly mathematical and this conception legitimates the 
equivalence in the table presented by Aristotle. Thus in this table both the one and the Limit 
are made equivalent with the good. Presumably the Pythagoreans supported the idea that 
the good is in the end (in the telos) when the work of the harmonising principle is 
completed (limited). Accordingly, the point is stressed by Aristotle (Met. 1072b30): “The 
Pythagoreans suppose that the supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the 
beginning: for although the beginning of the plants and animals are causes, beauty and 
                                                 
31 CORNFORD, R. M. Plato’s Cosmology, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, note on p. 50. 
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perfection are rather in the outcome.” The idea is also found in the Philebus, considered to 
be one of the Pythagorean dialogues of Plato: anything without telos was considered 
incomplete or unlimited.32  
 So in the Pythagorean generation of numbers we expect to find an equivalence of 
telos. In fact, the Pythagorean cosmos grows from a seed or egg and develops as an 
embryo, and so we can expect that it will develop until the animal cosmic is complete.  
 In the dualist version of the Pythagorean cosmology the egg is born of the marriage 
of two principles. Thus the Pythagorean Philolaus says that the Dyad (Unlimited) is the 
bride of Kronos.33 In fact, in the Pythagorean conception, as we saw, the Unlimited is 
essential for the process of generation. The basic idea is that the forms of nature and the 
Universe as a whole are generated as the numbers were. To be generated means to admit a 
flux or a movement, and this was on the side of the Unlimited in the table of opposites. 
Some authors present the etymological analysis that shows that the word arithmós is related 
to the term from which it originates: rythmós, rhythm.34 Unfortunately this analysis is 
controversial. But it is certain that the term rythmós (measured motion, measure, 
proportion35) derives from the verb rhein, which means to flow (rhein in its turn comes 
from Rhea, the goddess of fertility or generation).36 Because of these attributes Rhea was 
also considered the goddess of life. In this sense, Aristotle (Phys. 203 b 18), reviewing old 
concepts of Unlimited, argues that “if becoming and perishing are not to fail, that which 
comes to be must be drawn from an unlimited store.”  
 Thus it is plausible that the word “number” was, in some sense, apt to acquire the 
meaning of flow, passage or transformation. It is plausible also because in the cosmological 
scheme, the Unlimited was not only an extension considered as unformed matter but also 
the matter of time (which is not the ordered time of the cosmos), although at this level we 
                                                 
32 PLATO, Philebus, trans. J. C. B. Gosling, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. The whole dialogue discusses 
the relationship between Limit (that accounts for telos) and Unlimited. In 16c he says: “and the ancients, who 
are superior to us and dwelt nearer to the Gods, have handed down a tradition that all things that are said to 
exist consist of One and Many and contain in themselves the connate principles of Limit and Unlimitedness.” 
33 FREEMAN, p. 76. 
34 GHYKA, Matila, The Geometry of Art and Life, New York, Dover Publication, Inc., 1977. 
35 WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, MA: G. & C. MERRIAM Co. 1913. 
36 HUFFMAN, C. A., Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1993, p. 351. For 
Huffman the etymological connection between Rhea and flow was made by Xenocrates who was reworking 
Pythagorean ideas and so it has origin in the Academy. Also Plutarch says: “and Zaratas the teacher of 
Pythagoras called this (sc. the indefinite dyad) the mother of the number and the One its father.” Quoted in 
GUTHRIE, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 253. 
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are to suppose no differentiation between space and time. Thus the equivalences are: 
Number = matter (of time) = unlimited = moving.  
 Only if the Limit is coupled with the Unlimited can we have the generation of a 
complete form, a body. Rhea must marry with Kronos, the representation of One, to 
produce reality. In other versions the metaphor of marriage is replaced by that of breathing. 
The first unit-seed proceeds to generate, by breathing in the Unlimited, the mathematical 
objects, following two stages: first the generation of numbers and then the generation of 
geometrical solids. In both cases we are heading toward a limit or telos because the whole 
process was conceived as a growing toward a completion. The paradigmatic telos necessary 
for any geometrical form was conceived as contained in the first four numbers: the point, 
the line, the surface, and the solid are represented respectively as “limited” by the numbers 
1, 2, 3 and 4 – and they are generated in the same order (the idea is also associated with the 
four elements – fire is to earth as 1 is to 4).37 The model is the biological growth of a seed 
as it appears in Theon’s interpretation of the tetractys, where we still have the idea of the 
unit-seed: “The sixth tetractys is of things that grow (…): the seed is analogous to the unit 
and point, growth in length to 2 and the line; growth in breadth to 3 and the surface; growth 
in thickness to 4 and the solid.”38 When it reaches 4 the process reaches the complete form, 
or the body, that is, the process reaches its final telos. 39 
 With time the Pythagorean conception was refined. In an improved version the 
dimensions are created by the stretching or fluxion of the line which begins in a non 
dimensional point. This theory was developed later in the fluxion theory (which says that a 
line is a fluxion of a point, etc.) a view which arises more or less at the time of Plato. The 
basic idea is that the point is the beginning of dimension, but not itself a dimension. It is the 
movement (an attribute of the Unlimited) or the fluxion which really creates a dimension. 
The following passage from the Neo-Pythagorean Nichomachus of Gerasa reflects this:  
 
Unity, then, occupying the place and the character of a point, will be the 
beginning of intervals and of numbers, but not itself an interval or a number, 
                                                 
37 RAVEN J. E., Pythagoreans and Eleatics , Cambridge University Press, 1948, p. 15. 
38 CORNFORD, Parmenides. and Plato., p. 19. 
39 The Pythagoreans regarded the geometric point as equivalent to the arithmetical unit. The only difference is 
that the point is a “unit having position.” BURNET, J., Greek Philosophy, New York, Macmillan, 1968, p. 66. 
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just as the point is the beginning of a line, or an interval, but is not itself line or 
interval. Indeed, when a point is added to a point, it makes no increase, for 
when a non-dimensional thing is added to another non-dimensional thing, it 
will not thereby have dimension … Unity, therefore, is non-dimensional and 
elementary, and dimension first is found and seen in 2, then in 3, then in 4, and 
in succession in the following numbers, for dimensional is that which is 
conceived of as between two limits. The first dimension is called ‘line’, for 
‘line’ is that which is extended in one direction. Two dimensions are called 
‘surface’, etc.40 
 
 This explanation partially removes the objection of Aristotle: it is not the non-
dimensionality of the point that creates the dimension but the movement of it. But the 
puzzle remains: we have the dimension limited but never the point itself. The dimension, 
interval or line, can be limited infinitely, but it will always be a dimension or something of 
multiplicity. Was this the meaning of the Pythagorean myth, that the Limit was associated 
with the Unlimited or that it was begotten by it?  
 This leads us to the other version of the Pythagorean unity which also faces 
Aristotle’s objection. We find it in a fragment of Philolaus referred to by Stobeus: “The 
first thing fitted together, the one in the middle of the sphere, is called hearth.”41 The one or 
hearth is regarded as the first combination of the two principles, the Unlimited and Limited, 
or, to express it another way, the one is the first product of the imposition of Limit on the 
Unlimited. Stobeus is a late writer, but this version is also found in Aristotle. Referring to 
the two principles, he wrote:  
 
There need be no doubt whether the Pythagoreans attribute generation to them 
or not; for they say plainly that when the one had been constructed, whether out 
of planes or surface or of a seed or of elements which they cannot express, 
immediately the nearest part of the unlimited began to be constrained and 
limited by the limit. (Met. 1091a13–22).  
                                                 
40 Quoted in GUTHRIE, p. 261. 
41 HUFFMANN, C. A., Philolaus of Croton, p. 62. 
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Further evidence for the fact that the Pythagoreans proposed this kind of unity is the 
method of Eurytus, the disciple of Philolaus, in which pebbles (calculi) were arranged in a 
certain form to imitate a figure of a man or a horse, or anything else.42 In these passages we 
have the suggestion of a conception that unities necessarily have magnitude, they contain 
something of the Unlimited, which is of the nature of space. The pebbles or seeds, even the 
tiny ones, are constructed out of planes. In this sense, Burnet recalled that Zeller insisted 
that in the Pythagorean cosmology the numbers were spatial.43 
 Now the role attributed to the Unlimited was conceived also as introducing intervals 
of void in the unity as a way to create multiplicity, as the process of breathing continues. 
Aristotle explained this aspect:  
 
The Pythagoreans also asserted the existence of the Void, and that there comes 
into the Heaven, from unlimited breath which keeps things distinct, the Void 
regarded as a sort of separation or division between things that are next to one 
another; and this occurs first in numbers, for the Void keeps their natures 
distinct. (Phys. 213b, 22).  
 
Thus the two is created from the unit-seed when this is split by the void inhaling from the 
Unlimited. This explanation seems crude, but the idea of growth can be applied here too: 
the one splits in two because of its growth, like the multiplication of cells in a seed. The 
unity here can be separated in two, since it is of the nature of unlimited. Mathematically 
and physically the extended magnitudes or units are separated by the void, which is not an 
absolute nothing that would make the unities touch each other. Rather, this relative void 
was thought to have some kind of tenuous corporeity known as air, pneuma or breath. With 
this concept in mind, Aristotle considered that the Pythagoreans regarded all things as 
numbers (Met. 1083b16). Aristotle claims that this is an incorrect idea, since mathematics 
for him deals only with eternal objects.  
                                                 
42 This theory is mentioned in Met. 1092B10. 
43 BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1930, p. 291. 
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 Aristotle managed to identify the difficulty of their theory. The core of the confusion 
of formal cause with the material cause, which allows them to say that all things are 
composed of numbers, lies in the notion that number had magnitude:  
 
the Pythagoreans also (sc. as well as Speusippus) recognise a single type of 
number, mathematical number, but not as existing apart from sensible things 
(sc. which was the view of the Platonists in general), which they regard as 
being composed of it. They in fact construct the whole universe out of numbers, 
not however truly monadic numbers, for they suppose the units possess 
magnitude (Met. 1080.16).  
 
 According to Aristotle, Plato followed the Pythagoreans in most things, but differed 
from the Pythagoreans in holding that the numbers are distinct from sensible things. 
However, the doctrine of Ideas is basically of Pythagorean origin, with the difference that 
the ideas or forms are placed in the intelligible realm. Aubenque refers to the fact that in 
Plato’s non-written teachings, preserved in part by Aristotle, the two principles of One 
(Limit) and Dyad (Unlimited) engender the ideal numbers; and these in their turn engender 
the world of ideas or forms.44 
 To better understand the Aristotelian evaluation of the Pythagoreans’ concept of 
unity, we need to recall the Eleatics’ theory of One.  
 
Eleatics 
. 
Santillana, Cornford (whose views are based on Tannery), Burnet and Raven defended the 
same point of view, arguing that it was the usage of the principle of Unity along with the 
discourse of cosmogony that elicited criticism from Parmenides, who was Pythagorean 
before becoming a dissident. They said that the Pythagoreans were the main object of the 
Eleatics’ attack . But the Eleatics’ fragments are also vague and their ambiguity perplexed 
even the ancients. In fact, some Neo-Platonists saw Parmenides’ theory of One as a 
complement of the Pythagorean cosmology. Syrianus, for example, regarded Parmenides as 
                                                 
44 AUBENQUE, P., Plotino e o Neoplatonismo, In CHATELET, F., História da Filosofia, Rio de Janeiro, 
Zahar Editores, 1981, p. 202. 
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a very faithful Pythagorean (like Plato, Socrates and Empedocles).45 But since it seems that 
Plato tried to refute Parmenides, we can suppose that the first hypothesis has stronger 
evidence.  
 If we follow the most traditional interpretation, we have a picture of Parmenides 
using the demonstrative technique that he learned from Pythagorean geometry to object 
that, if the principle of Unity was maintained as the ultimate principle, reason constrains us 
to abandon any kind of cosmogony. His criticism, as our historians maintain, was mainly 
directed at the Pythagorean conception of the opposites, the One and Many. Thus it was 
non-sense to conceive that the original One could be split or multiplied into two principles 
and then into many, thus creating a cosmos. For Parmenides, the logical consequences of 
the concept of Unity include the characteristics of timelessness, indivisibility and 
changelessness. These attributes exclude the possibility of any birth of the cosmos or any 
kind of development of unit-seeds into a multiplicity. If we take the One consistently, we 
have to deny everything else. Accordingly, it is implicit that in taking the One we also 
reject any kind of multiplicity. For Parmenides, this Unity is the Being (what it is). As it is 
in a kind of eternal now, it cannot come-into-being, from which we deduce the 
impossibility of cosmogonies. He said:  
 
… Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it is the whole of 
limb, without motion, and without end. And never Was, nor Will Be, because it 
is now, a Whole altogether, One continuous; for what creation of it will look 
for? How, whence (could it have) sprung? Nor shall I allow you to speak of it 
as springing from Non-being; for neither is expressible nor thinkable that What-
Is-Not.46  
 
And this means that “for it is the same thing to think and to be.” 47 
                                                 
45 O’MEARA, Dominic, Pythagoras Revived, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990. Szabo also said that the 
Pythagoreans did not contest Parmenides’ theory of One, but they tried to “develop it further.” SZABO, A., 
The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics, Boston, Reidel, 1978, p. 263. 
46 FREEMAN, p. 43. 
47 FREEMAN, p. 43.The expression “whole of limb” may mean “it is wholly perfect”. 
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 The fullness of the Being is stressed: “Nor is the Being divisible, since it is all alike. 
Nor is there anything (here or) there which could prevent it from holding together, nor any 
lesser thing, but all is full of Being. Therefore it is altogether continuous.”48  
 For many interpreters this point means that the continuous is of the mind’s nature 
itself, and cannot be perceived as a sensible object. In fact, it contradicts all of our sensible 
experience, and for this reason it should be considered without validity and delusional. 
Thus, despite his logical structure, Parmenides’ poem suggests a mystical inspiration and 
his vision of the One suggests this divine approach: a perfect and complete entity which has 
the most perfect geometrical shape, the sphere. 
 In Parmenides’ fragments the rejection of the idea that a general principle of unity 
could generate a multiplicity is presupposed, but he does not discuss the theory of monads 
or numbers. It was only implicit in his defense of the absolute unity of the One (with its 
associated notion of continuity) that the existence of any discrete entity was impossible.  
 It was Zeno, one of his disciples, who specifically attacked the theory that things 
consist of a plurality of units. Simplicius preserved a commentary of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias on this passage, which gives some force to the thesis of Burnet, Raven and 
Cornford about the relationship between the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans: “As Eudemos 
relates, Zeno the disciple of Parmenides tried to show that it was impossible that things 
could be many, seeing that there was no unit in things, whereas many means a number of 
units.”49 
 Zeno tried to expose the pitfalls that appear when we regard the unit, point and atom 
as extended entities for forming things. He showed that we are meant to deal with the 
question of the infinite divisibility of geometrical magnitudes – the question of the 
continuous. The theory that regarded things as equated with many discrete units spatially 
extended was logically incompatible with the truly continuous, which is presupposed by the 
consistent notion of unity as proposed by Parmenides. If we suppose that things are 
composed of units with some magnitude, other consequences follow. In the second part of 
fragment 3, Zeno wrote: “If things are many, they will be infinite in number; for there will 
always be other things between, and others again between these. And so things are infinite 
                                                 
48 FREEMAN, p. 43. 
49 BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, London, Adam Charles Black, 1971, p. 315. 
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in number.”50 So if we say that the units that compose things have some magnitude, even a 
minimum magnitude, everything will have infinite size. Even the task of finding elementary 
units will be an impossible task. So we can try to divide a line of some length and we find 
two lines of smaller length, and so on until the infinite. We will never find the original unit 
or point. Aristotle enunciated the consequence of this reasoning: “For if it (the all) is 
divisible at every point there is no one, and therefore no many, and the whole is empty.”51 
 The proponents of the existence of multiple unities cannot face these difficulties by 
hypothetically proposing the alternative of non-extended unity-point-atoms, since other 
paradoxes will appear. If, for instance, the proposal is the existence of the unit without 
magnitude (and so it is indivisible), Zeno points out the consequences: “If it (a unit without 
magnitude) is added to another existing thing, it would not make the latter at all larger. For 
if a thing without magnitude is added (to another thing) the latter cannot gain anything in 
magnitude. And thus (it follows) at once that the thing added is nothing.” 52 The same is true 
with reference to subtraction. Basically the arguments of Zeno defend the idea that 
continuity cannot be analysed in or composed of discrete dimensionless unities.  
 On the other hand, Aristotle rejected Parmenides’ theory of One for many reasons. 
But he seems to have shared, in some sense, the Eleatics’ view that the combination of 
opposites would generate contradiction. As Cornford said: “It was, in fact, Parmenides 
quite as much as Zeno, that had assumed all opposites to be not only contrary but 
contradictory.”53 But he seems to have followed Zeno’s arguments against Pythagorean 
unity. He also considered the notion that numbers have contradictory magnitude, because 
unity by definition cannot have the multiplicity implicit in the concept of magnitude. If it 
has magnitude, it is infinitely divisible and cannot be composed of indivisibles (atomic). 
Therefore, the Pythagorean number is not an atomic (monadic) number, that is, it has no 
substantial unity.54 In this respect Aristotle argued: “For it is not true to speak of indivisible 
spatial magnitudes; and however much there might be magnitudes of this sort, units at least 
                                                 
50 FREEMAN, p. 47. 
51 BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 334 (ARISTOTLE, De gen, corr. A,8,324b35). 
52 FREEMAN, p. 47. 
53 CORNFORD, Parmenides. and Plato. p. 72. 
54 Guthrie said that the expression “monadic” means, according to his commentator, Alexander, unextended 
and incorporeal. GUTHRIE, p. 234. 
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have no magnitude; and how can a magnitude be composed of indivisibles?” (Met. 
1083b10). 
 For Aristotle, both the Pythagoreans’ versions of unity, the non-dimensional and the 
dimensional, are self-contradictory and are consequences of the failure to distinguish 
between the concepts of number and numbered objects.55 He rejected the doctrine of 
substantiality of numbers and the consequence that numbers can be the cause of 
substantiality of individual objects or of forms. He also rejected, as we have seen, the idea 
that Pythagorean unity can be non-dimensional. 
 We can enumerate the main points of Aristotle on the Pythagorean unit. Points 1) and 
2) concern points we have already seen; 3) and 4) are additional points.  
 
1) The Pythagorean unit cannot be non-dimensional or atomic, because as such it cannot 
generate dimension. Besides, if it were atomic, the All would be not continuous but would 
be fragmented by these atomic unities.  
2) It cannot be a dimensional unity, because in this case it can be divided infinitely and 
therefore there will be no ultimate unity or substantiality. “For if it is divisible at every 
point there is no one, and therefore no many, and the whole is empty.”56 In these two 
objections he was following arguments presented by Zeno. But the question still remains as 
to whether the Pythagoreans really proposed this kind of units. 
3) In fact, Aristotle also understood that the Pythagoreans proposed to connect the unity 
(the Limit) and the infinite (the Unlimited) and posited them as substance. In Met. 987a13 
he explained:  
 
But the Pythagoreans have said in the same way that there are two principles, 
but added this much, which is peculiar to them, that they thought that finitude 
and infinity were not attributes of certain things, e.g., of fire or earth or 
anything else of this kind, but that infinity itself and unity itself were the 
substance of the things of which they are predicated. This is why number was 
the substance of all things.  
                                                 
55 CHERNISS, Harold, Aristotle’s criticism of the Presocratic philosophy, Octagon Books Inc., New York 
1964, p. 43. 
56 BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 334 (ARISTOTLE, De gen. corr A, 8, 324b35). 
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Aristotle also rejected this version, because the opposites (in this case the Limit and the 
Unlimited) cannot be the first principles. This argument is the basis of his theory of 
Substance: 
 
All contraries then, are always predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, 
but just as appearance suggests that there is nothing contrary to substance, 
argument confirms this. No contrary, then is the first principle of all things in 
the full sense. (Met. 1087b).  
 
Furthermore, the unity cannot be both finite and infinite at the same time, because this 
violates the principle of contradiction which says that we cannot affirm contrary attributes 
of the same subject/substance at the same time. 
4) In addition, Aristotle rejected the Pythagorean postulation that the infinite can be 
substance, a theory mentioned by him in the Physics, that is, that the Unlimited could be an 
arche.57 He considered that in refuting the substantiality of number, the substantiality of 
infinity was also refuted, because for him the infinite was only an attribute of number.58  
 
 The fairness of Aristotle’s evaluation of the Pythagoreans is regarded as questionable 
by most scholars who have studied this school of thought. He seems to have attacked the 
Pythagoreans only to present his own theory of substance.59 But at least he did not 
condemn all the Pythagoreans’ conceptions about number. Thus in one passage he 
complained that the Pythagoreans posit the infinite both as substance and as divisible into 
parts.60 In another passage he made the same complaint against their use of the notion of 
infinite with other words: “All other thinkers who use it as matter, and for this reason too, it 
                                                 
57 ARISTOTLE, Physics 203a5: “The Pythagoreans and Plato posit the infinite as a thing by itself, not as an 
attribute existing in some other thing (for they do not posit number as existing apart from sensible things) and 
that the infinite exists also outside of the heaven …”  
58 CHERNISS, p. 38. 
59 For instance: “And again, by virtue of what, and when, will mathematical magnitudes be one? For things in 
our perceptible world are one in virtue of the soul, or of apart of soul, or of something else that it is reasonable 
enough; when these are not present, the thing is a plurality, and split up into parts. But in the case of subjects 
of mathematics, which are divisible and quantities, what is the cause of their being one and holding together?” 
Met. 1077A20. 
60 ARISTOTLE, Phys. 204A5. 
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is absurd that they should posit it as containing and not as being contained” (Phys. 208a). 
His intention seems to be to say that the Pythagoreans were right when they proposed that 
Unlimited is what leads to completion in the Limit. In another part of Physics, where he is 
not referring to the Pythagoreans, he seems to have been defending his position as they did:  
 
… the whole and the complete are either entirely the same or quite close in their 
nature. Nothing is complete which has no end, and end is a limit … For the 
infinite is the matter of the completeness of a magnitude and is potentially the 
whole and not actually, and it is distinguished as proceeding in the direction of 
both reduction and its inverse, which is addition; and as for its being a whole 
and finite, it is not so in itself but in virtue of something else. And qua infinite it 
does not contain but is contained; and because of this it is unknowable qua 
infinite, for matter has no form. So it is evident that the infinite is the formula 
of the part rather than in that of a whole (Phys. 207a15).61 
 
 Indeed it is also possible to see that both the Pythagoreans and Aristotle were 
concerned with immanent forms in nature. As we know, Aristotle placed the Platonic ideas, 
which he called forms, within a concrete reality.  
 In this section then I wanted to present the impact of the Eleatics on the formulation 
of the notion of unity. It also demonstrates that some arguments and even the form of 
reasoning used by the Eleatics to evaluate the idea of unity were very similar to those used 
later by Aristotle. 
 
                                                 
61 The other passage in which the continuous is equated to matter is Met. 1036 b7 : “… some people already 
raise the question even in the case of the circle and the triangle, thinking that it is not right to define these by 
reference to lines and to the continuous, but that all these are to the circle or the triangle as flesh and bones are 
to man, and bronze or stone to statue; and they reduce all things to numbers, and they say the formula of ‘line’ 
is that of ‘two’. And of those who assert the Ideas some make two the line-itself and others make it the Form 
of the line.” 
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Melissus and the Atomists 
 
This section discusses the third member of the School of Eleatics. His importance is due to 
his relationship with the School of Atomists. Melissus affirmed that the idea of unity 
necessarily implies that of infinity. In doing this he seemed to be reaffirming the 
Pythagorean pair of opposites, Limit and Unlimited. At the same time, he influenced the 
atomists. These philosophers, by proposing the infinity of atoms, exerted some influence on 
Leibniz. 
 Melissus helped the defence of Parmenides’ theory by perfecting it. The theory of 
Parmenides tried to defend, at least, the logically absolute unity of the Being. But the theory 
was liable to destructive criticism since he claimed that reality is a limited sphere, and we 
could certainly object that the limited sphere presupposes the infinite void around it, which 
was almost the same as the Pythagorean view of a limited cosmos surrounded by the 
unlimited. So the reality was two and not one. It was with these objections in mind that the 
disciple Melissus came to defend the doctrine of the master Parmenides. Basically, 
Melissus shared the same ideas as his master but he introduces important modifications for 
the sake of the coherence of the whole doctrine. For Melissus, therefore, the One cannot be 
limited: it is infinite both spatially and temporally. The arguments he used are as follows: 
(frag. 5) “If it were not One, it will form a boundary in relation to something else.” (frag. 6) 
“If it were infinite, it would be One; for if it were two (these) could not be (spatially) 
infinite, but each would have boundaries in relation to each other.”62 The infinity in time or 
eternity is also stressed along with its equivalence with completeness. Thus, for Melissus 
the idea of an Absolute One logically implies the idea of completeness or totality, since it is 
full and nothing can exist beyond it. The notion of the absolute One also logically implies 
the idea of the infinite: it is One because it is only one, so there is nothing else that can limit 
it, and as a consequence it is unlimited or infinite. Through the absolute One it becomes 
possible to link two ideas that are apparently incompatible: completeness and the infinite. 
These notions complement each other and there is no reason to suppose the priority of one 
aspect over the other. We cannot say that the One is prior to the Infinite. We seem to again 
be facing the same connection that the Pythagoreans faced when they tied the Limit to the 
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Unlimited on the same level. Aristotle also criticised Melissus, because he considered this 
notion self-contradictory: “his argument is rather crude and presents no problem, for 
something absurd is granted, the rest follows, and there is no difficulty in all this” (Phys. 
186a10).  
 With regard to Melissus there is a further fragment, which Burnet called the most 
remarkable, number 8, the first sentence of which says: “If Things were many, They would 
have to be of the same kind as I say the One is.” 
 This statement was not a proposal. But, according to Burnet, Melissus was able to see 
that it would be the only way possible to consistently maintain a theory of multiplicity. 
Leucippus took the statement as a suggestion and created the atomic theory. In fact, the 
atomists distinguished their atom from a geometric point. Consequently, they admitted the 
infinite divisibility of geometrical magnitudes but denied this kind of divisibility to matter. 
The atoms are not mathematically indivisible, but they are physically indivisible since there 
is no empty space in them. However, the resemblance between the Pythagoreans and 
atomists is clear, and Aristotle noticed it. The atoms are a transformation of Pythagorean 
monads which assume the characteristics of the One of Parmenides. But the One as a 
totality is maintained in the postulation of a plenum. Aristotle says: “For”, (Leucippus) 
said, “that which is strictly speaking real is an absolute plenum; but the plenum is not one. 
On the contrary, there are an infinite number of them, and they are invisible owing to the 
smallness of their bulk. They move in the void (for there is a void); and by their coming 
together they effect coming into being; by their separation, passing away.”63 There is no 
inconsistency here, because Leucippus claimed that it was a mistake to assume that the void 
is a non-existence. In this aspect he also followed the Pythagoreans who do not distinguish 
the void from the air. In the part preceding this passage, Melissus is also mentioned by 
reason of his thesis that the real is infinite. Burnet stated that the writing of Zeno can be 
added to this, showing that all pluralist systems cannot resist the argument of infinite 
divisibility. Leucippus accepted Melissus’ suggestion and also paid attention to Zeno’s 
observation by setting a limit to the divisibility; thus he created the atoms. 
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 Another interesting consequence of the Eleatic Philosophy was its impact on the later 
Pythagorean and Platonic traditions. 
 Thus Plato, in his dialogue Parmenides, analysed Parmenides’ claims about the One. 
This was an exercise of dialectic in which Plato intended to show the ambiguities of the 
“One” and also to show that Parmenides failed to distinguish its different meanings. 
Hypotheses I and II are two different theses about the One, and Parmenides confused them, 
as Cornford’s comment indicates:  
 
But in fact he (Plato) distinguishes in Hypotheses I and II two different senses 
and keeps them apart. The consequences deduced in each case do actually 
follow, and they are of course different. It is true that Parmenides can be held 
responsible for both senses, because he had confused them. Some of the 
attributes he had deduced for his One Being follow from supposing it to be a 
bare Unity that is one in every sense and in no sense many; others from 
supposing it to be a One which is a whole of parts. Plato separates the two 
assumptions, and by adhering strictly to each in turn shows that they lead to 
opposite conclusions.64 
 
 Here I shall quote the first hypothesis or first meaning of the One and two of its 
consequences, that is, that it has no extension and that it is nowhere:  
– 137c–d “If the One is defined as absolutely one, it is in no sense many or a whole of 
parts.” 
– 137d–138a “The One (being without parts) has no extension or shape.” 
– 138a–b  “The One (being without parts or extension) is nowhere, neither in itself nor 
in another.” 
 There is then the second hypothesis, enunciated by Plato in 142b–c: “If the One has 
being, it is One Entity, with both unity and being.” This hypothesis implies a duality since 
One Entity has two parts or it is a subject of which one can assert two truths: that it has 
unity and that it has being. This is what allows him to say that “One Entity is a whole of 
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parts (142 c–d) for it is at same time one and many”, meaning that One being is a whole 
and the “one” and “being” will be its parts.  
 In Parmenides 142d Plato explained: “Again, take each of these two parts of the One 
Being – its unity and its being: unity can never be lacking to the ‘being’, nor being to the 
part ‘unity.’ Thus each of the two parts, in its turn will possess both unity and being; any 
part consists of at least two parts, and so on for ever by the same reasoning. Whatever part 
we arrive at always possesses these two parts; for a ‘one’ always has being, and a being 
always has unity. Hence any part always proves to be two and never can be one. In this 
way, then, what is ‘one Being’ must be unlimited in multitude.” 
 Now Cornford said that this reasoning, which seems fallacious, is valid against 
Parmenides, because he said that “what can be thought can be” and that his One–Being was 
conceived as a continuous magnitude with a spherical shape, and so it may be endlessly 
divided.65 
 The Eleatics intended to refute the Pythagorean derivation of numbers, a multiplicity 
of ones, from the One, which they also called Being. Plato, in his second hypothesis, 
showed that the existence of number can itself be derived from Parmenides’ doctrine. In 
doing this, said Cornford, he is restoring, in a peculiar way, the Pythagorean evolution of 
numbers.66 From this reasoning it was possible to derive the unlimited plurality of numbers, 
which is the same process that produces infinity of beings. Plato said, in Parmenides 144a:  
 
Now, if number is, there must be many things, and indeed an unlimited 
plurality of things, that are; for we must admit that number, unlimited in 
plurality, also proves to have being. And if all number has being, each part of 
number must have being also. Thus being is distributed throughout all the 
members of a plurality of beings, and is lacking to none of these beings from 
the smallest to the greatest; indeed it is nonsense to suggest that anything that is 
should lack being. Thus being is parceled out among beings of every possible 
order from smallest to greatest; it is subdivided to the furthest possible point 
and has an illimitable number of parts.” 
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 The wholeness of the One is preserved, but this whole is divisible: (144e) “Further, 
since its parts are parts of a whole, the One, in respect of its wholeness, will be limited. For 
the parts are contained by the whole; and a container must be a limit. Therefore, a ‘One 
which is’ is both one and many, whole and parts, limited as well as indefinitely numerous.” 
This is a restatement of the original Pythagorean dualist doctrine, with the difference that 
the infinite is now deduced from the unity. In this sense the procedure of Plato is similar to 
that of Melissus, both having their starting point in the One of Parmenides. In this direction 
Cornford says that the development of this second hypothesis is “a brilliant refutation of the 
Eleatic thesis that the One is, and yet a plurality of beings is irrational.”67 The third 
hypothesis is, in some sense, a development from the second hypothesis. It implies also that 
the One co-exists with otherness: “One Entity (being in Time) comes into existence and 
ceases to exist, is combined and separated, becomes like and unlike, and it increases and 
diminishes” (155e–156b ).68  
 Over the centuries there has been a long debate about the intentions of Plato in this 
dialogue. It is not altogether clear that he would endorse the Neo-Platonic interpretation of 
it. In this regard Cornford mentioned Taylor’s claim that the scheme of Plotinus is 
inconsistent with the theology of Timaeus and the Laws.69  
 So far we have two theories of the first principles of the Pythagoreans. The first is 
that everything begins with the Unlimited (the unit or monad comes after). The second is 
that the first principles include both the Unlimited and the Limited. Here also there is no 
statement of priority of unit or monad. In neither of these two accounts does the unit have 
priority. It was only after the Platonist discussion of Parmenides that the Neo-Pythagoreans 
adopted a monist form.70 This discussion, together with the doctrine of substance developed 
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68 All these quotations of Parmenides are from Cornford’s book. 
69 CORNFORD, Plato and Parmenides, p. ix (the reference is TAYLOR, Mind N. S. No. 19, p. 326). 
70 In this sense John Rist wrote: “As long ago as 1928 Professor E. R. Dodds demonstrated the dependence of 
the One of Plotinus on the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. His demonstration has been universally 
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39 
 
by Aristotle, created the foundation of the theory of transcendent unity that stands before all 
duality. This is clear despite the fact that some, like Numenius, still defended a dualist 
doctrine. Cornford mentions these monist Pythagoreans on the basis of the fragments of the 
work Successions of Philosophers of Alexander Polyshistor (first century B.C,) preserved 
by Diogenes Laertius, and also on statements by Eudorus. Alexander’s first paragraph is: 
“The first principle of all things is the One. From the One came an Indefinite Two, as a 
matter for the One, which is the cause. From the One and the Indefinite Two came the 
numbers; and from numbers, points; from points lines; from the lines, plane figures; from 
plane figures, solid figures; from solid figures sensible bodies.”71 Eudorus, who was a 
middle Platonist, in his turn, asserted also that the Monad is the first principle of all things 
and the “supreme god”; the other opposing principles, the Limited and the Unlimited, are 
secondary or posterior to the first principle, the embracing Whole. The general view of 
these philosophers is adopted by the main Neo-Platonist, Plotinus.  
 
Leibniz 
 
Having traced some early history of the concept of unity, it remains to us to consider in 
what sense the Pythagoreans may be important for understanding Leibniz. Was Leibniz a 
follower of the original Pythagoreans as he claims? First it is necessary to point out that 
Leibniz, as one of the discoverers of calculus, is directly linked to the Pythagoreans. The 
intuitions that lead to calculus were already implicit in the Pythagorean doctrine. We saw 
that the basic idea of the Pythagoreans was that the numbers were born from the interaction 
of the Limited and the Unlimited. The Neo-Platonist Proclus enunciates this notion:  
 
The mathematicals are the offspring of the Limit and the Unlimited … This is 
why in this order of being there are ratios proceeding to infinity, but controlled 
by the principle of Limit. For number, beginning with the unit, is capable of 
infinite increase, yet any number you chose is finite; magnitudes likewise are 
divisible without end, yet the magnitudes distinguished from one another are all 
                                                                                                                                                    
Transactions and proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 93 (1962), p. 389. Dodds’ work 
is “The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the Neo-Platonic One”, CQ 22 (1928)129–42. 
71 CORNFORD, P. and P., p. 3.  
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bounded, and the actual parts of a whole are limited. The division of quantities 
is pursued to the infinite, but everything that is divided is defined, and the 
fragments of a whole are determined in act.72  
 
 The proposition is that the Unlimited (infinite) is allowed to be conditioned by the 
Limit. Thus there is a progression towards the infinitely great or infinitely small (the 
infinitesimals). Plato seemed to be trying to improve the conception when he replaced the 
expression “Unlimited” by the Dyad of great and small. According to the testimony of 
Aristotle (Phys. 206b27), Plato posited two infinities, and his Dyad is the conception that 
introduces the possibility of surpassing all magnitudes and proceeding to infinity in the 
direction of both increase and of reduction. Now this idea of progress toward the 
immeasurably small (or tending to 0) is basically the idea of the infinitesimal. Equally 
important is the idea of limit contained in this notion, that is, that the terms of the infinite 
series converge to 0 as its limit. Infinity, zero and limit are the intuitive concepts that are 
the foundation of the modern calculus. 
 Thus it is not a surprise to find a historian of calculus, Boyer, saying that “we know 
from Plato’s own writings that he was thinking out the solutions of the problems that lead 
directly to the discovery of the calculus.”73 In fact, one member of the Academy, Eudoxus 
of Cnido, developed the method of exhaustion or the “quadrature”, which can be 
considered a kind of precursor of calculus.74 We have seen in the table that the 
Pythagoreans regarded the curve as a form of the Unlimited and the line as a representation 
of the Limit. The successive interaction between these two geometric entities has the 
tendency to produce the increasingly small, the infinitesimals. Eudoxus’ method of 
regarded the curve as a succession of infinitely short segments and used the accumulation 
(or integration) of these infinitely fine slices to calculate its area. 
 The calculus, which was elaborated by Leibniz and Newton, was the culmination of 
this effort to provide a better expression for these infinitesimals. Leibniz referred to them as 
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quantities that were “vanishingly small” or “infinitely small.”75 This infinitely small was 
conceived as not a “simple and absolute zero but a relative zero, tending to zero.” The 
differential calculus demonstrates that a quality presents itself in an evanescent state. It is 
an “evanescent quantity, which retained the character of that which was disappearing.”76 
Here we can also find biological expressions, because the calculus was said to express not 
only what is disappearing but also how magnitudes that grow from elements smaller than 
all magnitude are generated. Newton suggestively called the calculus the method of 
fluxions, meaning by this expression that he was not dealing with static quantities but rather 
with dynamic entities. Thus he referred to the infinitesimals as the least indivisible, but also 
as “evanescent divisible quantities” and as “nascent increments”, meaning that the series of 
infinitesimals also accumulates for the generation of a magnitude or a quality 
(Integration).77 It is, therefore, not only the formulation of a law that expresses the 
intermediate states between the being and the (almost) nothing (zero) but also the inverse. 
The idea that a quality can be generated by the addition of the infinitesimally small was a 
Pythagorean idea that Aristotle adopted, as we see in the next chapter, and to which Leibniz 
gave full expression.  
 I now want to stress a second point. We have shown that the intervention of 
Parmenides in the Pythagorean theory gave birth to two main branches of thought: the 
development of the atomic theory and the theory of the monad of Neo-Pythagorean 
inspiration. We want to show that Leibniz, in a sense, managed to follow both. 
 In fact, Leibniz’s works also present some aspects that are similar to the original 
Pythagoreans. And I will show that this appears in his metaphor of a pond of fishes and 
gardens of plants in the Monadology. But the decisive aspect of the monad of Leibniz is 
that it is non-dimensional. Thus Leibniz can be better categorised as post Neo-Pythagorean 
than properly as Pythagorean. 
 However, we find another approach to the Pythagoreans’ principles when we read in 
a letter from Leibniz to the Princess Sophie, of the two pillars of his system: “My 
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fundamental meditation is about two things: to know about the unity and the infinite.”78 
The Monadology can be summarised by these meditations, because in it we have not only 
the principle of unity, the monad, but also an infinity of monads. It is on these two notions 
that he builds the architectonic of his philosophy. That Leibniz was trying to follow Plato in 
his discussion of Parmenides is evident from his writing of 1675:  
 
Therefore the essence of things is the same, and things differ only modally, just 
as a town seen from a high point differs from a town seen from a plain … it 
follows that no thing really differs from another, but all things are one, just as 
Plato argues in the Parmenides.79  
 
Thus, basically the unity is the fundamental aspect of things but it can vary infinitely in the 
same way as there are infinite angles on the same city. 
 However, we need to see in what sense unity and infinity are present in the theory of 
monads in connection with the theories that we have examined. Now the evolution of 
numbers achieved by taking into account Parmenides’ theory of Being and the maxim “for 
it is the same thing to think and to be” allowed Plato to say, in the second hypothesis of 
Parmenides, that: “if number is, there must be many things, and indeed an unlimited 
plurality of things, that are …” This is an aspect of the thought of the original 
Pythagoreans, since their unity is at same time a multiplicity. This theory is similar to one 
important feature of Leibniz’s philosophy, which is the doctrine that matter and even the 
whole cosmos are infinitely divided. For Leibniz this actual infinite divisibility does not 
dissolve the All into nothing, as Aristotle said, because each part divided is supported by a 
unity, a being or monad. These unities allow that the division continues until infinity. That 
these unities should be a kind of spiritual entity like a soul is a consequence of the fact that 
they are deduced from the Spiritual Being (although in this aspect he is already making 
connections with Aristotle’s notions). He expressed this view in the Monadology: § 65: 
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And the author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely 
marvelous artifice, because each portion of matter is not only divisible ad 
infinitum, as the ancients recognised, but each part is actually endlessly 
subdivided into parts, of which each has some motion of its own: otherwise it 
would be impossible for each part of matter to express the whole universe. § 66 
Whence we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, 
of entelechies, of souls, in the smallest particle of matter. § 67 Each portion of 
matter may be conceived of as a garden full of plants, and a pond full of fishes. 
But each branch of the plant, each member of the animal, each drop of its 
humour is also such a garden or such a pond.”80  
 
Leibniz’s intention of with this metaphor is to say that matter is divisible, but the unities 
that sustain the matter are not (which distinguishes his idea from that of the first 
Pythagoreans). Obviously the metaphor is ambiguous and does not make his notion 
evident.  
 In another text there is a conception of the continuum as the source of the multiplicity 
of monads by means of division. In this passage we can see the meaning of infinity as an 
explanation of the progress (described as perpetual) of monads connected with the idea of 
infinity as the source of the indefinite multiplicity of individuals:  
 
In addition to the general beauty and perfection of the works of God, we must 
recognise a certain perpetual and very free progress of the whole universe, such 
that it advances always to still greater improvement (cultum) … And as to the 
possible objection, that if it were so the world ought long ago to have become a 
paradise, the reply is ready: Even if many substances have already reached 
great perfection, nevertheless on account of the infinite divisibility of the 
continuum, there are always remaining in the depths of things slumbering parts 
which must yet be awakened and become greater and better, and in a word, 
attain a better culture. And hence progress never comes to an end.81  
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 However, there is a difference here that must be noticed. In the second hypothesis of 
Parmenides, Plato allowed the whole to be divided into several unities because the Being 
was a continuous entity. The resulting unities were also unproblematically continuous and 
this allowed the division to continue to infinity. At least for the earlier Pythagoreans it was 
possible to consider the unity as a continuous (spatial) entity. However, it is difficult to 
understand how Leibniz can describe the appearance of monads from the infinite 
divisibility of the continuous, since he always affirmed that his monads have no dimension. 
 The monad has diversity but it is a diversity of representations, not of parts.82 In 
Leibniz’s conception of a monad, unity has precedence over multiplicity. But it is a priority 
of the substratum over its representations. The monad is without parts, which for Leibniz 
means that it is clearly non-dimensional or non-spatial, that is, spiritual, although it is a 
foundational condition for the existence of the material world. This is one of the main 
tenets of Leibniz’s philosophy. 
 This is why the theory of monads harmonises better with the theory of atoms. In fact, 
Leibniz was an advocate of atomism when he was young but later refused the crude idea of 
elementary and material atoms as inconsistent. It is against reason (or against the principle 
of continuity), he said, that the divisibility of matter should stop on one level, the level of 
atoms. But he retained the atomist idea that we need to find a conception to avoid the idea 
that infinite divisibility of matter in the end reduces all reality to a mere nothing.  
 We have seen that Melissus’ argument that the possible multiplication of the One 
would be the only possible source of multiplicity. The atomists interpreted this in their own 
way and created the idea of material atoms. However, the One of Parmenides was not a 
material unity but was rather like a mind unity. We saw that the theory that regarded things 
as equated with many discrete and spatially extended units was taken by Zeno as 
incompatible with the truly infinite divisibility of the continuous implicit in the 
Parmenidian theory of unity. But the idea of the atomists was significant, since it provided 
a way to avoid infinite divisibility reducing the reality to nothing.  
                                                 
82 He says, for example, in the Monadology § 13 “… and consequently, there must be in the simple substance 
a plurality of affections and of relations, although it has no parts.” Leibniz, Wiener, p. 535. 
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 The monads of Leibniz have the same role as the atoms of the Atomists, with the 
difference that his monads are non-extended unities. Thus the ultimate reality must be 
something like true unities. In other words, the things that we see are aggregates of matter 
that have these unities as a fundamental level of reality:  
 
I realized that it is impossible to find the principles of true unity in matter alone 
or that which is only passive, since everything in it is only a collection or mass 
of parts to infinity. Now a multitude can only get its reality from true unities 
which come from elsewhere and are quite different from points (it is known that 
the continuum cannot be composed of points). Therefore to find these real 
unities I was compelled to have recourse to a formal atom, since a material 
being cannot be both material and perfectly divisible or endowed of true 
unity.83  
 
 Not only in the New System of Nature but also in the Monadology, he expressed the 
idea of ultimate substance using the specific term atoms. In the New system, another 
passage combines an allusion to the atoms with an allusion to the Pythagorean stress on the 
mathematical point:  
 
There are only substantial atoms, that is to say, real unities, absolutely destitute 
of parts, which are the sources of the actions; they are the first absolute 
principles of the composition of the things, and the last elements of the analysis 
of substances. They might be called metaphysical points; they have something 
vital and a kind of perception, mathematical points are their point for 
expressing the Universe.84  
 
In fact, the monads of Leibniz are unities similar to the atoms which cannot be split. In this 
case they cannot be split, because the monads have their unity derived directly from the 
unity of the One (of which the monad is a copy) and because, being incorporeal, it has no 
                                                 
83 LEIBNIZ, New System of Nature, 1695, Wiener, p. 107. 
84 LEIBNIZ, New System of Nature, 1695, Wiener, p. 112. 
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material parts to be separated. This indivisible unity will be the main reason for maintaining 
that the monad is closed in itself (without windows to the outside, except to God).85 We can 
suppose that one reason for this conception is again Melissus’ suggestion that the 
Parmendian One should be the model for the created Ones (since the One is a full being, he 
is already all that he could be). Thus the unities are not only mind-like, they are almost 
completely self-sufficient entities. They are a micro-cosmos since they are like the One. 
Since they are unities or atoms in the full sense, which means that they are completely 
separated from the other atoms, they are without windows. 
 We can summarise the two forms of unity presented by Leibniz in this way: 
 – When he said that matter is infinitely divisible he was presenting the metaphor of 
ponds full of fishes. In this regard his theory is similar to the early Pythagoreans' notions 
and the second hypothesis of the Parmenides of Plato, where the unities are infinite 
divisible (and qua parts of a whole the unities are not truly separated). Obviously what is 
divisible here is matter. But he affirmed some kind of unity in this metaphor with the 
allusion to (individual) fish. 
 – When he discussed individual monads the multiplicity attributed to them is only the 
multiplicity of representations. Consequently, the unity here is without parts and is 
indivisible. In this sense the monads of Leibniz are more like the atoms of Leucippus and 
Democritus (in the form proposed by Melissus) than the unities of the Pythagoreans and the 
second hypothesis of Parmenides. Since they are unities without parts, the monads are also 
similar to the unity of the first hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides. 
 This choice of unity made by Leibniz will have as an important consequence his 
denial of the substantiality of space, which is directly against the original Pythagorean view 
(as well as the Milesians’) that we saw at the beginning of this chapter. 
*** 
 
The last point that I would like to stress in this comparison between Leibniz and the 
Pythagoreans concerns the notion of harmony, which is a key concept for the Pythagoreans. 
The concept of harmony is another way of presenting the idea of unity, but in this case the 
                                                 
85 LEIBNIZ, Monadology § 7: “The monads have no windows through which anything can enter or depart.” 
Wiener, p. 534. 
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idea of unity is connected with the notions of beauty or good. This association will be later 
adopted by Plato in the form of his equivalence of One and Good. 
 Guthrie said that the idea of form regarded as something that could be given in a 
mathematical structure was the Pythagoreans’ great contribution to philosophy and was as 
important as the Milesians’ introduction of the concept of matter.86 But they considered 
also that the ideas of order and beauty in the cosmos are directly dependent on this concept. 
Here one distinction is important. The idea of form presupposes limit, since shape without 
limit is amorphous or chaotic. However, the limit can set boundaries in the continuum, but 
this process by itself does not necessarily produce beautiful or harmonious wholes. An 
almost infinite number of a limited set of boundaries can be produced from the continuum. 
Thus, Huffman stated that this is the reason why Philolaus introduced the third factor; 
harmony: “Limiters are simply things that set boundaries within a continuum, but in their 
own nature they do not necessarily produce order, that is the role of harmonia in Philolaus' 
system.”87 Thus harmony presupposes the idea that some combinations of numbers are 
more valuable than others. Only when the continuum is limited according to harmony do 
we produce a pleasant (beautiful and ordered) whole. And since these combinations can 
have truly aesthetic and moral effects on man, Pythagorean science, quite differently from 
modern science, is said to be rooted in values. So we can suppose that there is a kind of 
principle of unity that presides over the harmonisation of the Limit and the Unlimited in a 
specific whole. In this sense Kahn mentions a passage from a book attributed to Archytas, 
the Pythagorean pupil of Philolaus and friend of Plato, referring to this third factor 
necessary to bring the principles of the Limited and the Unlimited together: “This principle 
is first in power and superior to the others; it is appropriate to name this ‘god’ (theos).”88 
Thus even in Philolaus and Archytas, two more genuine Pythagoreans, there seems to be a 
certain tendency which is in conflict with the original dualism of the two principles. In 
addition, Nichomachus explains that harmony appears for the unification of the diverse and 
the reconciliation of contraries.89  
                                                 
86 GUTHRIE, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy, p. 267 and following pages. 
87 HUFFMAN, p. 45. 
88 KAHN, C, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, p. 77.  
89 GERASA, Nichomachus of, Introduction to Arithmetic, trans. M. L. D’Ooge, Greatest Books of the 
Western World, v. 11, Enyclopaedia Britannica and University of Michigan, 1989, p. 841. 
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 In Leibniz, harmony is also a key concept and it has a role similar to that in the 
Pythagorean doctrine, with the difference that Leibniz tends to equate the limiting factor 
with God or with the cause of harmony itself. And this can be understood because, for 
Leibniz, God is the great monad (principle of unity). 
 Thus for Leibniz harmony is perfection, which he defines as “unity within diversity” 
or “similarity in variety or diversity balanced by identity.”90 And the world has harmony 
because it has “greatest variety together with the greatest order.”91  
  According to Leibniz, to be delighted is to feel harmony and “in fact nothing is 
pleasing to the mind besides Harmony.” But he added that “variety delights but only if it is 
reduced to a unity;”92 and he considers both perception and thinking to be underpinned by 
harmony: “to be perceived is to be according to the principle of harmony.” Regarding 
thinking, which is similar to perceiving, he said: “thinking is nothing other than perception 
of harmony.” He presented a variation of this theme when he said that: “thinking is nothing 
other than the perception of a relation or more briefly, the perception of many things at 
same time or the one in the many.”93 God enters into the whole scheme because, for 
Leibniz, the unity of diversity happens as a consequence of a choice by God, the necessary 
being. Thus the simplest combination is that which better pleased God. In this sense he says 
that: “the necessary being acts in the simplest ways. For among the infinite possible ways 
there are certain simplest ones, but the simplest are the ones which offer most.”94 
 In this first chapter I have attempted to show some aspects of the discussion about the 
meaning of unity in pre-Socratic philosophy. We have that the Pythagoreans had more than 
one notion of unity. One of these notions was that the unit was a product of the Limit and 
the Unlimited, or that it was itself made of the Limit and the Unlimited. After the advent of 
the philosophy of the Parmenides, the subsequent analysis by Plato in the Parmenides and 
Aristotle’s criticism, the Neo-Pythagorean notion of unit appeared. This notion was the 
                                                 
90 Quoted by David Blumenfeld, JOLLEY, The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, p. 383. One reference is Monadology § 58. 
91 Quoted by David Blumenfeld, p. 386. The passage is in Principles of Nature.  
92 Quoted by MERCER, Christia, Leibniz’s Metaphysics, p. 214. The text of Leibniz quoted is Elements of 
Natural Law. 
93 These three quotations are in MERCER, p. 320 and p. 321. The text quoted is On endeavor and motion, 
perceiving and thinking. 
94 Quoted by David Blumenfeld, p. 389 (from GRUA, G, Leibniz: Texts inédits d’après des manuscrits de la 
Bibliothèque provinciale d’Hanovre, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948 cf 285 f.). 
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basis for the conception of unity in both Neo-Platonic philosophy and the system of 
Leibniz.  
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Chapter III – Aristotle and Leibniz 
 
 
The role that Aristotle plays in the theories of Leibniz is historically recognised. It is 
significant to remember some aspects of these theories, taking into account what they have 
in common with the Pre-Socratics, mainly the Pythagoreans, but also facing the question of 
Aristotle’s criticism of Pythagoreans’ mathematical philosophy of the. This chapter is 
divided into six sections: the first deals with the concept of being and substance in 
Aristotle; the second discusses the dynamic and vitalist approach of the concept of 
substance in Aristotle; the third is about the notion of knowledge as a biological process as 
it appears in De Anima; the fourth concerns the idea of cumulativity of changes; the fifth 
considers the question of stages of change and their relationship to the idea of the 
unconscious and the last section explains the relationship of the subjects of the former 
sections to Leibniz’s philosophy. 
 All these sections are connected by the pervading notion that unity, for Aristotle, is a 
unity of the soul. This conception implies that the soul is an entity of process and that the 
unity of the soul explains both the cumulativity of changes and the necessary notion of the 
unconscious. 
 
1 – Substance 
 
This section attempts to explain what substance is for Aristotle. Aristotle’s development of 
this notion was of supreme importance for Leibniz in constructing his own concept of 
substance. The section is subdivided into sections A–G, each relating to one meaning of 
substance.  
 The notion of substance in Aristotle is not an easy or clear concept. He develops this 
concept mainly in the Metaphysics, a book that is an ensemble of writings from different 
periods, in which many sections are mutually contradictory, while others are of great 
obscurity. They are like collected lectures rather than a book prepared for publication.95 
Thus it is not surprising that different historical conceptions of substance developed from 
                                                 
95 RANDALL, John Herman. Aristotle, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1965, p. 23 and 
p. 25. 
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this source and were then subject to many academic disputes, since no coherent view was 
ever possible. Different dimensions of this concept appear also in other books such as 
Categories, De Anima, etc. The logical notion appears primarily in the Categories. The 
view of Metaphysics, which I will call the self-governing notion, is best presented in the 
biological works and in the Physics. 
 It seems that Aristotle began his theory by bearing in mind the theory of Being-One 
of the Eleatics. It is possible that his theory of many meanings of being is an attempt to deal 
with the problem presented by the immobility of the Eleatics’ One. The Eleatics posited the 
Being (to on) as a transcendent entity subsistent for itself, and beyond the multiplicity of 
things. It is interesting to note its similarity to Aristotle’s notion of substance. But Aristotle 
is also interested in explaining the world that we experience. In this way he could not 
ignore the multiplicity and mobility seen in daily experience. Maintaining the importance 
of a theory of being as formulated by the Eleatics, he opens the door to reconcile it with the 
recognition of movement and multiplicity in the world so stressed by Heraclitus. The well-
known passage in which Aristotle asserted this doctrine is book Γ of Metaphysics, 1003a:  
 
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is 
related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by 
a mere ambiguity. (...) So too there are many senses in which a thing is said to 
be, but all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be because they 
are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because 
they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities 
of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are 
relative to substance or negations of one of these things or of substance itself.96 
 
 Thus “being”, has many meanings. However, all of them have a precise relation with 
an identical principle; that is, this diversity of meanings is based on a central core meaning. 
Several things that are said to be express different modalities of being, but all make 
reference to this something that is one. This one is the substance (in Latin substantia, in 
Greek ousia), which is more basic than the affections, processes and qualities. The 
                                                 
96ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, Oxford, Clarendon Press, ed. Ross, 1966. 
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recognition of many meanings of being allows processes (illustrated by the multiplicity of 
attributes that the substance has over the time) to be taken into account, but these are non-
substances in the sense that they are only modifications, qualities or relations of substances. 
The science of Metaphysics or First Philosophy has its centre in the concept of substance 
which is the unifying principle of being, or the ontological principle of reality (the ultimate 
cause of reality). 
 Some of the meanings of substance that appear in Aristotle can be enumerated here:  
 A) First I will refer to that which is perhaps the most important; substance as being-
qua-being. This concept is subject to a great deal of scholarly debate. But since this work is 
not about Aristotle, I will take as my reference only the interpretation of the notion of being 
qua being (or being as such) as presented by Philip Merlan.97 The reason for my choice of 
Merlan’s interpretation is that it situates the philosophy of Aristotle as an important factor 
in the preparation of Neo-Platonism.  
 Aristotle considers Wisdom (which he also calls the First Philosophy or Theology, 
and we call Metaphysics) as the study of the supreme principles and elements. In a passage 
in Met. E 1026a26 he explains that research about being is not only a matter for the 
physikos (the natural philosopher):  
 
... if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural 
science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the 
science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this 
way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being – 
both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.  
 
Thus the idea is that Theology (or Metaphysics) is the science that deals with unmoved 
ousia or being qua being. The subject matter of his first philosophy is this being qua being 
(ens qua ens).  
 Aristotle recognised the existence of this sphere of being as the uppermost or 
supersensible sphere, a sphere in which stability dominates. It is in this way the ontological 
basis for the principle of non-contradiction “for such a principle and substance seems to 
                                                 
97 MERLAN, P., From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 
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exist and is sought by nearly all the most refined thinkers as something that exists; for how 
is there to be order unless there is something eternal and permanent?” (Met. K1060a25). 
 In this sense it is also said to be incomposite, lacking parts or incorporeal (Met. Θ10, 
1051b17–1052a5), since matter is said to be the source of multiplicity. In that sphere there 
is the full sense of being, of existence: it is eternal, uncreated and divine: the “necessary 
being”. According to Merlan, this has become the traditional interpretation. He mentions 
Avicenna, who asserted that the subject matter of the Metaphysics is the ens, and Averroes, 
who asserted that the subject matter is God and the intelligentiae separatae.98 From this 
proposition that the subject matter is God and the intelligentiae separatae, it is possible to 
suspect that there is a plurality of incorporeal forms in the Aristotelian system. 
 The being qua being is a being that exists without any determination. It has no 
positive attribute or predicate, and in this sense it is the best example of what Aristotle calls 
ousia: “Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without 
qualification, must be substance” (Met. Z 1028a29). According to Merlan, it is pure being 
and so does not admit any contamination with non-being. Only when this pure being begins 
to be involved with non-being do we have the derivation of all things.99 
 Thus the variety of things proceeds from the involvement of being with otherness (or 
non-being) and so it becomes full of a variety of determinations (or attributes) to which 
correspond a set of negations. To be a composite thing is to be a thing from which we can 
predicate many determinations or attributes. Thus, ordinary knowledge is nothing more 
than the activity of predicating or withholding attributes. It is not clear how this 
involvement in otherness (or in matter) can happen. But at least when expounding the 
theory of being-as-such, Aristotle does not seem to have defended the view that the 
                                                 
98 MERLAN, p. 207. Merlan quoted Duns Scotus in his Quaestiones subtilissimae, super Il. Met. Arist. 
(Opera, v. VII 11–40 Vivès). 
99 In this sense Merlan wrote: “Being as such, i.e., being which has not to pay the price for its existence by 
being something and in this sense of the word to admit non-being – just being and therefore fully 
indeterminate in this sense of the word (...). From the fully indeterminate and in this sense fully and positively 
being and its opposite, all things are derived. As they proceed, they become more and more determinate, in 
the sense of being involved more and more with non-being (...). Being as such as the theme of Aristotle's 
metaphysics is the richest in being, not poorest. (...). On the other hand, the thing that is fully determinate in 
the ordinary sense of the word, including determinateness in time and space, is one bundle of negations (...). 
MERLAN, p. 185. 
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contraries can be the first principle of all things, as there is no thing contrary to 
substance.100 
 The problem of knowing this being qua being is the problem of knowing an entity 
which has no determinations, no predicates and consequently does not allow any 
predication. The solution to this problem is the postulation of a kind of knowledge which 
happens without the mediation of predication. Merlan translated this method of intuitive 
(noetic) knowledge, which is above discursive thinking, as a non-predicative act of “touch”. 
God knows himself only through this act. Aristotle uses the word entelecheia for the 
functioning that has the end in itself, or in cases where the exercise is the ultimate thing. 
This concept is most valid for this self-knowledge of the being qua being: “Therefore it 
must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and 
its thinking is a thinking on thinking” (Met Λ 1074b34). This doctrine is the basis of the 
notion of the self-sufficiency of the substance, and also of the notion that the soul is the 
origin of all motion in the universe. In fact, the Aristotelian terminology allows the 
relationship of pure thinking (actus purus n activity per se) and motion (activity) to be 
acknowledged. In addition, it is by its self-knowledge that the being qua being causes and 
knows everything that exists (since, for Aristotle, God is the primary cause). 
 Aristotle’s theory of being seems to imply that there are degrees of being, some 
degrees having more being than others (because they are more or less involved with non-
being or they have a greater degree of unity). This process implies a concatenation between 
these spheres, so that the superior can be termed the “cause” of the inferior spheres, among 
which we have the sphere of sensible things. Because the superior sphere is the “cause” of 
the inferior, the elements of the superior must in some way be present also in the inferior. 
Thus, according to Merlan’s interpretation, this being-qua-being is an element is something 
indwelling in all that is.  
 This exposition of being-qua-being seems to gain support by what Aristotle says in 
the De Anima. In book III5 he wrote that  
 
                                                 
100 “All contraries, then, are always predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, but just as appearances 
suggest that there is no thing contrary to substance, argument confirms this. No contrary, then, is the first 
principle of all things in the full sense; the first principle is something different” (Met N 1 1087 b35). 
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mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its 
essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, 
the originating force to the matter which it forms) … When mind is set free 
from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this 
alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former 
activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is 
destructible), and without it nothing thinks. 
 
 Thus we see the connection of the theory of being-qua-being with the idea that mind 
as activity is eternal and therefore unaffected and separable. This passage of De Anima101 is 
one of the sources of the notion of active intellect, but it is reminiscent of Anaxagoras, who 
talked of a changeless, separable and unaffected (apathés) intellect, and also of the Eleatics 
(who stressed the One as changeless). In any case, when Aristotle wrote that the being-qua-
being is the cause of the inferior spheres, it is clear that he was defending the idea that no 
contrary is the first principle of all things. 
 Besides the passage in De Anima, the doctrine of active intellect is also present in De 
generatione animalium II, 3,736b27. In these passages, Aristotle stated that the active 
intellect is “immortal and eternal.” As this concept is only schematic in Aristotle’s writings, 
it provided the opportunity for considerable discussion and different interpretations in the 
philosophic tradition of antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. However, many 
explained the action of active intellect in the soul as “the intellect that comes from outside” 
or God himself.  
 From what we have expounded we can see that the notion of substance as pure being 
in Aristotle can be interpreted in these ways:  
 – Soul or mind in its pure form (separate from matter) and in this case having divine 
character.  
 – Self-identity (or unity), exerting a pure activity, self-thinking, which is the 
paradigm of all activity. As self-identity it is the basis of the principle of contradiction. 
 – An element which is immanent or dwelling in all that it is (active intellect or 
intelligentae separatae). 
                                                 
101 De Anima 430a15. 
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2 – Other Meanings of Substance: 
 
In the previous section (Section A), we discussed the concept of pure being, which is the 
condition of the world of determinations. Thus we can understand the next meaning of 
substance, as that which can support attributes of contraries.  
 B) This section could be called the “logical” account of substance. In the Metaphysics 
1017b14 and Categories 2a11 we have the idea that substance is that which is the subject of 
predicates and not itself the predicate of anything else.102 Similarly, in Categories 4a10, 
substance is called that which undergoes and underlies change: “One and the self-same 
substance103, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities … at 
one time warm, at another cold.” Thus we need to understand substance as being prior to 
the play of opposites, which, in fact, allows the appearance of different attributes. 
 C) Strongly connected with this previous meaning is the conception that substance is 
matter. In Met. (1029a10-11) Aristotle said: “If this is not substance, it baffles us to say 
what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains.” In this 
case, being acquires a new meaning and it seems that Aristotle was thinking in terms of the 
Pythagorean notions which involve the contrary factors, Limit and Unlimited (now called 
being and non-being). Underlying these two he puts a third factor: the substratum or subject 
matter, which he calls matter. Thus there is a passage from privation or non-being to being 
as the realised final form. The passage to being has as its basis a substratum which is the 
substance, or in this case matter. This passage to being is generation and its opposite (from 
being to non-being) is perishing. He explained his theory on another level, following the 
same Pythagorean equivalence of the form and the hot: “perhaps the elements of 
perceptible bodies are, as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is the 
privation; and as matter, that which directly and of itself potentially has these attributes” 
(Met. Λ, 4, 1070b10). 
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103 ARISTOTLE, De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931. 
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 He repeated this theory in another passage, considering it valid for all sorts of 
generation, as for example, a quality: “for i.e. one might say that there are three principles – 
the form, the privation and matter. But each of these is different for each class; e.g. in the 
color they are white, black, and surface, and in day and night they are light, darkness, and 
air” (Met. Λ, 4 1070b20). Matter here is to be understood in the sense of substance because 
substance is what is in change but persists unchanged itself. Thus matter, as underlying 
both the contraries form and privation, and persisting throughout a change of one into the 
other, is a true substance. Also, matter as a substratum is the potentiality that allows some 
privation to become some form. Thus in this sense the contraries cannot be substance or 
first principles, because sometimes they exist and sometimes they do not – they are only 
attributes. 
 D) In another version substance means a concrete thing. This is also known as 
primary ousia, subject or subject matter. Aristotle wrote in the Categories v.3b10–13: 
“Every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this something’. As regards primary 
substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this something’; for a 
thing revealed is atomic and numerically one.”104 What exists is “this something” or “this 
here thing” (tode ti), an individual thing. Hence, for Aristotle, all that exists is individual 
and determinate. Thus this meaning of substance or being differs from the monolithic One 
of the Eleatics, since it must account for multiplicity. There are many particular or 
individual substances. 
 It is in this version of individual substance that we can include a different notion of 
matter. In books Z and H of the Metaphysics, matter is not substance, but is coupled with 
form in the hylomorphic analysis of the substance. Matter in this case has a relative 
meaning. When deprived of form, matter can be regarded as indeterminate (for example a 
pile of bricks and roof tiles) but it still has the potential to acquire form. Obviously 
indetermination is relative; roof tiles and bricks, flesh and bones, for example, have their 
own forms as individual unities, as well as their matter. Aristotle considered that absolute 
indetermination, that is, matter totally deprived of form, was nonexistent in an independent 
way. Thus, as Lear explained, matter is a relative item and that irreducibility means that the 
order (which is the expression of form) that “exists at any level of matter is insufficient to 
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generate the order required at the next level of organization.”105 Because each level of 
matter can be analysed into form and matter in its turn, matter obviously cannot be 
substance here. 
 If matter is to be shaped into a form, it is necessary to understand how it participates 
with form in the constitution of things as things. For Aristotle, both are constituted in a 
synthesis or a synolon when originating individual things, the substances.  
 E) From this notion we arrive at another meaning of substance, which is “essence”, 
which obviously is part of the conception of substance considered as a concrete thing. Thus, 
in one passage Aristotle considers that it is the essence that better expresses what an ousia 
is: “Clearly, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence” (Met. 
Z, 6,1032a5) and “the essence of each thing is what is said to be propter se (in virtue of 
itself) ... what then you are by your very nature is your essence” (Met. Z, 3, 1029b14). As 
Randall explains: “‘to be’ anything means ‘to be something that can be stated in a discourse 
… any subject of discourse.’”106 The essence is the reason of the attributes in the substance. 
It is the cause of something or its explanatory property. Consequently, it is the intelligible 
core or what can be known and stated about a thing in its individuality. In other words, the 
essence, although by nature non-linguistic (the discourse is not the ousia itself), can 
nevertheless be stated or expressed in a definition or formula. As Aristotle says:  
 
Each thing itself then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely 
accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to 
know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the 
exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one (Met. 
Ζ,6,1031b19). 
 
It is because the essence instantiates an order or logos (which can be translated as 
intelligible core of a thing) in the matter that it can render a thing intelligible and subject to 
a scientific discourse. 
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 The word “definition” has as a part of its meaning the notion of delimiting, of a 
limitation (finis) which allows a thing to be apprehended by intelligence. The classic 
example used to illustrate the definition of essence is that of man. Thus, the essence of man 
is said to be a rational animal. But such universals and genera (which are a formulation of 
logos,) are not primary ousia. In the Categories (chap. 5: 22 11–16), Aristotle called them 
secondary substances. They are not particular things but are predicated of many particular 
things. Essence is, properly speaking, peculiar only to an individual thing.  
 The Aristotelian universal has the character of an immanent ontological structure and 
is different from a Platonic idea, which Aristotle condemned as being inoperative. 
Aristotle’s eidos (his word for universals) has a genetic or generating power. The character 
of immanent structure of the Aristotelian eidos does not allow it to be confused with 
universals such as a hypostasised Platonic Idea. The universal does not have an existence 
separate from its instances. The universal bird is immanent in individual birds. The soul, 
which is a primary substance, instantiates these substantial forms as a principle that informs 
the bodies of animals and plants. 
 Aristotle also wrote in another place, Posterior Analytics, that only the universal can 
be an object of science.107 Consequently, there is a gap between what can be said about a 
thing and the thing itself in its individuality. Moreover, matter also seems to be an obstacle 
to intelligibility. Aristotle said: “... there is neither definition of nor demonstration about 
sensible individual substances because they have matter whose nature is such that they are 
capable of being and of not being” (Met. Z, 15, 1039b25). Thus, when he said that matter is 
capable of non-being, he seems to have been suggesting that for this reason discourse 
cannot describe the individual thing exhaustively. It is not capable of demonstration 
because there is always more than can be said: “And so when one of the definition-mongers 
defines any individual, he must recognize that his definition may always be overthrown; for 
it is not possible to define such things” (Met. Z, 15, 1040a 5). And the material aspect of 
ousia or the hyle is something that cannot be stated in words. “Matter is unknowable in 
itself” Aristotle wrote (Met. Z, 1036a9). In fact, the primary substance has something that 
means that it cannot be stated in words (and so we can only denote it by pointing it out). 
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This something is its matter.108 Thus for the Aristotelian tradition, matter was to be 
considered the principium individuationis or cause of the singularity of a thing. Thus in this 
case too, matter seems to be equivalent to the notion of substance. 
 F) Contrary to this previous view, Aristotle suggested that substance is form (Met. vii 
1–6), as I have already mentioned in section (A). Irwin said that in this case form must 
coincide with the individual subject and its essence.109 Thus the statue is identified with its 
form, which is its essence. The matter is included somehow in the conception of form, since 
there is no statue without matter. Furthermore, the form is made equivalent to actuality or 
activity. This meaning of substance is perhaps another way to express the meaning of 
substance as substratum. Substance conceived as substratum seems to be a necessary 
condition of the appearance of a manifested form (in the sense of telos) from mere 
potentiality. We will return to this topic later on.  
 G) Natures may also be considered as ousia. Aristotle considered that natures 
(phusis) are substances because they have the source of movement in themselves. He 
studies this subject in his book of Physics. 
 
3 – Dynamic and Vitalist Concept of Being 
 
In this section this dynamic notion of being in Aristotle and how it was connected with this 
teleology is discussed in further detail. Aristotle said that the soul is the form of the body 
(which is the matter) or the substance of a body (Met. H 1043a35). This sense of “form” 
cannot be confused with the sense that ousia is the form or the result of a process of change 
or movement (genesis). To be in this context means to be something that comes into being 
and passes away (to acquire a certain form that will disappear later). And this is one of the 
most important kinds of change: the process of “generation” and “corruption.” But form 
considered as soul is what allows this generation. 
  Thus for Aristotle the form cannot be regarded only as a shape, but it is also a 
forming power (energeia), an inner necessity or effort (of the soul), which shapes matter in 
a specific fashion. Thus, in book Θ (6 1050b 2) of the Metaphysics, Aristotle saw the ousia, 
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the being, as activity (energeia), and as the operation or functioning of powers. To name 
this effort or tendency to put powers into operation, Aristotle also uses the term horme, 
which was translated in the seventeenth century as “conatus” or “endeavour.”110  
 Aristotle denominated entelechy for the act, which is the acting perfection, or better, 
the perfection resulting from an actualisation. The senses attributed to this term are not, 
however, always the same. In De Anima (II 412 a 20), he states that the soul is entelechy or 
entélékheia (en, in; telos, aim or finishing; ekho, I have or I bring with me). On the other 
hand, in Met. Θ (3 1047a30–32), he says also that the soul is energy or enérgeia (en, in; 
ergon, work), meaning the aspect of the soul that can be called effort or striving. Both 
terms seem to be synonyms, although Randall specifies them: enérgeia means literally the 
operation or functioning of powers (dynameis).111 In this sense Aristotle associates 
movement with spiritual activity. Entelechy is a term coined by Aristotle to denote the 
functioning that has the end in itself, as the seeing is the end of the power – dynamis – of 
vision or the fullest functioning or culminating activity – in Latin, actuality.112 Thus in this 
second sense, entelechy is a way of being that does not own its realisation or perfection 
state instantly, but is designed to reach it through a progression. Thus a perfect oak tree 
living in the fullness of its capacities and in its full form as an adult tree is the entelechy of 
the oak, reached only after a lengthy period of growth (to be followed by a period of 
decay). 
 In a passage of De Anima (415b 8) Aristotle reaffirms the soul as the essence of life 
but also stresses its teleological character as well as its character as a source of 
movement.113 Here there is, again, a link to Pythagorean–Platonic doctrines, for in the 
Phaedrus the soul is the only entity that is able to move itself (the soul, consequently, is the 
origin and source of all movement in the universe). Still, in this dialogue it is suggested that 
the moving power present in the soul is Eros, desire, which always tends towards the aimed 
object. 
 In Aristotle also, the final cause is that which determines the purposes aimed for by 
the striving, and in this sense it can be seen as the most explanatory in the last instance. It is 
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the mechanism of final cause that determines the way in which efficient causes (the 
movement) agree with the material cause in the effort to achieve their full form. Thus all 
becoming is progress towards a final complete form, which is the guarantee for the unity of 
the whole process. In this sense also the three causes, final, formal and efficient, can be 
regarded as one.114 
 But the definition of soul that at the same time affirms its character of essence and 
also of activity directed to an end, (that is, introduces the discussion of the functional 
character of the soul) occurs in De Anima (412b10). Continuing with the question “what is 
soul”, he wrote: “Suppose that the eye were an animal – sight would have been its soul, for 
sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being 
merely the matter of seeing; when the seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except 
in name – it is no more real than the eye of a statue or a painted figure.” Thus, the form 
results from activity and is actuality (entelechy). It acquires the meaning of function. This is 
said in a different way in another passage, Partibum Animalim (694b14): “because nature 
makes organs for the function, and not the function for the organs.”115 Obviously a 
relationship with the environment is presupposed in this concept. In this sense he talks 
particularly of aquatic bird feet: “For they are in harmony with the mode of life of these 
birds, who, living in the water, where their wings are useless, require that their feet shall be 
such as to serve in swimming. For these feet are so developed as to resemble the oars of a 
boat, or fins of a fish” (Partibus Animalium 694b15). 
 The resulting form of living beings is a consequence of these two factors: the degree 
of power of a certain kind of soul and the soul’s precise functional role in its interaction 
with the environment. In De Anima the hierarchy of beings is represented according to the 
criterion of power of the souls, going from the nutritive function to which plants are 
limited, up to the rational faculty. The degree of perfection of a living being is also 
recognisable by its respective structural form. This classification of beings according to a 
degree of perfection (each entelechy is a relative perfection) became the model accepted by 
the naturalists for centuries.  
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. 
4 – Knowledge Considered as Biological Process 
 
Having seen Aristotle’s many senses of substance and the connection between those and 
what can be known, we now look to the substance not only as activity, but as an activity of 
knowledge. 
 For Aristotle the activity is spiritual and so we can understand why entelechy 
(actuality) is to be considered as representing: “possession of knowledge and actual 
exercise of knowledge.” (De Anima 412a20). In fact, as Randall stressed, for Aristotle, the 
“knowing” is a biological or living process.116 The power to respond with discrimination to 
the object of desire is the power to know and as such it is a natural activity. Thus, for 
Aristotle, the soul (psyche) is not only the power or arche of living, but also the power or 
arche of discrimination, to kritikon: the power of selective response. This is the power to 
know, which includes both sensing (to aistheterion) and in animals like man, thinking – the 
operation of nous – which Aristotle called noesis.117  
 In treating the problem of discrimination in the psychology of Aristotle the 
relationship with the environment is an obvious presupposition. Living beings do not 
achieve their (desired) ends without intercourse with the outside world, and this happens 
through sensation, imagination and thinking. The general definition of sense is in De Anima 
(424a15):  
 
By a ‘sense’ is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible 
forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in 
the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without 
the iron or gold.  
 
 These forms received through sense will be the origin of imagination (phantasia – 
Aristotle stressed that this notion is related to the word phos – light): “imagination must be 
a movement resulting from actual exercise of a power of sense.” (De Anima 429a). Thus 
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the imagination is a kind of changing or movement in the soul (or in the pneuma of the 
soul). 
 In De Anima Aristotle also claimed that the function of discriminating is itself a 
motion. Thus sensation is a motion and this motion is an “alteration” or a change of quality 
of the soul. It is possible to say that the soul receives the sensations passively and this 
process is considered as a change of quality of the soul: “Sensation is held to be a 
qualitative alteration, and nothing except what has soul in it is capable of sensation.” (De 
Anima 415b22). And in another place there is a similar statement: “Sensation depends, as 
we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some 
sort of change of quality” (De Anima 416b30).  
 The term “affection” (Gr. páthos, Lat. passio) carries the suggestion here that 
sensation is an alteration that the soul suffers (and consequently transforms it). Aristotle 
also mentions the theory by which thinking produces the same effect, since this process has 
the same characteristic as sensation. The following can be found in De Anima 427a 17: 
“Indeed the ancients go so far to identify thinking and perceiving; (...) They all look upon 
thinking as a bodily process like perceiving, and hold that like is known as well perceived 
by like ...” It is worth recalling that in the history of philosophy this conception remained 
important for the Stoics and others, such as some scholastics who designated the concepts 
as passio animi. 118 When Aristotle said “that like is known by like” he states a principle 
that is valid both for thinking and perceiving: both these faculties have the capacity to 
identify themselves with the objects of their knowledge “.... the soul is in a way all existing 
things; for existing things are either sensible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what 
is knowable, and sensation is in a way what is sensible ...” (De Anima 431b20). In fact, in 
Met. Λ.9.1075, he said that “thought and the object of thought are not different in the case 
of things that have no matter” and he suggested that these things without matter are 
essences. This argument is equivalent to his notion that perception captures the form 
without the matter. We can suppose that what Aristotle was proposing is that the two forms 
of knowledge, sensible and intellectual, have their paradigm in the form of knowledge of 
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the being qua being, who, when thinking himself, implies that the subject and object are the 
same.  
 Thinking and sensing are similar in the sense that both are processes that imply action 
upon the soul. Aristotle analysed this thesis in De Anima (429a13): “If thinking is like 
perceiving, it must be either a process in which it is acted upon by what is capable of being 
thought, or a process different from but analogous to that.” In fact, according to Aristotle, it 
is a specific kind of intellect that produces the thoughts (or acts upon) in the soul, and this 
intellect is not that created by the elaboration from sensation and imagination. The latter is 
the passive intellect (nous pathétikos), which also receives thoughts from the active 
intellect (Gr. nous poiétikus, Lat. intellectus agens).  
 Taking into account this formulation, we have in Aristotle a theory that the individual 
soul receives new forms through two different doors: the senses organs and the active 
intellect. We can imagine how these new forms can change the quality of the soul or, 
expressed in another way, how they transform it (which means to become impregnated with 
forms from outside). For example, he says: “... let a motion with respect to quality be called 
“alteration”(...)… by quality I do not mean that which is in the substance of a thing (for a 
differentia is also called a quality), but an affective quality in virtue of which a thing is said 
to be affected or to be incapable of being affected” (Met. Ε 2–226a 25). 
 
5 – The Cumulativity of Change 
 
This section deals with the infinitesimal analysis of movement and how Aristotle related it 
to psychology. 
 The analysis of movement refers to knowledge of what nature is, since nature is the 
principle of motion or change. The starting point of the analysis of movement in Aristotle is 
the Pythagorean–Platonic theory which he complained was not very clear. As he says: 
“they do not tell us at all, however, how there can be movement if limit and unlimited and 
odd and even are the only things assumed, or how without movement and change there can 
be generation and destruction ...” (Met. A, 989a9). The Platonists, as the main followers of 
the Pythagorean tradition, did not help very much to clarify the matter. In fact, the 
Platonists regarded generation from non-being as somehow existing. However, the notion 
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of non-being was still obscure, even when they called it the Indefinite Dyad (of Great and 
Small) or when it acquired the meaning of matter. They also seemed to defend the idea that 
the Dyad (or infinite) is an arche (a beginning or principle). Thus Aristotle complained that 
the Pythagoreans posit the infinite both as a substance and as something divisible into parts. 
He rejected this idea because he maintained that the infinite is a mode of number or 
magnitude and, as such, it belongs to the category of a subject’s attributes and it is not the 
subject itself.  
 In the Metaphysics he tried to deal with this question. Aristotle kept the two 
Pythagorean factors, which are limit and unlimited (also called being and non-being), but 
added to these two a third factor: the substratum or subject matter. Thus there is a passage 
from privation (non-being) to being (the realised final form), and this passage occurs with 
the substratum or substance as basis. The passage to being is conceived as generation and 
its opposite (from being to non-being) is a corruption. 
 This theory implies that change or movement is a process that involves a distinction 
between potential and actual (form), because the potential is the basis from which the 
striving starts. This starting point is in a sense non-being, because it is still a privation of 
form. However, it is not non-being in an absolute sense, since in this case this potentiality 
would produce nothing. A change is an actualisation of potentiality, or a change from 
potency to act. The notion of development is implied, since the change or coming-to-be is a 
power that is working or developing – the operatio (it is not pure power or potency nor an 
already achieved goal). In this sense Aristotle says: “... as for becoming is between being 
and not being, so that which is becoming is always between that which is and that which is 
not; for a learner is a man of science in the making, and this is what is meant when we say 
that from a learner a man of science is being made” (Met. A, 1, 994a27). 
 The final cause is the conceptual instrument that allows Aristotle to deal with infinite 
regress. The final cause is the opposite of the infinite and as such it is conceived as the end 
or limit: “... those who maintain the infinite series eliminate the Good without knowing it ... 
the reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose, and this is a limit; for the end is a 
limit” (Met. A, 2, 994b10). Again, in another place, he stated: “Further, if generation and 
movement exist there must also be a limit; for no movement is infinite, but every 
movement has an end, and that which is incapable of completing its coming to be cannot be 
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in process of coming to be.” (Met. B, 999b9); and: “now ... for change may be completed 
and there is an end of a change, and this was in fact shown to be indivisible because it is a 
limit” (Phys. Z, 5,236a10). Aristotle thus says that no movement is infinite, because it 
reaches the limit which is the completed form or goal. Aristotle, however, recognised that it 
is necessary to deal with the concept of infinity, since it is inherent to any motion: “Now a 
motion is thought to be one of those things which are continuous, and it is in the continuous 
that the infinite appears, and for this reason, it often happens that those who define the 
continuous use the formula of the infinite, that is, they say that the continuous is that which 
is infinitely divisible” (Phys. Γ 200b17). As he said, only the end of the change, the limit, 
will be indivisible. 
 Motion is also infinite in relation to the time which it occupies. Aristotle said in the 
Phys. 237a10: “if, then, all time is divisible, and that which is intermediate between 
moments is time, everything that is changing must have completed an infinite number of 
changes.” Thus this reasoning implies that movements are subject to being potentially 
infinitesimally divided or infinitely composed. The approach toward a complete form is 
continuous, but can be conceived in terms of the potential addition of quantities, which are 
potentially infinitely divisible, or, as he said, “everything that is changing must complete an 
infinite number of changes.” Thus, in Aristotle, the infinite division is only potential and 
never actual, because he argues that actual division will destroy the whole.  
 However, even with the division being potential, Aristotle managed to apply 
numerical analysis. When he considered qualitative changes or alterations, he applied this 
kind of analysis: “similarly, we have a definite thing that causes alteration and a definite 
thing that undergoes alteration and a certain amount, or rather degree, of alteration is 
completed in a certain amount of time” (Phys. H 250a31). 
 All this has stronger support when Aristotle asks about the possibility of the infinite 
divisibility of sensation and sensible qualities. He concluded that if body can be infinitely 
divisible, consequently the same is valid for the sensible qualities that it projects, as the 
following quotation indicates:  
 
A difficulty might arise as to whether, if every body is susceptible of infinite 
division, its sensible qualities, e.g., color, flavor, smell, weight, sound, cold and 
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heat, lightness, hardness and softness, are also susceptible, or is this 
impossible? For each of these produces sensation; in fact they are called 
sensible from their capacity to excite sensation. Then on the above assumption 
sensation must be capable of infinite division. (De Sensu 445 b3–20).  
 
 He proceeded to affirm that some sensible increment is not perceptible by itself, but 
needs to be inter-related in an aggregate to be perceptible, stating that: “but it is important 
to realise that as the increment of sense is not perceptible by itself, nor isolable (for it exists 
only potentially in a more distinctly perceptible whole), so neither it will be possible 
actually to perceive its small object when separated from the whole, yet it will be 
perceptible, for it is so already potentially, and will become so actually by aggregation” (De 
Sensu 446a10). 
 
6 – Stages and the Unconscious 
 
In the preceding section, the Aristotelian idea of change as being directed towards a goal, a 
telos, was raised. In this section we will examine the idea that changes occur in stages 
directed to a goal, and its relationship to the idea of the unconscious. 
 Since all movement is succession directed toward an end, we can understand why 
change in Aristotle is achieved, taking into account the fulfilment of a number of stages. 
Each stage is a preparation for the next. Again the idea of the unity of a process is 
prominent. Each stage preserves its effect for the final goal and in this aspect nature 
imitates art. For Aristotle, in human art, we see operations directed to a purpose, according 
to a plan in the mind of the worker. In the same way, nature exhibits a progress towards 
order and perfection. It has a teleological character. 
 Thus in living beings, changes happen in such a way that the earlier changes are 
regulated in view of later results, until a completed end is reached. The whole process is 
similar to the role that human work plays, and therefore Aristotle used art to illustrate 
teleology. In his exposition there a notion of unconscious effort is implicit, since in living 
beings there is a succession of stages towards an end, but all this happens without 
deliberation. Aristotle explained:  
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Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things 
also is so. Thus if a house, e.g. had been made by nature, it would have been 
made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature were 
also made by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature. Each 
step then in the series is for sake of the next; and generally art partly completes 
what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates her. If, therefore, 
artificial products are for the sake of the end, so clearly also are natural 
products. The relation of the later to the earlier terms in the series is the same in 
both. This is most obvious in the animals other than man: they make things 
neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation. (…) If then it is both by nature 
and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants 
(...) send their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that 
this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature. 
And since ‘nature’ means two things, the matter and the form, of which the 
later is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be 
the cause in the sense of ‘the for the sake of which’ (Phys. B 8 199a11).  
 
Importantly, Aristotle continued (Phys. B, 8, 199b26): “It is absurd to suppose that a 
purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not 
deliberate. If the ship building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by 
nature”. 
 Hence it must be well understood that although the example of handicraft is used to 
better understand nature’s operations, it is art, in truth, that imitates nature. Aristotle 
stressed that animals and plants strive to reach their goals without inquiry or deliberation. 
Even art does not need deliberation to produce its objects (since it becomes second nature – 
a habit). In the biological analogies exposed in the Metaphysics, the example frequently 
used is that of the tree seed; for example, the acorn, the potential oak tree that “struggles” to 
develop in order to reach its full form, the adult oak tree, the actualised seed. The seed 
grows until it becomes an adult tree, because in some sense it has an impulse or desire to do 
so. It does not have a conscious purpose nor does it consciously strive to become a tree, 
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since it has not any conscious thinking. However, it has desires or “strivings”. In fact, if the 
soul is energeia or activity, it is crossed with acts, which is the same thing as saying that it 
is crossed by forms. Here Aristotle was expressing the idea of possibility of the 
unconscious effort.  
 Concerning the relations between earlier and later stages, Aristotle explained that 
they are the same in those that happen by art as they are in those that happen naturally. In 
both cases the formal aspect precedes the material one. He stated this in places such as, for 
example, Met. Θ (8, 1050a4,) where he argued that “because the things that are posterior in 
becoming are prior in form and in substantiality”; and De partibus animalium (646a25), 
where he pointed out that:  
 
Now the order of actual development and the order of logical existence are 
always the inverse of each other. For that which is posterior in the order of 
development is antecedent in the order of nature, and that is genetically last 
which in the nature is first. (That this is so is manifest by induction; for the 
house does not exist for the sake of bricks and stones, but these materials for 
the sake of the house; and the same is the case with the materials of other 
bodies ...). In order of time, then the material and the generative process must 
necessarily be anterior to the being that is generated; but in logical order the 
definitive character and the form of each being precedes the material.  
 
The suggestion is that it is this precedence of the form that allows living beings to strive to 
achieve form almost automatically, that is, without deliberation and unconsciously. Thus 
we can understand better why Aristotle conceived form as substance. Somehow and 
somewhere this previous or substantial form exists and is a condition for the appearance of 
the forms that we see in nature. 
 There is a tension in the writings of Aristotle on this subject. Aristotle’s explanation 
of sensation and the idea of interaction with the environment implicit in his functionalism 
seems to conflict with the notion that the organism develops depending only on the 
prescriptions already present in its essence or in its substantial form.  
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Leibniz and Aristotle 
 
In this section I consider some ideas about the continuity between Aristotle and the 
Pythagorean–Platonic tradition, attempting to show how Leibniz helped to make this 
continuity more explicit. 
 Aristotle rejected the Pythagorean faith of the Platonists and the Platonic tradition 
that the order of nature is and must be mathematical in character. The criticism of Aristotle 
is based, for instance, on the claim that Pythagoreans and Platonists do not take into 
account the gap between the sphere of the ideal (and numbers are ideal beings) and the 
realm of the real. He reproached the Pythagoreans (in Met. N 3, 1090a30–35) for producing 
bodies out of numbers, deriving bodies out of planes, or as he said, weight out of what is 
weightless. Moreover, he directed his criticism to the Platonic conception that universals 
(Ideas) can generate particulars. Thus for Platonism, the soul is equivalent to 
mathematicals, and in this sense the Platonists were again the object of Aristotle’s criticism 
(for the derivation of bodies out of numbers). 
 In this respect the Neo-Platonists not only did not agree with this Aristotelian 
differentiation between Plato and the Pythagoreans, but also considered Aristotle himself to 
be dependent on the philosophy of Pythagoras. Moreover, in those matters where Aristotle 
dissented from the Pythagoreans, he was regarded as having cut himself off from the truth. 
Thus for Iamblichus and Proclus, Aristotle “was something of a deviant requiring active 
and constant correction.” 119 But Syrianus believed that Metaphysics could be used in the 
Pythagorean–Platonic tradition if some corrections were made, and Iamblichus even tried to 
improve Aristotelian physics in such a way as to turn it into a true “Pythagorean” science of 
nature.120 Indeed, it is possible to see that both the Pythagoreans and Aristotle were 
concerned with immanent forms in nature. As we have seen, Aristotle placed the Platonic 
ideas that he transformed into his notion of form within a concrete reality as a forming 
power (energeia) that shapes matter in a specific fashion. Thus, for Aristotle the soul was 
also a formal reality and as such it could be, somehow, translated into numbers.  
                                                 
119 O’MEARA, Dominic, Pythagoras Revived, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 180. 
120 O’MEARA, p. 128. 
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 Leibniz followed the indication of the Neo-Platonists in working with the 
compatibility or continuity between the Pythagorean vision and that of Aristotle; a project 
that, as Randall’s comments indicate, is still not finished: “the real vision of Leibniz in the 
seventeenth century still remains to be fulfilled: to work out a mathematical expression of 
the fundamental Aristotelian concepts for the understanding of the world that has generated 
us as beings with the natural desire to understand.” 121 
 But the idea of substance in Aristotle seems to be more similar to the Parmenidian 
unity than properly to the Pythagorean concept. His substance has no opposite and we have 
seen that the main concept of unity of the Pythagoreans came from the prior pair of 
opposites – the Limited and Unlimited. The analysis of alteration, however, has a 
Pythagorean influence.  
 The importance of Aristotle for the philosophy of Leibniz is centred mainly on the 
concept of substance, a thesis which is put forward almost unanimously by commentators. 
First there is the idea found in Aristotle that substance is individual or particular. In 
Aristotelian scholarship this can be subject to controversy. But it is clear that Leibniz 
interpreted Aristotle’s substance as being individual. There is not only one individual 
substance, God, as in Spinoza. There is also an infinity of other individual substances, the 
monads. He totally rejected the notion that such a non-individual thing as space could be a 
substance. And, in fact, he tried to construct a science of dynamics, elaborated against 
Descartes, based on the notion of activity of the individual substances.122 It is true that 
using Aristotle’s substance as a basis for a conception of matter was a very creative act on 
the part of Leibniz. It is not evident that Aristotle proposed such a vitalist conception of 
matter, although he also insisted that the continuous is infinitely divisible. The fact is that, 
as far as possible, Leibniz placed the dynamics into an Aristotelian framework. Thus for 
him force is said to be an attribute of a subject and in other texts it is said to be the 
                                                 
121 RANDALL, p. 58. 
122We have a discussion of the controversy with Descartes in WOOLHOUSE, Roger, Descartes, Spinoza and 
Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Methaphysics, London and New York, Routledge, 
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Entelechy itself.123 Force is derived from the efforts of substances and from this conception 
Leibniz formulated the argument against the substantiality of space. As he put it:  
 
We have elsewhere explained that there was contained in material things 
something which has to be added to mere extension, and is really prior to it, 
viz., a natural force implanted by the Creator in all things. It does not consist in 
the mere ‘potentiality’ with which scholastic philosophy seems to be content, 
but is characterized by an effort (conatus) or nisus which, were it not limited by 
a contrary effort would also come to a complete realization…Since activity is 
the characteristic mark of substance; extension on the contrary affirms nothing 
other than the continual reiteration or propagation of an already presupposed 
effort and counter-effort, that is resistant substance, and therefore, extension 
cannot possibly constitute substance itself.”124  
 
Bertrand Russell said that Leibniz achieved fame exactly by his derivation of the science of 
dynamics from the doctrine of substances, an association that he completely failed to 
demonstrate.125 But the basic idea does not seem to be totally wrong, and it inspired the 
whole scientific research of Boscovich.126 
 Second, Leibniz thought of his notion of substance in terms that we expressed in item 
(B), where Aristotle’s substance is the subject of predicates. Thus Leibniz used it to explain 
his notion of individual substance and the entire Monadology. Here I shall quote a passage 
in which the idea of substance as the subject of predicates is connected with meaning (A), 
that substance is dependent on God: 
 
My idea of pure proposition is such that every predicate, necessary or 
contingent, past, present and future, is included in the idea of subject … This is 
                                                 
123 Leibniz says “Aristotle calls the first Entelechies. I call the more intelligible, primitive forces which do not 
contain only the act or complement of possibility, but further an original activity.” LEIBNIZ, New system of 
nature, 1696, Wiener, p. 108. 
124 LEIBNIZ, Specimen Dynamicum, 1695, Wiener, p. 120. 
125 RUSSELL, Bertrand, A critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz, p. 89. 
126 Boscovich used the theory of monad and combined it with Newtonian elements to develop a concept of 
impenetrability in terms of force rather than in terms of matter. WHITE, LANCELOT LAW, ed., Roger 
Joseph Boscovich, S. J., F. R. S., 1711–1781, Studies on His Work on the 250th Anniversary of His Birth, 
London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1961. 
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a very important proposition that deserves to be well established, for it follows 
that every soul is a world apart, independent of everything else but God, that it 
is not only immortal and impenetrable but retains in its substance traces of 
everything that happens to it.127  
  
 We have seen that in Aristotle, according to conception (C) of substance there is a 
passage from privation (non-being) to being (the realised final form), and this passage 
occurs with a substratum, the substance, as a basis. This passage to being is generation, and 
its opposite (from being to non-being) is corruption, but the whole process has as its basis a 
substratum, the substance (“being” in a deeper sense). The equivalence in Leibniz is his 
doctrine of the immortality or indestructibility of the monads and even of animals. He said, 
for example, in the Monadology: “it is because of this, too, that there is never complete 
generation or, strictly speaking, perfect death, consisting in the separation of the soul. What 
we call generation is development and growth, just as what we call death is envelopment 
and diminution.”128 Here he was clearly following the theory that generation and corruption 
are not absolute events but occur with a substratum as a basis, which in no way can 
disappear. We also have another passage in which Leibniz connected Aristotle with other 
philosophers such as Parmenides and Hippocrates:  
 
… the ancient author of the book On Diet, attributed to Hippocrates, had 
glimpsed something of the truth when he said explicitly that animals are not 
born and do not die, and that the things believed to begin and to perish only 
appear and disappear. That is the thought of Parmenides and of Melissus, 
according to Aristotle. For these ancients were more solid than people 
believe.129  
 
He expressed the same thought in a different way, in the following quotation, when he said 
that substance is the sphere of reality where no experience is lost: 
 
                                                 
127 LEIBNIZ, Identity in individuals and true propositions, 1686, Wiener, p. 97. 
128 LEIBNIZ, Monadology,§ 73, trans. Loemker, Reidel, 1969, p. 650. 
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… on my hypotheses souls are not ‘indifferent to any parcel of matter’, as it 
seems to you that they are; on the contrary they inherently express those 
portions with which they are and must be united in an orderly way. So if they 
passed into a new coarse or sensible body, they would retain the expression of 
everything of which they had had any perception in the old one; and indeed the 
new body would have to feel the effects of it. So that there will always be real 
marks of the continuance of the individual.130  
 
This conception was useful for Leibniz in defending his theory that the monad preserves all 
its previous states. For him the mind is eternal thinking since: “every mind is endless 
duration.”131 
 In Leibniz’s early philosophy of, as was shown by Mercer and Sleigh, Leibniz tried to 
explain the generation of the organisation of living beings by substance.132 Thus substance 
is mind, which is incorporeal, indestructible (eternal) and a source of constant activity, 
causing and maintaining the organisation of the matter in a living body. As in Aristotle 
there is also a connection between substantiality and activity. The mind acts through matter. 
As the mind has thoughts, each one of them is an action of the mind in matter and these 
actions produce the properties and create the organisation of a living being. In the late 
period, from the Discourse of Metaphysics of 1686 until the time of the Monadology, his 
theory was modified and mind does not directly act through matter, but “actions happen” 
by an adjustment inherent to the pre-established harmony. In this version, the monad loses 
its organisation when its perceptions become increasingly confused.  
 We have seen that, even in Aristotle, form must coincide with the individual subject 
and its essence. Also, the concept of final causes is conceived as almost coinciding with 
formal cause and efficient cause. Leibniz followed the same scheme. But he expanded the 
Aristotle’s concept of immanent teleology into a cosmic teleology, connecting the final 
cause with the principle of the best (or Good). Thus explanation by final causes means that 
nature acts in an intelligent way to make everything for the best. He defended final causes 
not only in biology, as an explanation for the existence of organs like the eye, for example, 
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but also to explain the laws of physics.133 He said that: “very far from excluding final 
causes and with wisdom, we must from these deduce everything in Physics.”134 Ultimately 
God is the foundation of final cause, or the last source of intelligence and perfection in 
nature, “… the true Physics may be tapped from the source of divine perfection. God is the 
final reason of things, and the knowledge of God is no less the principle of sciences than his 
essence and will the principle of beings.”135 Thus the doctrine of monads is also dependent 
on final causes. Therefore, the perceptions of each monad arise from one another according 
to the internal laws of appetitions, which are ruled by final causes guided by the idea of 
Good. Each monad follows its own law of the series of perceptions, something equivalent 
to the Aristotelian notion of essence. Here the meaning of following the final causes is that 
the individual is achieving its individual concept.  
 Leibniz’s theory of perceptions of can be identified more clearly as originating in 
Aristotle. It was in the Physics that the Greek made the connection between the analysis of 
infinity in change (or movement) and regarded perceptions and other cognitive functions as 
an example of movement (an alteration) in the soul. Leibniz assumed this postulate in 
paragraphs ten of the Monadology when he wrote: “I assume it as admitted that every 
created being, and consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and indeed that 
this change is continuous in each. That this change happens by a graduation”. And in the 
thirteenth paragraph he said, “every natural change takes place by degrees.” He also 
stressed that this graduation happens in a causative way: “Every present state of a simple 
substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is 
big with its future” (§ 22).136  
                                                 
133 LEIBNIZ, On a general principle, useful for the explanation of laws of nature, 1687, Wiener, p. 69. 
134 Idem 
135 Idem. 
136 In this sense Randall said: “Aristotle insists that the world displays real geneses, real comings into being, 
with a fundamental unity and continuity, a basic temporal pattern and structure. Wherever we cut into these 
processes, we find them, in the words of Leibniz, the seventeenth-century Aristotelian, ‘heavy with the past 
and big with the future.’ We find that in a significant sense, every process is now what it will be. It has 
genuine temporal parts and relations which are essential to its being that process, and not merely incidental to 
it. The process cannot be adequately understood apart from this temporal character and pattern. Now this, as 
Whitehead made clear, is precisely our own criticism of the Newtonian philosophy of nature. That philosophy 
makes time as accident, we say; it does not take time seriously. It regards motion as a succession of 
instantaneous states, as just one state after another. This view, as Whitehead pointed out, culminates in the 
structureless world of Hume, in which ‘anything may be followed by anything.’” RANDALL, p. 170. 
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 As in Aristotle, Leibniz took into account the notion of desire (l'appetit) in the 
process of change. However, his explanation of appetition seems to be very similar to the 
way Aristotle talks about enérgeia, that is, actuality, as meaning operation, or “exercise of 
knowledge.” Leibniz explored the connection between desire, perceptions, the unconscious, 
infinity and final cause or limit. Monads, he said, have perceptions with specific content 
and a “power of transition” or “appetition” which is a tendency to new perceptions. It 
seems that appetitions are not only pure movement but the tendency of a given perception 
to pass to a new perception in its efforts to achieve states of increased perfection. Leibniz 
explained, in a passage of the Monadology that makes clear the idea of the unconscious, 
that if a living thing strives to reach a goal it is necessary to have some kind of knowledge 
of it. The passage is in paragraph fifteen:  
 
The action of the internal principle which brings about change, or the passage 
from one perception to another, can be called appetition. In fact, the appetite 
cannot always attain in its entirety the whole of the perception towards which it 
tends, but it always obtains some part of it, and attains new perceptions.  
 
These perceptions do not necessarily imply thought, as Leibniz explained in his 
correspondence with Arnauld: “[it] is enough for us to conceive a perception, without its 
being necessary for us [to] attach thought or reflection to that representation.”137 Usually 
Leibniz called these unconscious perceptions “petites perceptions” and he said that they are 
also necessary to create clear perceptions:  
 
Besides, there are hundreds of indications leading us to conclude that at every 
moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions unaccompanied by awareness 
or reflection; That is, of alteration in the soul itself, of which we are unaware 
because the impressions are either too minute and too numerous, or else too 
unvarying, so that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own. But when 
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they are combined with others they nevertheless have their effect and make 
themselves felt, at least confusedly, within the whole.138  
 
Such insensible perceptions are confused while they remain single parts, but become 
clear as they accumulate. Leibniz explained these petite perceptions by appealing to the 
notion of actual infinity which he considered to be an expression of the law of continuity, 
as he pointed out: “all of which supports the judgment that noticeable perceptions arise by 
degrees from ones which are too minute to be noticed. To think otherwise is to be ignorant 
of the immeasurable fineness of things, which always and everywhere involves an actual 
infinite.”139 
 As we have seen, the basis of this reasoning can be found in Physics. In that book we 
find the claim that the alterations suffer the same process of generation as happens in a 
living being: there is a cumulative progression of many stages or degrees until the end of 
the process is achieved. The infinitely divided or small is understood, through a rising 
process to reach a limit, becoming a complete and clear perception. Thus we have the 
elements for Leibniz to appropriate the infinitesimal calculus, which he invented as the 
mathematical expression of the analysis of the infinite, into an instrument for the analysis 
of cognitive faculties. As Michel Serres stated, perception is no more than an “integral” of 
petite perceptions: “Une connaissance donnée domine toujours une décomposition 
élémentaire qui la prépare, celle-ci découvre une infinité, la décomposition est 
différentiation et l’idée ou connaissance qui la domine est une intégrale.”140 Also the 
calculus puts the perceptions (and the knowledge, the memory, the creation, etc) into the 
context of final causes: “la théorie place également les petite perceptions dans un contexte 
téléologique”141 (as we have seen, the limit was identified by Aristotle with the end or 
goal). 
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 The notion of infinitesimal perception, or its correlate, the idea of infinitesimal 
endeavour or conatus was also an object of Leibniz’s attention in his thinking about 
dynamics. The conatus is said to be the origin of movement. In this he was following 
Hobbes, who, before him, arrived at an intuitive understanding of infinitesimal processes. 
Hobbes defined endeavour as infinitesimal motion or “motion made in less space and time 
than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number.”142 Equally for Leibniz 
“thinking is an endeavor or minimum motion, and there can be several endeavors in the 
same (space).”143 This identification of thinking with movement, in which Leibniz followed 
Hobbes, Aristotle and ultimately Plato, was important for his project of deducing the 
science of dynamics from the monads. 
 In his theory of monads, Leibniz proposed that monads do not have only perceptions 
of their immediate experiences in its world. They have also petite (unconscious) 
perceptions of all that will happen to them in the future. Moreover, all monads express the 
totality of the world (all other monads) with some degree of obscurity. In a certain sense the 
monad is omniscient (although only on an unconscious level). In fact, to support this aspect 
of the theory of monads Leibniz appealed to the Aristotelian theory of the active intellect: 
“...in sum ... there is something divine in mind, which Aristotle called active intellect, and 
this is the same as the omniscience of God.”144 In fact, Leibniz said that it is God who 
mediates what one monad can perceive from another, or from the world. What God does is 
to intervene in each monad to select from the infinite set of possibilities – some of which 
will be gathered in a singular series of privileged perceptions. This process is similar to his 
work of creating a world from an infinite set of possibilities. Leibniz’s conception was that 
a chain of these perceptions selected from the infinite background, (which is the totality of 
the world) will create a law of series or the concept of each individual. Thus Leibniz said that 
the series of petite perceptions, which are traces of former states, are constitutive of the 
individual. As he put it: “these insensible perceptions also indicate and constitute the same 
individual, who is characterized by vestiges or expressions which these perceptions 
conserve from the individual’s former states, thereby connecting these with his present 
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state.”145 These vestiges of former states, together with obscure perceptions or 
precognitions of future states, will constitute the unity of the individual concept. In the 
creation of this notion of sense, Leibniz was possibly also following Aristotle, who 
mentioned that “the unity is ... in some cases that of serial succession” (Met. Γ1005a11). 
This last assertion, combined with the Aristotelian doctrine that the sphere of the actual is 
prior to the potential, explains many aspects of the Leibnizian idea of the concept of the 
individual. 
 Since Leibniz used this theory to account for the individual, it is no surprise that he 
also used it to explain his principle of identity of indiscernible: “I have also pointed out that 
in consequence of imperceptible variations no two individual things could be perfectly 
alike…”146 We find a better indication that Aristotle is his source in this respect in a text 
from 1698: On nature in itself; or on the force residing in created things, or on the force 
residing in created things and their actions. Also referring to the principle of identity of the 
indiscernible (“there is nowhere any perfect similarity”), he said:  
 
… it is, I believe, because he had understood something of this, that Aristotle, 
more profound in my opinion than many think, judged that in addition to local 
change there was need of alteration, and that matter would not be invariable. 
Moreover, this dissimilarity or diversity of qualities, and hence this ἄλλοίωσις 
or alteration, which Aristotle did not sufficiently explain, comes from the 
diverse degrees and directions of efforts, and so from the modifications of 
indwelling monads. We understand by this that there must be in bodies 
something besides a uniform mass and its local motion.”147 
 
 Perhaps we could understand Aristotle’s notion of being qua being of as that sphere 
of reality which has in actuality all that will happen to each monad. In fact both notions, 
that is, the being qua being and the individual monads, share self-sufficiency (except with 
regard to God) since they only deal with their own thoughts (a kind of self-intuition). Both 
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are said to be outside the determinations of space and time. Both are said to be the principle 
of individuation (which can be interpreted as confounding them with matter or the source of 
matter. But further, the being qua being can be seen as an essence (as unity) that is the 
necessary condition for the existence of substance, which will have the gradual 
development of a series of predicates (the operatio). 
 
This chapter has presented the concept of being and substance in Aristotle. All the sections 
are connected by the guiding notion that unity for Aristotle is a unity of the soul, a fact 
which explains that it is a thing of process, that it has cumulativity of changes and that the 
whole activity depends on a certain notion of the unconscious. I have compared it with 
Leibniz and showed that it was an important factor in his doctrine of the monad and his 
notion of petites perceptions. It is important to stress, however, that not all Aristotle’s 
philosophy of is harmonious with Leibniz’s system. A great part of the Aristotelian theory 
of perception, which I will discuss in Chapter 5, does not fit very well into Leibniz’s 
system.  
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Chapter IV – Plotinus and Leibniz 
 
 
This chapter initially contains an historical introduction to Plotinus, with some notes about 
his efforts towards a philosophical synthesis of the previous schools. The rest of the chapter 
consists of two parts. The first part attempts to show how Plotinus understood the 
production of substances in the eternal and their fall into the sphere of time. The second 
part deals with the dimension of simultaneity and the communication of substances. The 
theories presented in Part I are the basis for Part II. At the conclusion of each part there is a 
comparison with Leibniz.  
 Plotinus attempted to unite the many intuitions of Aristotle that are scattered in his 
many books into something close to a system, and he tried to unify these intuitions into a 
Platonic framework. Inside this framework his union of the three hypotheses of Plato’s 
Parmenides is important in the creation of his system. The claim here is that Plotinus is the 
strongest influence in the system of Monadology, because Leibniz took the synthesis of 
Plotinus up to its final consequences.  
 Leibniz himself said that he was more a Platonist than anything else, that many of his 
basic doctrines were to be found in Plato, and that the reading of Plato had had a profound 
influence on the development of his thought. According to George M. Ross, this admiration 
for Plato has been carefully registered by scholars such as Foucher de Careil, Brunner, 
Schrecker and Belaval. However as Ross explains, the doctrines he saw as Platonic are 
different from genuine Platonism and can be best recognised as Neo-Platonist.148  
 This is true despite the fact that Leibniz had criticised some Neo-Platonists (for 
example, Fludd, More and Cudworth) for having distorted the ideas of Plato in various 
ways, either by extending spiritualism too far or by interpreting Plato too superficially. On 
the other hand, he praises Plotinus for his Parmenidian concept of unity, and the 
Renaissance Neo-Platonist and Cabalist tradition (the Paracelsians, such as the two Van 
Helmonts) for their universal vitalism. 
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 Perhaps it is specifically in the figure of Plotinus that we can find the system which, 
better than any other ancient school, lays the foundation of Leibniz’s doctrine. The Neo-
Platonists, as is known, thought of themselves as simply Platonists, or better, as followers 
of the ancient wisdom brought to Greece by Pythagoras and developed by Plato. However, 
they worked strongly to incorporate elements of the philosophy of Aristotle and of the 
Stoics. Facing the problems and questions postulated by both Plato (they praised mainly the 
Timaeus and the Parmenides) and Aristotle (as in Metaphysics), they made an effort to 
achieve a great synthesis.149 
 Thus, Plotinus constructed a system that tries to unify the three main schools of 
antiquity, Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism, on the basis of the belief that these 
schools could be seen as pertaining to a very old tradition, much older than Greek 
civilisation. Whether he was successful in this enterprise remains in question, but it is true 
that the whole Neo-Platonic philosophy can be read as an eclectic enterprise in the better 
sense of the word recognised by Hegel:  
 
In the better sense of the word the Alexandrians may, however, very well be 
called eclectic philosophers, though it is quite superfluous to give them this 
designation at all. For the Alexandrians took as their groundwork the 
philosophy of Plato, but they availed themselves of the general development of 
Philosophy, which after Plato they became acquainted with through Aristotle 
and all the following philosophies, and especially through the Stoics; that is to 
say, they reinstated it, but invested with a higher culture.150  
 
 Having in mind this effort of synthesis, we can stress the central importance of a 
doctrine found in Plotinus, to the discussion of Leibniz. This doctrine, found in Timaeus, is 
the principle of participation that says “all things are in each thing, but in each according to 
its own way of being.” In his introduction to MacKenna's translation of The Enneads, Paul 
Henry says that Plotinus is in debt to Numenius, who interpreted a passage of Timaeus 
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(39e) to create the doctrine of three superior principles or hypostases, that he calls the three 
Gods: the father, the creator and the creation.151  
 Paul Henry called attention to the fact that in V Ennead I, 8 Plotinus discussed the 
three hypostases, the One, the Intellect and the Soul of the World, and regards these three 
principles as being connected with the three hypotheses of the Parmenides of Plato. The 
first principle is the One, the pure unity that transcends Being or the world of forms and all 
material reality. According to Henry, Plotinus also identified the One with the Good 
discussed in the dialogue of the Republic of Plato (Rep. vi 509b).152 The association of the 
three hypotheses of the Parmenides (which are different conceptions of unity) will have 
important consequences for Plotinus’ system and it seems that Leibniz adopted this same 
structure. It is not clear, however, as we have said before, that Plato would agree with this 
move. 
 
The One, the Good and Plotinus’ Theory of Procession  
 
In Plotinus the notion of emanation or irradiation of powers is of central importance. He 
defended the premise of the fundamental reality, the eternal One, from which other realities 
emanate, while its unity remains intact. With this notion of pure or intact unity we can see 
that Plotinus made his choice between the other options of unity that existed before him. He 
did not choose a unity parallel to the multiplicity, as we have seen in some Pythagoreans, 
nor did he choose a unity produced by a previous Unlimited. He took care to separate his 
unity from the Being. The partless Unity only pertains to the first principle which is 
completely simple, the Good. It seemed to Plotinus a logical necessity that the Unity should 
be free of all multiplicity, as he considered that the Unity cannot be the total of beings, or a 
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sum of beings, since in that case its oneness would be cancelled. In this sense, therefore, we 
can say that Plotinus accepts the considerations of Aristotle about unity. In fact after the 
first and simple principle, everything is contaminated by multiplicity. Thus the Unity is said 
to be beyond being and as such it is transcendent. However, its unity is the cause of the 
unity of all that comes after it. 
 Thus Plotinus in this sense indicated that this primordial unity is not exactly a 
number, but the foundation of all numbers. This gives intelligibility to the all or the being. 
He made intelligibility and unity equivalent, but the same unity is also the cause of the 
existence of beings and their forms:  
 
And just as there is, primarily or secondarily, some form or idea from the 
monad in each of the successive numbers – the latter still participating, though 
unequally, in the unity – so the series of Beings following upon The First bear, 
each, some form or idea derived from that source. In Number the participation 
establishes Quantity; in the realm of Being, the trace of The One establishes 
reality: existence is the trace of The One – our word for entity may probably be 
connected with that for unity.153  
 
 This primacy of the unity, then, is the basis for the doctrine of the emanation or 
procession, which postulates that this primordial reality irradiates the other levels of reality 
from itself. The consequence of this notion is that emanation or procession is a descending 
movement, which proceeds from the superior to the imperfect and from unity to 
multiplicity, a movement that is, in certain way, non-teleological. Plotinus said: “The 
emanation, then, must be less good, that is to say, less self-sufficing: now what must that be 
which is less self-sufficing than The One? Obviously the Not-One, that is to say, 
multiplicity, but a multiplicity striving towards unity; that it is to say, a One-that-is-
many.”154 Thus when Plotinus defended the idea that multiplicity is a derivation from the 
One, he shared not the original but the later development of the Pythagorean theory, which 
                                                 
153Fifth Ennead  V, 5. 
154 It strives towards the One-that-is many because the pure unity is beyond being. Fifth Enn. III, 15. 
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is the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine that the dyad is issued from the monad.155 The asymmetry 
is present because the dyad is always less good than the monad.  
 The movement of emanation is counter-balanced by the tendency to return to the 
One, the conversion. This second movement is the turning back of that which was 
emanated, for the contemplation of the principle from which it derives. The ultimate goal of 
this movement is a striving towards its origin, and so we have the basis for the doctrine of 
finality. To understand better this return to the One, we need to remember that for Plotinus 
the One is also the Good. It is because it is the ultimate Good that the act of everything else 
is directed toward it, but it itself does not look for anything else. Plotinus said it is beyond 
existence but because it does not look for anything else, and is therefore characterised by a 
certain immobility or stability, it turns out to be the foundation of existence or being. Thus 
it is the ultimate goal and at the same time the spring of all aspiration, desire or will. 
Plotinus explained:  
 
Now, if all aspiration and Act whatsoever are directed toward the Good, it 
follows that the Essential-Good neither need nor can look outside itself or 
aspire to anything other than itself: it can but remain unmoved, as being, in the 
constitution of things, the wellspring and first cause of all Act: whatsoever in 
other entities is of the nature of Good cannot be due to any Act of the Essential-
Good upon them; it is for them on the contrary to act towards their source and 
cause. The Good must, then, be the Good not by any Act, not even by virtue of 
its Intellection, but by its very rest within itself.156  
 
It seems that here Plotinus was thinking in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of the ultimate 
self-thinking substance as the foundation or substratum of everything else. Thus the One 
has a kind of activity which is its self-sufficing activity or its life. This can be called the act 
of essence of the One. But the act going out of the essence is its emanation, which Plotinus 
referred to frequently as an image (in Greek, eidōlon). Basically this is the dualism of 
                                                 
155 See note number 60. 
156PLOTINUS, First Enn. VII, 1 This is similar to what Plotinus says about substance in the Sixth Ennead: 
“Substance, then is that from which all other things proceed and to which they owe their existence; it is the 
centre of passivity and the source of action.” Sixth Enn. III, 4. 
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Platonic tradition, as propounded in the Timaeus (27C–29D), between the archetypal world 
of ideas and the world of appearances, images. For Plotinus, like Plato, the image was of 
less value than the original, as he indicated in the fifth Ennead: “Now even in the Divine 
the engendered could not be the very highest; it must be a lesser, an image.”157 In the case 
of the One, it is the Intellect which is the emanated image. On the next level, the Intellect is 
substantial activity and the soul is the act going out of the essence, its image. This same 
paradigm is again repeated in the relation of soul with the material world.  
 If the Good is self-sufficient and as such the substratum, it is nonetheless true that all 
that comes after looks for it also as the object of the conversion.  
 
The Good has no need of the Intellectual-Principle which, on the contrary, 
needs it, and, attaining it, is shaped into Goodness and becomes perfect by it. 
The Form thus received, sprung from the Good, brings it to likeness with the 
Good. Thus the traces of the Good discerned upon it must be taken as an 
indication of the nature of that Archetype: we form a conception of its 
Authentic Being from its image playing upon the Intellectual-Principle.158  
 
The Intellect is perfected by the Good and in this process images of goodness and 
oneness are communicated to itself; images which are the forms (and numbers) themselves, 
principles of order and beauty. It is in this way that the Plotinian doctrine says that the 
Good is the cause of the perfecting of the Universe or Nature.159 Ultimately the doctrine of 
the Good is the justification for the explanations based in final causes.  
 However, because the Intellect has the One–Good immanent in itself it also contains 
the will, which is identified with the process of intellection. Thought is the will as it attains 
its final goal, which is its good:  
 
                                                 
157 Fifth Enn. I, 7. 
158 Third Enn. VIII, 10. 
159 The same conversion happens in nature: “Nature produces by looking to the Good, for it looks towards 
Order – which has its being in the consistent total of the good, while the unordered is ugly, a member of the 
system of evil, and besides, Nature itself clearly springs from the divine realm from the Good and Beauty.” 
PLOTINUS, Third Enn. V, 1. 
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The contemplating Intellect, the first or highest, has self-disposal to the point 
that its operation is utterly independent; it turns wholly upon itself; its very 
action is itself; at rest in its good it is without need, complete, and may be said 
to live to its will; there the will is intellection: it is called will because it 
expresses the Intellectual-Principle in the willing-phase and, besides, what we 
know as will imitates this operation taking place within the Intellectual-
Principle. Will strives towards the good, which the act of Intellectual-Principle 
realizes. Thus that principle holds what will seeks, that good whose attainment 
makes will identical with Intellection.”160  
 
Like Aristotle, Plotinus also identified thought with act or action. In other words, the act of 
the intellect is the thought and the culmination of the will. It is important to stress here that 
in Plotinus the process of intellection goes together with or is inseparable from will. 
 
2 – The Intellect in Plotinus 
 
Plotinus used the Pythagorean term “dyad”, to describe this level of reality after the One. 
This is called Intellect or Intellectual Principle (or yet again Spirit, Nous) and is created 
with the introduction of principle of multiplicity or alterity, although Plotinus also uses the 
term “Divine Mind”. The dyad is the Intellectual World, or the realm of Ideas: “‘out of the 
indeterminate dyad and the One arise the ideas and the numbers’: for the dyad is the 
Intellectual-Principle.”161 Here Plotinus was being faithful to Plato, who before him placed 
the interaction of the Limited and the Unlimited of the Pythagoreans in the transcendental 
sphere and not inside the world itself as the Pythagoreans thought. Thus the dyad, or 
matter, is the first product of the One (the Good), since it is an emanation from it, and when 
it turns back to contemplate the One, it generates the numbers and the Ideas from this 
vision. This dyad is, in fact, a kind of indeterminate intelligible matter. When it turns to 
contemplate the One it acquires determination, generating the Nous or Intellect. 
                                                 
160 Sixth Enn. VIII, 6. 
161 Fifth Enn. V, 2. 
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 Thus contemplation or thinking implies the idea of a multiplicity of thoughts being 
thought. The Intellect contemplating the One thinks, besides the archetypal Ideas, an 
infinity of thoughts (thus it is a dyad, as Plotinus said). For Plotinus the Intellectual 
Principle is a Seeing and, as seeing, the Intellect implies duality or the first alterity. The 
first division created by the emanation of the principle of the dyad is the division of subject 
and object or thinker and its matter. On another level of meaning of the term “dyad”, the 
Intellect is undetermined in its infinity (since it results from procession), but achieves form 
and perfection from its seeing (its reversion).162 In some sense the Intellect is not only this 
amorphous infinite (or a kind of matter) because it unifies and perfects itself, creating 
numbers and ideas when it contemplates the One. Moreover, there is a certain circularity, 
because the subject and its matter confound themselves. In this sense Plotinus is part of the 
tradition coming from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, who claim that Being is equivalent 
to thought.  
 Plotinus said that Being is the Intellect thinking, and it thinks itself or its own 
thoughts. He explains this point when he says that the process of thinking implies the 
existence of a potentiality that is turned into actuality. Thus a kind of matter is being 
presented to thought, intelligible matter:  
 
The Intellectual-Principle is a seeing, and a Seeing which itself sees; therefore it 
is a potentiality which has become effective. This implies the distinction of 
Matter and Form in it – as there must be in all actual seeing – the Matter in this 
case being the Intelligibles which the Intellectual–Principle contains and 
sees.163  
 
 If we consider the question as to whether the Intellect was seeing the One or was 
seeing itself, Reale clarified: “the Spirit, in fact, doesn’t think the One, but thinks itself as 
full and fecundate by the One.”164 This means that even at that stage the One is already 
immanent in Intellect. It is the final goal but it is also immanent. As we have seen, it is the 
                                                 
162 In this sense Plotinus says: “There is a infinity in the Intellectual Principle since, of its very nature, it is a 
multiple unity”. Sixth Enn VII, 14. 
163 Third Enn. VIII, 10, theorein means looking at or viewing, rather meaning intuitive than discursive 
thought. 
164 REALE, G., História da filosofia antiga, vol. 2, São Paulo, Loyola, 1994. p. 461. 
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substance of the Spirit. We have already said that the Intellect produces an infinity of 
thoughts or ideas because of its own nature as a dyad. Thus we can conclude that in 
contemplating the One from its own infinite nature it at the same time creates and 
contemplates infinite thoughts (each thought as a formal entity implies unity).  
 Because the Intellectual Substance is substance in the first degree, or truly a Being, it 
alone has true existence and other beings have it only to a lower degree.165 They are 
thinking substances and are at the same time intelligences and intelligibles, which dismiss 
the possibility of regarding the intelligibles as mere representations. It seems to Plotinus 
that since the thinking substances are in direct contact with their intelligibles and because 
the thinking substances are themselves intelligibles, they are consequently in the possession 
of truth. But this possession of their own intelligibles implies that the substance 
paradoxically possesses all intelligibles and this can happen because the being of the 
thinking substance is derived from the One. This derivation allows the Intellect to share the 
oneness or wholeness of the One. We can see this in the following passage from Enneads:  
 
Only the Transcendent can be that; it is the great beginning, and the beginning 
must be a really existent One, wholly and a truly One, while its sequent, poured 
down in some way from the One, is all, a total which has participation in unity 
and whose every member is similarly all and one. What then is the All? The 
total of which the Transcendent is the Source. But in what way is it that source? 
In the sense, perhaps, of sustaining things as bestower of the unity of each 
single item? That too; but also as having established them in being.166  
 
 The previous passage is worthy of note, since Plotinus enunciated the idea that the 
level of the Intellect is a totality in which each member “is similarly all and one.” If we 
combine this with the notion that the Intellectual Principle is infinite, we have the picture of 
a totality of infinite substances, with each participating in the unity of the One and being at 
same time the all. In this infinite number of substances, each substance is itself an authentic 
being or full being, and as such it is infinite, not limited. Its infinity means that it thinks all 
                                                 
165 Sixth Enn. I, 3. 
166 Fifth Enn. III, 15. 
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other ideas, since to think is to be. Consequently, it is in some sense all others at the same 
time: everything in everything. Nevertheless, the intelligible objects keep their individual 
identity despite being present to all others. Each one contains the whole and is part of the 
whole without losing its individuality in the whole. As individuals each object is subject to 
the qualification that the whole is present “in each according to its own way of being.” 
 In this direction it is to be noted that not only are the general or archetypal ideas part 
of the Intellectual world but so are individuals and modes or accidents of individual things. 
Thus the Intellectual world is the producer of infinite formal diversity. Plotinus considered 
that there is a pre-existence of individuals in that sphere:  
 
Before we had our becoming Here we existed There, men other than now, some 
of us gods: we were pure souls, Intelligence inbound with entire of reality, 
members of the Intellectual, not fenced off, not cut away, integral to that All. 
Even now, it is true we are not put apart (…).167  
 
Because each substance reflects each other, those infinite substances reflect in themselves 
the archetypal or general ideas.  
 As a result of this doctrine we also have the character of the eternity of the Intellect. 
Plotinus affirmed that characteristic of the Intellect in passages such as the following: 
“Now the life of Authentic-Existence is measurable not by time but by eternity; and eternity 
is not a mere more or less or a thing of any magnitude but is the unchangeable, the 
indivisible, is timeless Being.”168 Time, he said, is a characteristic of the Soul. In fact, it 
arises with the activity of the Soul, which is the sphere of succession.169 Nothing is lacking 
on the level of Intellect because it is All. 
 
                                                 
167Sixth Enn. IV, 1.4. It was a Greek belief, and it was made notorious by Socrates’ biography, that each man 
has a personal daimon (in Latin genius), in the superior sphere; even Plotinus refers to it as the Primal man. 
168First Enn. V, 7. Regarding this aspect, the Intellect is said to be in the sphere of the monad and not in the 
sphere of the dyad, because the dyad is the sphere for more or less or the sphere of graduation. 
169Fourth Enn. IV, 15 Also in the Third Enn. VII, 13 he wrote: “Simply, that the Soul-Movement has for its 
Prior Eternity which knows neither its progression nor its extension. The descent towards Time begins with 
this Soul movement; it made Time and harbours Time as concomitant to its Act. And this is how Time is 
omnipresent: that Soul is absent from no fragment of the cosmos just as our Soul is absent from no particle of 
ourselves.” 
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3 – The Good and Intellect in Leibniz 
 
3.1 – The Good 
 
Beginning with the notion of the Good, Leibniz followed Plotinus in placing the Good as 
the cause of the increasing perfection of things in the world and the purposive or finalist 
feature of the cosmos. Now, in his version of the return or conversion to the One, all the 
monads contemplate the cosmos or the totality with a better or lesser degree of clarity, 
forming a great chain of being.170 This notion is not in contradiction with the assertion that 
the monads are contemplating the world. Leibniz, in fact, said that we can only see the 
world by means of God and the world itself is only a sign of this ultimate reality, God.  
 The degree of perfection that a monad can achieve is proportional to the clarity of its 
perceptions. Following the precept of Parmenides that to think is to be, as they reflect the 
Good with more clarity, they themselves become better or more perfected. They have a 
spontaneous movement, the appetition or desire, for new perceptions. Reaching new 
perceptions, they achieve at the same time pleasure and a new degree of perfection, in a 
never-ending ascent towards higher levels of perfection. In certain passages, pleasure, 
which is the signal of the reception of goodness, has the meaning of increasing in 
perfection. For example: “In us, pleasure is the sense of increase in perfection; in God it is 
perfection in its entirety, possessed once for all.”171 
 This whole process seems to be explained by Plotinus with the idea of identification 
of the One with the Good, summarised in the passage quoted above where he says: “the 
will is intellection.” 
 In the Intellect the intelligible substances are each a unity and they have goodness 
because they receive an impression from the One. Thus each intelligible substance has a 
definition or a limitation which constitutes its form, its oneness. Thus it is implicit in 
Plotinus that the idea of each form by itself implies a choice from the field of possibilities 
or indetermination (chaos) which is the dyad, the intelligible matter prior to contemplation. 
                                                 
170 The expression used by Lovejoy as the theme and title of his book: The Great Chain of Being. 
171 LEIBNIZ, De Summa Rerum, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, p. 83. Again if Plotinus says that the 
forms have “sprung from the Good,” and so have traces of the Good, Leibniz equally says that “perception, 
pleasure, and happiness are everywhere.” p. 83. 
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Following Plato (in Timaeus 47e–53c), he believed that matter (dyad) is a mere possibility 
of being. In fact, matter regarded as infinity can mean the infinity of all possibilities. Thus 
the act of contemplation implies choices and these are choices that are manifested in the 
unities of ideas or individual substances. Because the One is connected with the Good, we 
can say that these selections are better in relation to the previous state of indetermination of 
the dyad. Thus the ideas of the One and the Good meet in the concept of order. By contrast, 
there is no choice in Leibniz’s sense, in that the understanding and the will work together 
and forms are produced almost necessarily. 
 This is not the case with Leibniz, although the chain of beings of his Monadology 
seems to be an example of this notion of parallelism of goodness and form. In fact, each 
monad is situated in the hierarchy of monads according to its degree of perfection. If 
perfection can be related to the pleasure or volitional aspects of the soul (will) we can 
understand why Loemker said that in Leibniz the will of God is identified with the 
understanding: “Descartes’ theory of the will was promptly corrected by both Spinoza and 
Leibniz in the interest of the older tradition; both of them affirmed that “will is nothing but 
(or “does not differ from”) the intellect.”172 This is the position of Plotinus and Spinoza, but 
I do not consider that this identification exists in Leibniz, or, rather, it exists only in parts of 
his system.  
 It is true that Leibniz was opposed to Descartes, who conceived the precedence of the 
will of God (which we can identify with the Good) in relation to his understanding. Thus, 
for Descartes, God could have chosen different laws of logic. But against the thesis of 
identification of the understanding and will, Leibniz asserted in The Discourse the 
precedence of the understanding. As he put it, “besides it seems that every act of will 
implies some reason for willing and that this reason naturally precedes the act of will 
itself.”173 And he continued, saying that the truths of geometry and metaphysics are 
consequences of his understanding which are not established by his will. “Hence their 
necessity is blind, unintelligent” says Joseph,174 in so far as they are independent of final 
causes. But Leibniz wanted to preserve the freedom of God so that he could use this 
                                                 
172 LOEMKER, L., Struggle for Synthesis, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 131. 
173 LEIBNIZ, Discourse of Metaphysics, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. L. Loemker, Dordrecht, D. 
Reidel Publishing, 1969, p. 304. 
174 JOSEPH, H. W. B., Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949, p. 90. 
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prerogative to make a better choice (intelligent choice) in the production of the most perfect 
world, whose laws are for this reason contingent. God has a will, which is the capacity for 
choosing: “… we take the will for the power of choosing, the exercise of which is 
volition.”175  
The One of Plotinus, as for Plato, on the contrary, seems to necessarily produce the world. 
As Lovejoy said: “This expansiveness or fecundity of the God, moreover, as Plato clearly 
implies, is not the consequence of any free and arbitrary act of choice of the personal 
creator in the myth; it is a dialectical necessity.”176 This view was followed by Spinoza, 
who said that: “God produces the world by that necessity by which he knows himself.”177 
But the God of Leibniz uses creative intelligence and his prerogative of choice to produce 
the best possible world. And for this reason he reproached Spinoza; “From what precedes it 
is seen that what Spinoza says on the intellectual love of God (Eth., pt. 4, prop. 28) is only 
trappings for the people, since there is nothing lovable in a God who produces without 
choice and by necessity, without discrimination of good and evil.”178 
 Leibniz rejected the idea of those “who say that the works of God are good only for 
the formal reason that God has made them.”179 This seems to be the case for Plotinus, but 
Leibniz also shares some similarities with him. Leibniz also treated the initial state as 
unordered. Thus, the infinity of the possible objects precedes order, since they can be 
contradictories. As such they are completely without form, and are chaotic or unthinkable. 
In this sense Leibniz said: “All possibles cannot be understood distinctly by anyone, for 
they imply contradiction.”180 Contradiction, therefore, is the principle of impossibility. To 
give order to chaos means to give existence to some possibles, turning them to actuality by 
exclusion of the contradictory. The creation of order occurs then, since the exclusion of 
contradictories allows for a nexus of subordination of the possible into a totality, or an 
order of connection inside the whole. In this sense the principle of identity is itself 
achieving the good by eliminating the contradictory and so creating order. But after the 
separation of the incompatibles into compatible wholes, we still need the exercise of 
                                                 
175 LEIBNIZ, Refutation of Spinoza (1708), Wiener, p. 493. 
176 LOVEJOY, A., The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 54. 
177 Ep. 49 quoted by Leibniz, in LEIBNIZ, Wiener, p. 492. 
178 LEIBNIZ, Refutation of Spinoza , Wiener, p. 496. 
179 LEIBNIZ, Discourse of Metaphysics, section 2, Loemker, p. 304. 
180 LEIBNIZ, De Summa Rerum, p. 29. 
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choice. Thus from a group of many sets of possibles it is necessary to choose one, of which 
the constitutive order is more harmonious, to produce the world. The idea that guides 
Leibniz is also that God is working with a continuous entity, and as such, it involves an 
infinity from which He can make his choices. Leibniz always had in mind the analogy of 
geometrical continuity: “… Geometrical figures appear simpler than moral entities; but 
they are not so, because anything which is continuous involves an infinity, from which 
selections must be made.”181 From a continuous plane someone can draw an infinity of 
forms of triangles, but if s/he wants the most perfect form, s/he will choose the equilateral, 
whose symmetry of proportions, in some sense, reflects the unity of God. Thus, choosing 
the best from the several possibles is influenced by the perfection (goodness) of God. 
Furthermore, for Leibniz it was also a condition of this perfection that he could exert his 
creative freedom. Thus God always chooses the best, and Leibniz always maintained that 
he does so without being compelled. Thus the principle of the best is the criterion according 
to which God chooses to mould the infinite matter into the best of possible worlds, 
choosing the most perfect world, which is the one with more reality or more being. 
According to the principle of Perfection, the best possible world is that which has the 
maximum reality. This means the maximum of diversity produced by the simplest cause: 
“simplest in hypothesis and richest in phenomena.” This is also the criterion for efficiency 
in the creative act of God, since it allows the production of the most with the least 
expenditure.182 Thus we can say that the proper work of the creative intelligence of God is 
based on the principle of the Best and linked with the philosophical notion of Good. 
 But this perfect world is the only possibility that achieves reality, that is, becoming 
the World. Many possibilities will remain possibilities for ever. This is in direct contrast 
with Plotinus’ view because, he said, following Plato, that the infinite power of the One is 
capable of producing an equally infinite effect, which is the Intellect in its infinite 
contemplation, ultimately the origin of everything in the world.183 Lovejoy analysed this 
                                                 
181 LEIBNIZ, New Essays, p. 385. 
182 “As for the simplicity of the ways of God, this is shown especially in the means which he uses, whereas 
the variety, opulence and abundance appear in regard to the ends or results. The one ought thus to be in 
equilibrium with the other, just as the funds intended for a building should be proportional to the size and 
beauty one requires in it.” LEIBNIZ, Discourse, section 5, Loemker, p. 306.  
183 Plotinus also had the conflicting ideas that the emanations of the One are always of less value than the One 
itself. For this reason matter is sometimes considered as a sign of evil or imperfection. The idea of conversion 
or return to the One requires or supposes this notion. 
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point, from which we deduce that not only the best possible but all possibles must be made 
real:  
 
How many kinds of temporal and imperfect beings must this world contain? – 
the answer follows the same dialectic: all possible kinds. The ‘best soul’ could 
begrudge existence to nothing that could conceivably possess it, and ‘desired 
that all things should be as like as himself as they could be.’ ‘All things’ here 
could consistently mean for Plato nothing less than the sensible counterparts of 
every one of the Ideas … In the Timaeus, it is true, Plato speaks of ‘living 
things’…but in respect of these, at least, he insists upon the necessarily 
complete translation of all the ideal possibilities into actuality … the fullness of 
the realization of the conceptual possibility in actuality … If any eternal 
essences have temporal counterparts, the presumption was that all do so, that it 
is of the nature of an Idea to manifest itself in concrete existences. If it were not 
so, the connection of the two worlds would have seemed unintelligible … I 
shall call it the principle of plenitude, … not only the thesis that the universe is 
a plenum formarum in which the range of conceivable diversity of kinds of 
living things is exhaustively exemplified, but also any other deduction from the 
assumption that no genuine potentiality of being can remain unfulfilled, that the 
extent and abundance of the creation must be as great as the possibility of 
existence and commensurate with the productive capacity of a ‘perfect’ and 
inexhaustible Source, and that the world is the better the more things it 
contains.184  
 
 In some sense Leibniz shared this view as well. Thus, for him, the axiom of 
perfection of God goes together with another notion: the idea of the equipollence between 
cause and effect: “We say that the effect involves its cause; that is, in such a way that 
whoever understands some effect perfectly will also arrive at knowledge of its cause. For it 
is necessary that there is some connection between a complete cause and the effect.”185 The 
                                                 
184LOVEJOY, A., The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, pp. 50–52. Lovejoy’s references are the Platonic 
dialogues of Parmenides 130 c, e and Timaeus 39 e, 42e, 51 a, 92 c. 
185 LEIBNIZ, De Summa Rerum, p. 51. 
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most important thing is that he uses this principle as an example of the correspondence of 
God and the world: “... every complete effect represents a complete cause, for from the 
knowledge of the effect I can always infer its cause. Thus … the world itself in a sense 
represents God.”186 The principle of equipollence is important for the science of dynamics, 
since it is built in analogy with the properties of the soul, and so the forces are also 
ultimately dependent on or in analogy with the Good (or the process toward the Good, the 
will). For Leibniz dynamics is related to the conatus of the monads, that is, their appetition 
or effort of passage from one perception to another. Ultimately, since the Good is identified 
with the One (in Plotinus), we have a clue regarding the principle of conservation in 
dynamics. 
 But if God manifests only some of his ideas, the axiom of equipollence cannot be 
defended. The Intellect is the most immediate emanation from the One; it shares more than 
any other reality its characteristic goodness (its forms). Thus it is the main mediate source 
of the order and perfection delivered to Nature. All ideas or all possible individual 
intelligible concepts therefore have some degree of goodness/oneness. Following Leibniz, 
these ideas could never be manifest, and consequently part of the goodness of God will 
never be manifested. The equipollence would be ruined. 
 But we still can attempt to understand this axiom on the basis of Leibniz’s claim that 
this is the best of the worlds. Thus if God is perfect and he is a cause, the world, as his 
effect, must be perfect too. But in this case we cannot see why a perfect Being will have 
possible thoughts, less perfect ones, which he will never express in the world. This seems 
to be against the principle of economy that Leibniz defends as the rule of the creation of the 
world.  
 
3.2 – The Intellect in Leibniz 
 
The infinite and eternal generation of intelligible substances in Plotinus in the sphere of the 
intellect can help us understand some concepts in Leibniz. Firstly, it can provide an 
explanation for the diversity of perception in each individual subject on that level. And 
secondly, it provides an understanding of the doctrine of the immanence of knowledge in 
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the substance, which is ultimately the basis of Leibniz’s doctrine that the monads have no 
windows.  
 The discussion of the Intellect in Plotinus, with his assertion that the infinity of forms 
is created by it was, perhaps, a starting point for some of the Leibnizian tenets. Thus, 
Plotinus’ statement that the infinity of forms or intelligible things is created as an 
emanation of the One has its exact equivalence in Leibniz, in that God emanates the infinite 
souls. The model for this creation is the form of God itself, which is varied infinitely 
according to different perspectives or from the point of view of the contemplation of God. 
In Leibniz usually there is no differentiation between One and Dyad, because the intellect is 
the mind of God, but the idea of infinity of form produced by contemplation is present in 
his philosophy.187  
 Leibniz was usually very close to Plotinus in defending a theory of emanation. Thus 
he said in the Discourse of Metaphysics:  
 
Now it is clear, first of all, that the created substances depend on God, who 
preserves them and indeed even produces them continually by a kind of 
emanation, as we produce our thoughts. For God turns the universal system of 
phenomena which he has seen fit to produce in order to manifest his glory, on 
all sides and in all ways, so to speak, and examines every aspect of the world in 
every possible manner, there is no relation which escapes his omniscience, and 
there thus results from each perspective of the universe, as it is seems from a 
certain position, a substance which expresses the universe in conformity to that 
perspective, if God sees fit to render his thought effective and to produce that 
substance.188  
 
 In a text written when he was young, De Summa Rerum, he expressed the same idea 
with a small modification, that the variety of perspectives comes from the same essence. 
                                                 
187 Sometimes Leibniz sustains a sharp dualism of God and Matter (that is, nothingness). Thus he says: “All 
creatures derive from God, and from nothingness (Nichts). Their self being (Selbstwesen) is of God, their 
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like numbers”. On The True Theologia Mystica, 1690, Loemker, p. 368. However this view is contrary to the 
general framework of the system of Monadology which is a kind of monist idealism. 
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The infinity of form is only a variation, by means of different perspectives, of the 
contemplation of the same entity (God), just as in Plotinus infinite variability is produced 
from the contemplation of the One: “There is the same variety in any kind of world, and 
this is nothing other than the same essence related in various ways, as if you were to look at 
the same town from various places…”189 And this essence is said to be the essence of God: 
“hence it comes about that the same essence of God is expressed in any genus of the world 
in its totality, and so God manifests himself in infinitely many ways.”190  
 In another part of the Discourse of Metaphysics we also have the doctrine of 
substances explained in terms of emanation.191 God is said to be light and the soul its 
image. The next passage is important because it displays the famous doctrine of Leibniz in 
which he says that the soul is alone with God. This is one of the arguments of his theory of 
non-communication between the monads:  
 
God is the only immediate object of our perceptions which exist outside of us, 
and he only is our light. In the rigorous sense of metaphysical truth there is no 
external cause which acts upon us except God alone, and he alone 
communicates himself immediately by virtue of our continual dependence upon 
him. Whence it follows that there is no external object that affects our soul and 
immediately excites our perception. It is also only by the virtue of the continual 
action of God upon us that we have in our soul the idea of all things; that is to 
say every effect expresses its cause, the essence of our soul is a certain 
expression, imitation or image of the divine essence, thought, and will and of 
all the ideas which are comprised in God  
 
After this passage comes Leibniz’s connection of the Platonic metaphor of the sun with the 
Aristotelian intellect agent:  
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God is the sun and the light of the souls (...) In addition to the Holy Scriptures 
and the Fathers, who were always more Platonists than Aristotelians. I recall 
having observed long ago that at the time of the Scholastics, several believed 
that God is the light of the soul, and as they put it, the intellectus agens animae 
rationalis.192 
 
 Plotinus referred to the level of the Intellectual Principle where the vision of 
everything seems to be an instantaneous intuition, and it is the condition necessary for the 
existence of infinity of forms on the level of reality where successiveness reigns, the reign 
of the Soul. The multiplicity which is simultaneous on the level of Intellect unfolds itself in 
the successiveness and is thus the condition of the finalist doctrine. The hypostasis of Soul 
is an emanation from the Intellect and as such it depends on it. This dependence can be 
translated as the relationship that exists between cause and effect. 
 In Leibniz, the infinity of forms will be present in the mind of God, but also in each 
individual mind, there is an intelligible world, following the doctrine of All in All. Leibniz 
expressly presented his ideas as being supported by the Plotinian system, explaining the 
differences between the mind of God and us. In a letter to Hansch of 1707 he wrote:  
 
Furthermore, as Plotinus has rightly said, every mind contains a kind of 
intelligible world within itself; indeed, in my opinion it also represents this 
sensible world to itself. But there is an infinite difference between our intellect 
and the divine, for God sees all things adequately and at once, while very few 
things are known distinctly by us; the rest lie hidden confusedly, as it were, in 
the chaos of perceptions. Yet the seeds of things we learn are within us.193  
 
Thus Leibniz not only adhered to this idea of an intelligible world within us but also added 
that even the sensible world is part or is included in that intelligible sphere. This notion is 
consistent with Plotinus’ system, in which the sensible world is the last manifestation of the 
hypostasis of the Intellect. 
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 Connected with this theme we have Plotinus’ notion, that the Intellectual Principle is 
a substance whose activity is basically self-awareness or self-reflection (a doctrine which 
recalls Aristotle’s self-thinking substances). This will also be a central theme in Leibniz, 
although mediated by Augustine’s and Descartes’ rethinking of it. Thus, for Leibniz, 
human self-consciousness, which he called apperception, is a kind of intuitive knowledge 
that is the key for many basic metaphysical concepts (of the referred intelligible world) 
which are also called perfections of God. By reflecting on himself, the subject can, by 
analogy, reach these basic notions. Thus the metaphysical notion of unity arises from 
reflection on the I or self. The simple internal experience of oneself can also give us the 
notions of substance, action (or force) and others, which is sufficient proof that they do not 
come from the senses. In a letter to Queen Sophia, in 1702, Leibniz affirmed that from this 
introspection we arrive at the basic metaphysical notions or simple Ideas of God: 
 
And since I conceive that there are other beings who have the right to say ‘I’, or 
for whom this can be said, it is by this that I conceive what is called substance 
in general. It is the consideration of myself also, which provides me with other 
concepts in Metaphysics, such as those of cause, effect, action, similarity, etc., 
and even those of logic and ethics.194  
 
 Thus we can see here that his idea of substance, the ultimate foundation of reality, has 
support in the idea of the self-reflecting ego. The self-reflecting ego is autonomous 
regarding the external world in the process of acquiring knowledge (at least of the truths of 
reason):  
 
What the ancient Platonists have said is thus quite true and quite worthy of 
consideration – that existence of intelligible things, particularly of the I who 
think and am called a mind or soul, is incomparably more certain than the 
existence of sensible things and that it would not be impossible, speaking with 
metaphysical rigor, that there should exist at bottom only intelligible 
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substances, of which sensible things would be only appearances. Instead, our 
lack of attention causes us to take sensible things for the only true ones. It is 
also well to observe that if I should discover some demonstrative truth, 
mathematical or other, in a dream (and this can in fact be done), it would be just 
as certain as if I were awake. This shows that intelligible truth is independent of 
the truth or existence of sensible and material things outside of us. This 
conception of being and of truth is thus found in the ego and in the 
understanding rather than in external senses (…). In the understanding we 
discover also what it means to affirm, to deny, doubt, will, and act. But above 
all we find there the force of the conclusions in reasoning, which are a part of 
what is called the natural light.”195 
 
 In all that we have referred to so far we see that the emphasis of Leibniz recalls the 
Platonic theory of knowledge, in something similar to the theory of reminiscence. The 
conception of the external environment as a source of knowledge is almost non-existent 
and, in this aspect, Leibniz is very far from Aristotle. Leibniz’s conception is that the 
natural light, which is the distinct understanding of the nature of the mind and its innate 
ideas, allows us to know the necessary truths or truths of reason with no need for the 
senses. They are always there, shining in the depths of the soul, but are obscured by our 
attention to the confused external things and our inclination to the necessities of the body. 
But for Leibniz this intuitive knowledge, which begins with the experience of self-
consciousness, allow us to know not only most abstract principles or concepts, but also to 
know intuitively that we think a multiplicity of thoughts. Thus, from self-experience I can 
infer the existence of the world (to which this multiplicity of thoughts refers). Here he 
seems to be talking not only of truths of reason, but also about the truths of fact. And in fact 
even the self-thinking basis of truth or reason seems to be derived from the fact that we 
have inner experiences:  
 
As for primary truth of fact, these are inner experiences which are immediate 
with the immediacy of feeling. This is where the first truth of the Cartesians and 
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St. Augustine belongs: I think therefore I am. That is, I am a thing which thinks. 
But we must realize that just as identities can be general or particular, and that 
they are equally evident in either case (since A is A is just evident as a thing is 
what it is) so it is with the first truth of facts. For not only is it immediately 
evident to me that I think, but it is just as evident that I think various thoughts; 
At one time I think about A and another about B and so on. Thus the Cartesian 
principle is sound, but is not the only one of its kind. This shows that all the 
primary truths of reason and of fact have in common that we cannot prove them 
by anything more certain.196 
 
 Most important is that for Leibniz, as it was for Aristotle, it is from the intuitive 
experience of oneself or self-awareness that we can deduce the abstract principle of 
identity, that he called the general law of being. This is the fundamental principle of reason, 
since it gives intuitive legitimacy or immediate validity to connections between coherent 
notions. And so it is the basis for the building of all discursive reasoning. As Loemker 
stressed, this principle is also broadened into a guiding scientific axiom since the principles 
of equality in mathematics (for instance, in algebraic equations), of congruence and 
similarity in geometry and mechanics, the principle of the equipollence of cause and effect 
or conservation in dynamics, and also the logical notion of identity of complete subject and 
complete predicate, are very important for the construction of his doctrine of monads.197 
 
4 – The Hypostasis of Soul in Plotinus 
 
In Plotinus we have a sphere of time in which the simultaneity of states of the universe can 
occur. Later (in the logical sense), this sphere will be translated into the successiveness of 
states of the entity in the realm of process, the soul. 
 Thus in the Hypostasis of Intellect proposed by Plotinus, the past and the future are 
contained in the eternal now:  
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Certainly there is no later in the divine; what is There as present is future for 
elsewhere. If then the future is present, it must be present as having been fore-
conceived for later coming to be; at that divine stage therefore it lacks nothing 
and therefore can never lack; all existed, eternally and existed in such a way 
that at the latter stage any particular thing may be said to exist for this or that 
purpose; the All, in its extension and so to speak unfolding, is able to present 
succession while yet it is simultaneous; this is because it contains the cause of 
all as inherent to itself.198  
 
Plotinus presented the notion of the Intellectual Principle, in which everything is 
simultaneous, as the necessary origin of the seminal causes of everything. It is a necessary 
condition for the existence of the world of process. The essence of a thing in Nature is its 
cause, which is a kind of “Idea itself, unfolded”. This is what Plotinus called the Reason–
Principles in Nature and this originates from the Intellectual realm. According to Cudworth, 
this is equivalent to the metaphysical seeds or seminal reasons of the Stoics.199 Thus, the 
theme of successiveness of acts of soul in Plotinus is treated with the adoption of the idea 
of spermatikos logoi.200 This notion, in its turn, is an adaptation of Aristotelian concepts, if 
we accept David Hahm’s thesis.201 In fact, it was Aristotle who took the Platonic eternal 
Ideas and brought them to the natural world, making them operative, and thus creating the 
concept of Entelechies. 
 The Stoic cosmobiology, however, emphasised the fact that the spermatikos logoi are 
metaphysical seeds containing the “seminal formula”, which will govern the developing 
individual, unfolding itself according to the seeds’ fate. The logoi contained the “seminal 
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formula” which governed the developing of the individual and how it would behave. The 
original seed was said (perhaps this is a Pythagorean reminiscence) to be made of fire (by 
Cleanthes) and was completely ruled by fate (heimarmene).202 The Stoics also linked this 
concept of fate with the idea of the cause as continuity. “Heimarmene is the continuous 
(literally: strung together) cause of things.”203 For Plotinus, the Reason–Principle is the 
unfolding of the Intellectual Principle in the realm of soul or in matter in the same way as 
there was for the Stoics the development of their metaphysical seeds. This is the creative or 
demiurgic work of the soul (in accordance with the Intellectual Principle) and it follows a 
pre-ordered rule or plan.204 
 Plotinus equivalently says: “Given the Reason-Principle (the out going divine idea) of 
a certain living thing and the Matter to harbor this seed principle, the living thing must 
come into being: in the same way.”205 The essential existence encompasses things of nature 
in its whole time of existence, from its beginning to its end, and in this sense it is its cause. 
These things were generated, as we have seen, in a sphere outside the dimension of time. 
Later on Augustine used this idea. In his account of the creation, in the book The Literal 
Meaning of Genesis, Augustine already proposed that in the event of creation God 
produced the seeds of all creatures at once.206 It was left for the ages to develop all the 
seeds and the contents of the seeds in due time.  
 Following the teaching of Aristotle, Plotinus posited the intellectual substances as 
those substances that are already activated, and as such they can awaken what is on the 
level of mere potentiality in the lower level of reality, that of the soul. For Plotinus, then, 
the Intellect is its entire content, simultaneously present or eternal. He differentiates it 
carefully from the process of the soul: “But though Intellect possesses them (his 
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constituents) all by way of thought, this is not a discursive thought, nothing it lacks that is 
capable of serving as Reason Principle, while it may itself be regarded as one great and 
Perfect Reason Principle ... It is a universal rule that whatever reasoning discovers to exist 
in Nature is to be found in the Intellect apart from all ratiocination.” 207 The Intellectual 
Principle is also a vision, but it possesses what it sees, since it possesses itself. There is no 
deficiency there. But the soul has a certain deficiency or lack of perfection, since it looks 
toward the Intellectual Principle for what it does not have, to be perfected by it. This is the 
reason why Plotinus says that “Wisdom comes first” while “Nature is last” but also: 
“Nature doesn’t know, it merely produces.”208 Nature acts intelligently, following an 
ordered series of steps, but does so without deliberation. Thus, for Plotinus, the notion of 
unconscious teleology also occupies a central place in the metaphysical scheme.  
 However, in other passages, Plotinus said that Nature does not have any deficiency. 
This is not an inconsistency of Plotinus because he was then considering the idea of the 
immanence of the Intellectual Principle (in the form of the Reason–Principle) in the soul 
and in Nature (regarded as the creative phase of the soul), which is the reason why he uses 
the term self-intellection: “... Nature does not lack; it creates because it possesses. Its 
creative act is simply its possession of its own characteristic Essence; now its Essence, 
since it is Reason–Principle, it is to be at once an act of contemplation and an object of 
contemplation.”209 
 But the soul is not the Intellect. Thus Plotinus explained that the discursiveness 
accompanies movement and both pertain to the realm of the soul. The movement, in fact, is 
caused by the successive process of reasoning or the discursiveness of the soul, as it unfolds 
the content of the Intellect. Thus when the soul turns back to contemplate its origin it is 
perfected, but this happens gradually, by the process of reasoning: “Sprung, in other words, 
from the Intellectual-Principle, Soul is intellective, but with an intellection operation by the 
method of reasoning ...”210 The soul is also an intelligible being and is activated when it 
turns to contemplate the Intellect. This is an intellective act or effort of the soul and it 
operates by reasoning, or successiveness of reasons. Obviously reasoning has a specific 
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meaning here. It does not mean deliberation exactly. It means that the unfolding of the 
content of the Intellect happens by degrees. Thus Plotinus adds that all kinds of life can be 
described as forms of thought, which vary in grades of thinking, and we have again the 
notion that the soul results as an emanation from the Intellectual-Principle, and, as such, the 
souls constitute seminal reasons, or Reason Principles, which manifest themselves in 
different degrees:  
 
In a certain sense no doubt all lives are thoughts – but qualified as thought 
vegetative, thought sensitive and thought psychic. What, then, makes them 
thoughts? The fact that they are Reason-Principles. Every life is some form of 
thought, but of dwindling clearness like the degrees of life itself ... Thus every 
Life, of the order strictly so called, is an Intellection. But while men may 
recognize grades in life they reject grade in thought… This is simply because 
they do not seek to establish what Life is. The essential is to observe that, here 
again, all reasoning shows that whatever exists is a bye-work of visioning 
(…).211  
 
 Thus Plotinus understood life as a certain kind of discursive thinking, as life varies in 
degrees because the soul gradually converts to its Intellect.  
 In many places in the Enneads, Plotinus insisted that the soul creates, after 
contemplation, a doctrine which is a development of the Parmenidian doctrine of the 
identity of being and thought. Thus, for Plotinus, to think or to see is to bring into being, or 
to see is to become what is seen, by virtue of the Parmenidian principle: “Thus the act of 
production is seen to be in nature an act of contemplation, for creation is the outcome of a 
contemplation which never becomes anything else, which never does anything else, but 
creates by simply being contemplation.”212 The soul accordingly has two aspects in its 
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action; it contemplates the Intellect on one side and produces Nature on the other. In fact, 
the creation of Nature is a mere by-product of the contemplation of the Intellect. 
 I consider that this exposition shows the strong immanentism of the philosophy of 
Plotinus. The subject has certain autonomy. All that happens is the development of an 
essence given since eternity. Consequently there is a devaluation of the external world, 
considered as a causative sphere. According to Plotinus, the external circumstances are not 
decisive. The same circumstance acts differently on different individuals, as the perception 
or judgment of the soul varies. But Plotinus attempted to avoid the notion of Stoic 
Providence or Heimarmene as a factor determining what will happen to a certain subject. 
He tried to stay close to Aristotle’s original notion of essence . Thus when he gave the 
example of the different conduct of persons he said: “The act of the libertine is not done by 
Providence or in accordance with Providence; neither is the action of the good done by 
Providence – it is done by the man – but is done in accordance with Providence, for it is an 
act consonant with the Reason-Principle.”213 
 
5 – Leibniz – Soul 
 
Plotinus’ notion of the eternal Intellect can provide a framework to explain Leibniz’s notion 
of individual concept. This notion implies that all states or perceptions (the predicates of 
the substance) that will happen to a certain individual subject are somehow totally given 
beforehand. Plotinus said that the substance considered as Soul presupposes the existence 
of the intelligible substance. But the intellectual substance of Plotinus exists basically in act 
and not activity and, in this sense, it can be compared to Leibniz’s individual concept of in 
the sense that it has already presented all events that will happen to the monad. Hence, the 
monad considered as an entity of process must presuppose the existence of this other stance 
or it could never have any intuition of its future states, as Leibniz claimed. We could say 
that the individual concept is the condition for the actualisation of the perceptions of the 
monad regarded as a thing of process. This is why he said the monad has no need of 
anything outside itself. It becomes what it is by self contemplation or self-thinking, because 
its individual notion as well as the intelligible world is immanent in itself, almost in the 
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same way as posited by Plotinus. Its duration is nothing more than the development of the 
content of its individual notion. The doctrine of individual concept is therefore strongly 
based in Plotinus, who in turn was inspired by Aristotle’s notion of essence and the Stoics’ 
notion of metaphysical seeds. These doctrines were accepted by Augustine, who saw them 
as being in concordance with the Biblical narrative. It is therefore strange that this notion of 
individual concept met with so bitter a reception on the part of Arnauld. After having 
received the thesis of Leibniz by means of Landgrave, Arnauld replied to this last:  
 
I find in these thoughts so many things to frighten me, and which if I mistake 
not nearly everyone will find so shocking, that I cannot see what would be the 
use of a writing that all the world apparently would reject. I will give as an 
example only what is said in article 13 – that the individual notion of each 
person contains once for all all that will ever happen to him.214  
 
Arnauld found this notion frightening because for him it seemed to imply a “necessity more 
than fatal.” 
 In the following correspondence Leibniz tried to convince Arnauld of his view in a 
detailed argumentation. But my purpose here is only to show that Leibniz was following 
the framework posited by Plotinus’ synthesis . As quoted above, Leibniz said that “God 
sees all things adequately and at once, while very few things are known distinctly by us; the 
rest lie hidden confusedly, as it were, in the chaos of perceptions.” In the Discourse he 
says: “One could call our ‘essence’ or ‘idea’ that which contains all that we express, and as 
it expresses our union with God himself, it has no limits …”215 In these propositions it is 
clearly implicit that the individual created substance cannot see the infinity of all things at 
once as God can. The soul or monad cannot see and will never see all things adequately, 
because it is attached to a certain point of view; this is its individuality. But in a limited 
way it shares the omniscience of God. From its individual point of view the soul can see, 
although dimly, the all. Thus for Leibniz, the infinite series of confused perceptions of the 
soul, which are organised in a series, becomes the foundation of the theory of individuality, 
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which he calls also the “idea” or “essence” of the individual. The principle that to see is to 
become what is seen (or the equivalence between to see and to be) seems to be the case of 
the monads, as their identity or essence lies in their individual series of perceptions. This 
notion demands that this particular infinite series of perceptions should be regarded as the 
individual’s point of view of the universe: 
 
What is most noteworthy in this is, that individuality involves infinity and only 
he who is capable of understanding it (infinity) can have knowledge of the 
principle of individuation of such or such thing, which comes from the 
influence (rightly understood) of all things in the universe on one another.216  
 
 Thus the idea of the individual concept implies a point of view regarding the totality 
of the Universe. This can happen because the soul brings with itself the intelligible world 
and so it, in some sense, has the science of everything that happens in the world. This is 
more or less the doctrine of Plotinus, that the intelligible substances which mirror the All 
present in the Intelligible World are brought to the realm of process, the realm of the soul. 
Leibniz proposed that the soul will have a specific position in the universe in such a way 
that it will obtain a specific set of perceptions, which are the basis for its individual notion. 
But this point of view and these privileged perceptions do not preclude the perception of 
the rest of the universe, although dimly: “Thus when we consider the connection of things, 
it can be said that there are at all times in the soul of Alexander traces of all that has 
happened to him and marks of all that will happen to him and even traces of all that 
happens in the universe, though it only belongs to God to know them all.”217  
 Obviously, this conception implies that is inappropriate to separate the individual into 
two parts, its future and its past, which will destroy its unity as substance. The identity of 
the individual requires the conception of continuity implicit in the individual concept. Thus  
 
… each soul retains all its previous impressions, and could not be separated into 
two halves in the manner you have described: within each substance there is a 
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perfect bond between the future and the past, which is what creates the identity 
of the individual. Memory is not necessary for this, however, and is sometimes 
not even possible, because of the multitude of past and present impressions 
which jointly contribute to our present thoughts; for I believe that each man’s 
thoughts has some effects, if only a confused one, or leaves some trace which 
mingles with thoughts which follows it.218  
 
 The past contributes to the present and we can suppose that this process will continue 
into the future. The principle of continuity is strongly present here as we can see in these 
two other passages: “no endeavor in the universe is lost, they are stored up in the mind, not 
destroyed”219 and “each present state of a substance occurs in it spontaneously, and is 
nothing but a consequence of its preceding state.”220 Hence in so far as all these notions 
imply a constant accumulation of petite perceptions to produce clear perceptions, the soul is 
said to be progressing in degrees of perfection. All these positions presuppose the 
irreversibility to a more primitive state. Even when Leibniz spoke of a passage to a lesser 
degree of perfection, as is the case of death, he considered it as only a relative or 
momentary fallback or preparation for a forward jump. In this sense he said:  
 
Perpetual preservation, immortality … Their changes of state never are and 
never were anything but changes from more to less sensible, from more perfect 
to less perfect, or the reverse, so that their past and future state are just as 
explicable as their present one. Even the slightest reflection shows that this is 
reasonable, and that a leap from one state to an infinitely different one cannot 
be natural.221  
 
This is, obviously, a re-statement of his doctrine of individual notion, in which the notion 
of continuity makes the necessary link between past and future. 
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 We can see in all these notions that the theory of Leibniz can be read as a statement 
of the doctrine of conversion of souls in Plotinus. What is missing perhaps is the doctrine 
that some individual notions will always remain mere possibilities in the mind of God. This 
would be, as I said before, an anomaly in Plotinus’ system, because it would imply that 
some emanated intelligible ideas will not emanate in their turn, as would be expected. 
However my exposition about Plotinus is intended to show that the doctrine of monads was 
virtually present there. It appears as a singular application of a Neo-Pythagorean theory of 
One together with a synthesis of material taken from Aristotle and Stoics. Leibniz also took 
care, as did Plotinus, to affirm that the progress of the substance is not determined by fate, 
as the Stoics thought. And so Leibniz, concerned to defend the liberty of men as he was 
defending the liberty of God, used the word “spontaneously” as we have seen above, 
although his line of thought was providing reasons for the opposite view. In fact, Leibniz’s 
whole doctrine of petites perceptions of and the notion which says that the individual is 
connected with all that happens in the universe are more fitted to support the determinist 
view of the Stoics’ doctrine of providence. Arnauld perceived this “fatal necessity” in the 
notion of the individual concept, but Leibniz tried to convince him that those reasons 
“incline without necessitating.” Obviously this argument is not very convincing. It is even 
more unsatisfactory if we take into account that Leibniz defended the “Principle of 
sufficient reason”, which says that nothing happens in the universe without a reason. 
 The second point that I want to stress in this part is the manifestation of the 
substances creating nature. In Plotinus we saw an infinite and Eternal Intellect which 
manifests itself in the realm of Soul, and ultimately this realm expresses itself in producing 
nature. The project of Leibniz, as he said to Des Bosses, was to give an “explanation of all 
phenomena solely through the perceptions of monads functioning in harmony with each 
other.”222 Thus material things are appearances that result from the harmony of a set of 
monads and their perceptions. A mass of matter is not a true substance; its unity is ideal or 
imaginary, since it results or is a manifestation of a collection of these true substances, the 
monads. But Leibniz is also committed to the thesis that the reality of material things needs 
the supposition that they are well founded in perceptive substances, which is their factor of 
diversification. In a letter to De Volder he said:  
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I have shown (…) in my rejection of empty space that matter so long as it is 
commonly thought to be determined by mere modifications of extensions or 
mass does not suffice to fill the universe, and further we must assume 
something necessarily quite different, amounting to a principle of change and 
diversity in the phenomena, so that along with expansion, contraction, and 
motion of the several parts of matter, a principle is required for its consilience 
and diversification. Consequently I insist on assuming that no substance can be 
created or annihilated.223 
 
And he repeated in another letter to De Volder: “… if matter were not differentiated – as it 
is primarily through the entelechies – no manifold of phenomena could arise, that 
furthermore, then the only uniform states of extension would ever differentiate one 
another.”224  
 Thus the notion of individual concept is in the last resort used to explain diversity in 
Nature. Here the substances and their perceptions have the same decisive role as the soul in 
Plotinus: to create a diversified Nature. The notion of the individual concept can be seen as 
the basis for the principle of Identity of the Indiscernible, which says that we cannot find 
any two things exactly equal in Nature. Again, if the phenomenal accidents which 
constitute a body are a reflection of its constitutive monad, the consequence is that this 
body is the reflection of what the monad sees. Thus the Parmenidean tenet that “to think is 
to be” is achieved also in Leibniz in the level of substances, the self-thinking monads, and 
afterwards manifested in the sensible world. In this aspect Leibniz was following Plotinus, 
and ultimately Aristotle, Plato and Parmenides, for whom the spheres of being and 
knowledge are in fact the same.  
 Ultimately the diversification that we see in Nature will be nothing more than the 
manifestation or unfolding of the infinite diversity already present in the realm of Intellect. 
Leibniz seems to have recognised this connection as the following passage suggests:  
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It follows also that there cannot be two individual things in nature which differ 
only numerically. For surely it must be possible to give reason why they are 
different, and this must be sought in some difference within themselves. Thus 
the observation of Thomas Aquinas about separate intelligences, which he 
declared never differ in number alone must be applied to other things also 
Never two eggs, two leaves, or two blades of grass in a garden to be found 
exactly similar to each other.225  
 
 Obviously in the case of Leibniz, as we have discussed, the realm of infinite 
possibilities will not be totally manifested. Only the set of the best compossibles, that is, the 
best group of things which are of possible combination, will be manifested. 
 
 
Part II 
 
6 – The Universal Sympathy and Perception 
 
One main topic in Plotinus is the idea that the Universe, Nature or the All constitutes a 
unity or a whole, in which each part is perfectly connected with everything else. Plotinus 
took this idea from the Stoics (an idea also present for the Pythagoreans and in the 
Timaeus) but he elaborated it in his own way. Even while criticising the Stoic theory of 
knowledge, he used their ideas of the sympathetic whole as the basis for his own theory of 
knowledge. 
 Plotinus said that the Universe is contemplating the Good.226 However, he said that 
even now it can be considered perfect, because it is an ordered whole made as a perfect 
copy of the Divine realm. It is already an All. If we do not perceive this perfection it is 
because we do not see the harmony of the whole, but we pay attention to the ugly minor 
detail without noticing that it gains beauty in the whole: “We are like people ignorant of 
painting who complain that the colors are not the beautiful everywhere in the picture; but 
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the artist has laid on the appropriate tint to every spot.”227 This perfection, or the ultimate 
cause of this ordered organisation of the Universe (or the All), comes from the eternal plan 
existent in the Divine Mind or, we may say again, the Universe results from the unfolding 
of the Intellectual Principle. The idea of continuity in the unfolding of the Intellectual 
Principle (which itself is a whole) guarantees the unity of the development of the Universe, 
its wholeness. The Soul of the World consequently governs the Universe because it already 
has its complete plan. Thus we can say that the World Soul is the unity of the One projected 
to rule and harmonise the world. It is projected to rule the world because it is similar to 
individual things which follow the rules already present in their seminal reasons. Here the 
unity of the World Soul is a unity with reference to development in time. In this aspect it 
was called “Providence”. In the synchronic dimension, the World Soul also follows the 
biological analogy because the harmony of the world is similar to the form in which, in 
individual organisms, each different part is adapted to its function in the whole. The same 
World Soul is present in each individual part, but in each part the World Soul manifests a 
degree relative to that part’s essence, a degree that corresponds to the achievement of the 
part’s function in its adjustment in the All:  
 
The gist of the whole matter lies in the consideration that the Soul governs this 
All by the plan contained in the Reason-Principle and plays in the All exactly 
the part of the particular principle which in every living things forms the 
members of the organisms and adjust them to the unity of which they are 
portions; the entire force of the Soul is represented in the All, but, in the parts, 
Soul is present only in the proportion to the degree of essential reality held by 
each of such partial objects.228  
 
 For Plotinus then, the limitation of each thing, determined by its essence, is not a 
reason to prevent its share of participation in the All. In fact he says that each part has been 
made with a view to the whole and so its limitation is a requisite for this participation. We 
remember that Plato said in the Timaeus that the Universe was a great animal, which 
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implied a great communion between its parts. 229 Plotinus followed this doctrine. Thus the 
sympathy between the different parts happens because these are like organs of this great 
organism, which is a living and dynamic whole:  
 
But, with all this gradation, each several thing is affected by all else in virtue of 
the common participation in the All, and to the degree of its own participation. 
This One-All, therefore, is a sympathetic total and stands as one living being; 
the far is near; it happens as in one animal with its separate parts: talon, horn, 
finger, and any other member are not continuous and yet are effectively near; 
intermediate parts feel nothing, but at a distant point the local experience is 
known. Correspondent things not side by side but separated by others placed 
between, the sharing of experience by dint of like condition – this is enough to 
ensure that the action of any distant member be transmitted to its distant fellow. 
Where all is a living thing summing to a unity there is nothing so remote in 
point of place as not to be near by virtue of a nature which makes of the one 
living being a sympathetic organism.230  
 
 In this All, each part performs a distinct function. In its functioning, each individual 
is related to each other. And this relation occurs in a twofold way: exerting influence by 
means of its tasks, and receiving some influence of the acts of others. Thus when 
performing its own function, every member acts on every other member. Plotinus’ belief in 
the action on distance or the efficacy of magic was a corollary of this doctrine. Magic and 
its success also depend on this sympathy of the whole.231  
 Since everything is so closely knit, intertwined into a whole, all is ordered and 
nothing is left to chance. As Plotinus said, everything exists with a Law of Justice. Thus all 
the parts are in strict relation to the whole: “All the living things, then ... fall under the 
general principle of the All – they have been made parts with a view to the whole.”232 This 
whole is, accordingly, the ultimate cause: “The beings thus coordinated are not the causes; 
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the cause is the coordinating All.”233 Thus, it is the whole that establishes the definite role 
or function of the parts. It is this unity of coordination that guarantees that each part has its 
just place and is in certain harmony with the others. 
 Because all relations of sympathy in the whole are ruled by strict proportion, with no 
room for chance, Plotinus said that it is a living unity and at the same time mathematically 
determined:  
 
The being we are considering is a living unity and, therefore, necessarily self-
sympathetic: it is under a law of reason, and therefore the unfolding process of 
its life must be self-accordant: that life has no haphazard, but knows only 
harmony and ordinance: all the groupings follow reason: all single beings 
within it, all the members of this living whole in their choral dance are under 
the rule of Number.234  
 
Their reciprocal interaction, or their sympathy, follows the strict rule of mathematical 
determination. The unity of the whole is thus the cause and consequence of this 
determination. Obviously this doctrine forced Plotinus to search for a solution to the 
problem of how any freedom of the individual can be harmonised with the idea of cosmic 
causes working in a mathematically unified cosmos.  
Plotinus built his theory of the sympathetic Whole on the basis of the idea that each part of 
the Whole (which he calls also the All or Universe) is itself a whole. Each part of the 
Universe, that is, each individual soul, is itself a whole or totality. Here we remember his 
explanation of the soul, as the intermediary between the Intellect (the Being or the Existent) 
and matter (represented by the things of sense). This doctrine, he affirmed, is directly 
inspired by a doctrine in the Timaeus. Referring to the demiurge, Plato said: “By blending 
the impartible, eternally unchanging essence with that in division among bodies He 
produced a third form of essence partaking of both qualities.”235 Plotinus interpreted this 
passage in this way:  
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So far we have the primarily indivisible – supreme among the Intellectual and 
Authentically Existent – and we have its contrary, the Kind definitely divisible 
in things of sense; but there is also another Kind, of earlier rank than the 
sensible yet near to it and resident within it – an order, not, like body, primarily 
a thing of parts, but becoming so upon incorporation. The bodies are separate, 
and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while, still, it 
is present as one whole in each of its severed parts, since amid that multiplicity 
in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition, there is a 
permanent identity;…236  
 
Thus the nature of the soul is radically different from the material or extended things. It is 
not a kind of continuance of subtle matter extended inside the body, as some ancient 
doctrine seems to say.237 Nor can it be sundered like the body parts. However, it is present 
in each part as a whole:  
 
The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, which we affirm to be the Soul has 
not the unity of an extended thing: it does not consist of separate sections; its 
divisibility lies in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is indivisible 
as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any part.238  
 
If it had the nature of material things, each part could be isolated from the others, like the 
bricks in a wall, but then the soul could not form a true unity. The supposition of Plotinus 
here is that a material thing is necessarily a discontinuous thing. And consequently, 
interaction (or sympathy) between two extremely isolated things would be impossible. 
Even if those parts were souls, there would be a great multiplicity of souls with no means 
of communication among each other.  
 Thus, Plotinus defended the conception that each soul is, in some sense, the All or the 
totality. To illustrate this point, Plotinus used the example of the interaction of the parts of 
the organism:  
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If it (the soul) had the nature of body it would consist of isolated members each 
unaware of the conditions of every other; there would be a particular soul – say 
a soul of the finger – answering as a distinct and independent entity to every 
local experience; in general terms, there would be a multiplicity of souls 
administering each individual; and, moreover, the universe would be governed 
not by one soul but by an incalculable number, each distinct apart to itself. But 
without a dominant unity, continuity is meaningless.239  
 
The organism is a good analogy for the world, because it illustrates that the order demands 
the existence of a pervading unity which is the cause of sympathy between the different 
parts. It is a unity of diversity and each part is in sympathy or feels all that happens in the 
rest of the Whole. 
 The soul, then, is a unity and a multiplicity; but what does this affirmation mean? The 
unity can be interpreted as the unity of the individual and the multiplicity or infinity can be 
seen as the presence of the All in that individual: “The one principle reaches the individual 
but nonetheless contains all souls and all intelligences; thus, because it is at once a unity 
and an infinity; it holds all its contents as one yet with each item distinct, though not to the 
point of separation.”240 We had this same idea when we described Plotinus’ Idea of a 
multiplicity of Intellects. And this is the same paradigm for the soul. However, in that case 
the presence or mirroring of the All is simultaneous in each Intellect. In the individual soul, 
the presence of the All is not simultaneous, since in the Soul the perceptions obey the rule 
of succession. But it is important to stress here that this might be considered as one 
important solution for the One–Many problem. It is the basis of the Neo-Platonic doctrine 
of the micro-cosmos, or that each part is a contracted form of the whole.241 That each thing 
can be, in some sense, a contracted form of totality is explained by the fact that it is at the 
same time a unity and an infinity or Limited and Unlimited thing. And this was, as we saw, 
the doctrine of the first Pythagoreans.  
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 But for Plotinus, this theory of non-limitation of things could not be understood as 
something that could “spatially” connect the different souls between themselves. This 
conception could be, however, a kind of return to the idea that the soul is extensible. As we 
have seen, Plotinus said expressly that the soul is inextensible and that it contains all souls. 
Although Plotinus mentioned the idea of All Soul (or World Soul) many times, which could 
be a kind of general soul connecting the others, he himself clarified how this concept 
should be understood: “The Soul is not a thing of quantity; we are not to conceive of the 
All-Soul as some standard ten with particular souls as its constituents units. ... The Ten 
could not be (essentially) a unity (the Soul would be an aggregation, not a self standing 
Real-Being) and further – unless every one of the single constituents were itself an All-Soul 
– the All-Soul would be formed of non-souls.”242 Also, in another passage he affirmed that 
the All-Soul cannot be seen as an entity separate from the others souls: “... it is the identical 
Soul that is present everywhere, the one complete thing, multi present at the one moment; 
there is no longer question of a soul that is apart against a soul that is an all ...”243  
 Plotinus’ theory of perception is dependent on the postulation of this theory of 
universal sympathy and the conception of the monadic soul. The postulation of an 
individual and immaterial (or non-dimensional) soul is necessary, since it is the sphere 
which guarantees the reunion of the multiplicity of the perceptive experience into a unity or 
into a monadic structure: “There can be no perception without a unitary percipient whose 
identity enables it to grasp an object as entirety.” Perception, knowledge, memory and, 
consequently, moral excellence depend on the existence of this postulation. It assures the 
absolute unity of experience through time (diachronic level), but it also guarantees the unity 
of experience necessary for the act of interpretation or cognition of a certain spatial or 
multidimensional entity (synchronic level). Plotinus posed this unity of the percipient as 
another argument against the theory of impressions:  
 
When sight and hearing gather their varying information, there must be some 
central unit to which both report. How could there be any statement of 
difference unless all sense impressions appeared before a common identity able 
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to take the sum of all? This there must be, as there is a centre to a circle; the 
sense–impressions converging from every point of occurrence will be as lines 
striking from a circumference to what will be a true centre of perception as 
being a veritable unity.244  
 
The soul cannot be a material thing because the centre of consciousness cannot be a thing 
of quantity or a thing subject to being divided in a multiplicity. The image received as 
impression needs the unifying stance of subject to be perceived as a unity: this implies the 
immaterial soul, since this unification can be achieved only by an immaterial substance. 
 The affirmation of the unity of soul has importance for another reason. Plotinus 
denied that Soul has a spatial dimension as the pneuma of the Stoics seems to have. Soul 
must be one-dimensional like the centre of a circle. He discussed the consequences if we 
consider the soul to be spatial. Thus, he denied the possibility of an extended soul that 
attaches point to point to its object of perception:  
 
… supposing the centre of consciousness to be a thing of quantity and 
extension, the sensible object will coincide with it point by point of their co-
expansion so that any given point in the faculty will perceive solely what 
coincides with it in the object: and thus nothing in us could perceive any thing 
as whole. This cannot be: the faculty entire must be a unity; no such dividing is 
possible; this is no matter in which we can think of equal sections coinciding; 
the centre of consciousness has no such relation of equality with any sensible 
object.245  
 
Thus for Plotinus the idea of an extended soul would imply perception in each point of its 
extension. But this would destroy the unity or wholeness of perception and the soul would 
perceive many things at the same time without any kind of coordinating unity. The 
argument then is that the faculty of perception unifies the multiplicity of an extended 
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sensible object in its unified act of perception. Therefore, the seat of perception, the soul, 
must itself be a unity and not an extended thing.  
 This unity represented by the soul, must be immaterial (spiritual), because a material 
thing is also subject to gain or loss and gains and losses cannot maintain a true unity. The 
parallel is with numerical or geometrical objects or things of quantity as material masses: 
they cannot achieve unity because they have no true stance of unification. On the contrary, 
their partition or increase destroys its totality or wholeness, and being such dispersion they 
cannot grasp a unity as the immaterial substance can. In assuring that the centre of 
consciousness cannot be material, Plotinus was again attacking old theories of spatial and 
material souls, such as souls made of air or fire like those of the Stoics or of atoms, as 
proposed by Democritus: “Would not such soulless addition be subject to just such loss and 
gain of substance, in fact to the non-identity, which marks the rest of the material mass? 
And, if this were so, how explain our memories or our recognition of familiar things when 
we have no stably identical soul?”246 Thus the unity here is a unity that keeps the 
experiences through time. A material thing would not preserve this unity since it pertains to 
the realm of dyad, which, by definition, is a subjected to losses and gains. 
 Plotinus then developed his own doctrine of perception which, to repeat, presupposes 
the theory of sympathy of the Whole. For Plotinus, all perception happens because the parts 
are parts of a self-sympathetic Whole. The interaction between these parts is mediated by 
the wholeness of each part: “Perception of every kind seems to depend on the fact that our 
universe is a whole sympathetic to itself: that it is so, appears from the universal 
participation in power from member to member, and specially in remote power.”247 He 
defended his point of view against that of the Stoics, from whom he adapted his own 
doctrine of sympathy. 
 The Stoic theory, under Aristotelian influence, says that perception results from the 
imprints that the forms or the images (likeness or species) exerted over a medium, the air or 
pneuma. This whole theoretical framework is also part of that tradition that we mentioned 
in the first chapter, the idea of air or pneuma of Anaximenes or the spatial aither of the first 
Pythagoreans. In De Anima (424a15) Aristotle says: “by sense is meant what has the power 
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of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without matter,” and (De Anima 
416b30): “Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or affection from 
without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality.” Following these ideas, 
Cleanthes claimed that the representation or image (phantasia) was a kind of impression on 
the soul, like the impression made by a ring on wax. And for receiving such an impression 
the soul obviously should be material, the pneuma itself. Chrysippus stressed that the cause 
of perception was the modification or tensions of an elastic and material medium, the 
pneuma (a kind of fiery air), tension similar to the propagation of waves of sound. The air 
between the object and the body continues the action of propagation of an image 
originating in the body and, since there is a continuity between the pneuma in the Soul, 
which is also a kind of air, and that pneuma of the external space, the image reaches the 
ruling centre of the Soul, the hegemonikon, where the sensation takes place.248 Thus the 
notion of space through which this tension takes place was important to this conception. 
Equally, the existence of this medium in a state of tension would be for a Stoic the 
explanation for a movement of a finger as demanded by the hegemonikon, the centre of the 
soul. In fact, the Stoics diverged from Aristotle on a special point. For Aristotle the pneuma 
was only a subtle envelope of the Soul, made from the substance of the stars.249 Because it 
was made of a very subtle matter it had a function of being an intermediary between an 
immaterial soul and the body. Thus, it was its function to primarily receive the impact of 
sensible objects. For the Stoics, however, the whole soul was pneuma.  
 Plotinus maintained the existence of such a subtle body, as Aristotle proposed, and 
expressly dismissed the Stoic conception: “Perceptions are no imprints, we have said, are 
not to be thought of as seal impressions on soul or mind.”250 The reason alleged against this 
theory is that it is based upon a modification of a material medium, and Plotinus insisted 
that perception depends on a spiritual and immaterial cause:  
 
… there is further consideration showing that sight is not brought about by this 
alleged modification of the intervenient. Any modification of the air substance 
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would be necessarily corporeal: there must be such an impression as is made 
upon sealing wax ... the facts are explicable only as depending upon greater 
laws, the spiritual, of a living being one and self sensitive.251  
 
Thus, perception for Plotinus depends on the unification of the experience in an immaterial 
unity, or a percipient subject, and matter, which, by definition is a thing of pure 
multiplicity, has no such stance.  
 Plotinus shared the doctrine of universal sympathy with the Stoics, but he explained it 
in a different way. The Stoic pneuma was conceived as a medium whose tensions 
transmitted images of things. This was the cause of sympathy or interaction, not only 
between the parts of the body, for instance, between the brain and finger, but through the 
external environment, to other bodies. They conceived this transmission to be also the 
cause of perception. In Plotinus, sympathy is caused not by a medium but rather is 
explained by the doctrine that there is an All-Soul (which would be in some sense similar to 
the Stoic pneuma). Thus there is no communication between the different parts of the body 
or different individuals through a medium such as the pneuma or other kind of extended 
subtle matter of the individual soul or of the Soul of the World. The communication occurs 
because there is a presence of the Wholeness of the All-Soul in each part of the body and in 
each individual as a totality. Plotinus seems to have generalised the idea also for external 
perception: “That every living being is a self-sensitive allows of no doubt; if the universe is 
a living being, no more need be said; and what is true of the total must be true of the 
members, as inbound in that one life.”252 Perception must be so based in both the self-
sensitiveness of a living being which is derived from the self-sensitiveness of the universe. 
The object seen must be in some sense within the self-conscious subject (self-sensitiveness) 
and because the object exists in its own right as a different part of the universe, he can say 
that the universe as a whole is self-sensitive. 
 The conception of perception in Plotinus relies on the idea that the soul (or Mind) is 
an activity (energeia). This implies that it should have an essentially active role or it means 
that its character is not to accept an impression passively but rather to act. And it is by its 
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activity, which in the last instance relies on self-thinking, that the soul exercises 
discrimination or judgment (kriseis) on the impressions the body receives. As activity, it 
does not passively submit to its environment but tries to be master of it. Its mastery is in 
proportion to its capacity of self-thinking. Thus, for Plotinus, the existence of the 
impressions alone cannot account for the existence of perceptions, or in other words, 
intellectual knowledge cannot be derived from sensible experience:  
 
As with sight, so with hearing. It is the air which takes the impression, a kind of 
articulated stroke which may be compared to the letters traced upon it by the 
object causing the sound; but it belongs to the faculty, and to the soul-essence, 
to read the imprints thus appearing before it, as they reach the point at which 
they become matter of its knowledge. In taste and smell also we distinguish 
between the impressions received and the sensations and judgments; these last 
are mental acts, and belong to an order apart from the experiences upon which 
they are exercised. The knowing of the things belonging to the Intellectual is 
not in any such degree attended by impact or impression: they come forward, 
on the contrary, as from within, unlike the sense-known as from without: they 
have more emphatically the character of acts; they are acts in the stricter sense, 
for their origin is in the soul.253  
 
Plotinus did not seem to deny the existence of sense impression, but he did not give it the 
crucial role of transmission of knowledge or production of meaning. The soul is aware of 
the stimuli that the sense organs receive from the external world. However, the impression 
by itself (as a sign or a letter) does not convey its meaning. The recognition of sensible 
forms depends on the access of the soul to the forms of the Intellectual Realm. As Emilsson 
explained, Plotinus did not think that the image or representation itself is self-evident, or 
“says what it is.”254 The very image does not carry its intelligibility to the receiving subject. 
In fact, Plotinus considered that if we accept the theory of the imprints of the objects of our 
vision we see only vestiges of the objects, not the objects themselves: “if to see is to accept 
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imprints of the objects of our vision, we cannot see the objects themselves; we see only 
vestiges they leave within us; the things themselves would be very different from our vision 
of them.”255 It seems that what Plotinus wanted to say here is that sense perception by itself 
cannot grasp the truth of the thing itself or its inner essence. In fact, the intelligibility of the 
image depends mainly on the presence in the subject of the intelligible form of that essence 
that the image expresses. And since the intelligible content cannot be separated from the 
Mind that thinks it, we arrive at the Plotinian formula that there is no knowledge without 
the self-thinking of the subject. Only by self-thinking does the soul reach the forms, 
because the Intellectual Realm is immanent in itself. 
 As appearance, the image only gives the opportunity of perception, but the 
interpretation of the realm of sense (krisis) is relative to the essence of the perceiving 
subject, since the soul only progressively awakens the content of the Intellect in itself. For 
Plotinus the awakening of the Intellectual Principles in the soul makes it more apt to 
elaborate the world of senses. 
 
9 – Space and Power 
 
For Plotinus, each part of a body has some kind of consciousness. Since extension or rather, 
the extended body, participates in the unity of the soul (which Plotinus calls “another 
Kind”) this participation in the soul must take place in such a way that the soul as a whole 
is present at every point of this body. The soul is not divisible like a body or a thing of 
quantity. However, the mass of the extended thing is really divided into an infinity of 
points:  
 
If, then, the divided and quantitatively extended is to participate in another 
Kind, is to have any sort of participation, it can participate only in something 
undivided, unextended, wholly outside quantity. Therefore, that which is to be 
introduced by participation must enter as itself an omnipresent indivisible. This 
indivisibility must, of course, not be taken in any sense of littleness: littleness 
would be still divisible, could not cover the extension of the participant and 
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could not maintain integral presence against that expansion. Nor is it the 
indivisibility of a geometrical point: the participant mass is no single point but 
includes an infinity of points; so that on the theory this principle must be an 
infinity of points, not a simultaneous entire, and so, again, will fail to cover the 
participant. If then, the participant mass in its entirety is to contain that 
principle entire, the universe must hold that one soul present at its every 
point.256  
 
Thus the extended mass acquires indivisibility by its participation in the unity of the soul. 
This indivisibility implies, however, an infinity of points at which the soul is present as a 
one or as a whole. Directly afterwards, Plotinus asked “if admitting this one soul at every 
point, how is there a particular soul of the individual …?” His answer was this: “The one 
soul reaches the individual but it nonetheless contains all souls and all intelligences. This is 
because it is at once a unity and an infinity; it holds all its content as one yet with each item 
distinct, though not to the point of separation.”257 Thus the way for an extended body to 
participate in the unity of the soul and, at the same time, respect its material condition of 
infinite divisibility, is that we assume the presence of the soul as a whole at each point. 
 This aspect also explains how the soul, being in essence a non-dimensional essence, 
can be the principle of number, as the Platonic tradition says. The soul has the multiplicity 
in its essence, but this multiplicity is a mind’s multiplicity, this dyad is intellectual: “… it 
holds all its contents as one yet with each item distinct, though not to the point of 
separation.” The numerical multiplicity then is a thing of the mind. The numbers, as we 
have expounded, are produced by the mind process which is the contemplation of the Dyad. 
Plotinus explained this point better in another passage, where he referred to the theory of 
Xenocrates that the soul is a self-increasing number. He clearly wanted to correct the 
interpretation that the soul, because it is the principle of number, is a thing of extension:  
 
It is in this understanding that the soul has been taken to be a numerical 
principle, while others think of it as in its nature a self-increasing number; this 
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latter notion is probably designed to meet the consideration that the soul at no 
point fails (...) Of course, we must understand this adding of extension not as a 
literal increase but in the sense that the soul, essentially a unity, becomes 
adequate to omnipresent; its unity sets it outside of quantitative measurement, 
the characteristic of that order which has but a counterfeit unity, an appearance 
by participation. The essential unity is no aggregate to be annulled upon the 
loss of some one of the constituents; nor is it held within any allotted limits, for 
so it would be the less for a set of things, outside its scope; or it must wrench 
itself asunder in the effort to reach to all; besides, its presence to things would 
be no longer as whole to all but by part to part; (.....) Now if this principle is to 
be a true unity – where the unity is of the essence – it must in some way be able 
to manifest itself as including the contrary nature, that of potential multiplicity, 
while by the fact that this multiplicity belongs to it not as from without but as 
from and by itself, it remains authentically one, possessing boundlessness and 
multiplicity within that unity; its nature must be such that it can appear as 
whole in every point...258  
 
Thus for Plotinus the consideration of the soul as a principle of number must be understood 
in the sense that the soul is allowed to be omnipresent in an extended entity. Thus the soul 
does not lose its unity but by its omnipresence it creates the condition for the appearance of 
the extended entity. Here again Plotinus considered that the notion of multiplicity implies 
necessarily the idea of aggregation, since multiplicity is a notion opposed to a true unity. 
 Here again we have the idea of the existence of the Intellectual or Divine Matter, 
which can be the object of determination, and which explains the feature of multiplicity of 
the soul or of the Mind. If this Matter implies multiplicity, this multiplicity is always under 
the domain of Unity, which is prior, as we saw in the theory of emanation. Plotinus 
differentiated the matter of our experience from that matter that exists in the Intellectual 
World. It is a kind of living and intellectual matter, compared with which familiar matter is 
only a kind of sterile or dead matter. It has the capacity, which is caused by its own living 
or thinking movement, to multiply itself and thus allows the appearance of spatial shapes of 
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different material forms. But this multiplication is not to be taken as a spatial extension. It 
is a kind of intelligible multiplication, which makes the soul adequate to be omnipresent. 
This allows the extended body to acquire its extension by participation in that intelligible 
extension of the soul. The determination of Intellectual Matter is the paradigm for 
determination in the material world which, being dependent on the other, has a lesser 
degree of reality. It is like an image in a mirror of the other.259 Between the two spheres of 
matter there is no true interaction, but only this process of reflection. Any hypothetical 
interaction, any outgoing or ingoing, would be incompatible with the maintenance of the 
unity of the soul. 
 The consequence of these propositions is that Plotinus was led to deny the true 
ontological status or true reality of extension. If the extension of bodies is based on 
numbering, and this numbering is only a reflection of the numbering of an indivisible Soul 
(whose multiplicity is involved by its unity) how can true unities of extension, be possible, 
as, for example, the case of space? Because the numbering is produced by a numbering 
soul, Plotinus regarded the numbering as the true magnitude. This is not the case of space 
which is only a kind of relation:  
 
Now we have often maintained that number and magnitude are to be regarded 
as the only true magnitudes, and that space and time have nor right to be 
conceived as quantitative: Time as the measure of Motion should be assigned to 
relation, while Space, being that which circumscribes Body, is also relative and 
falls under the same category; though continuous, it is like Motion, not included 
in Quantity.260  
 
Plotinus complemented this explanation, adding that the unity of extension which forms the 
magnitude of a body is so only because it participates in the absolute unity of the One 
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(represented by the unity of the Soul). Its unity is not absolute or substantial and so can be 
regarded as a unity only in an accidental sense:  
 
Again, whence does Matter derive its unifying power? It is assuredly not a 
unifying force in itself, but only through participation in Unity. We inevitably 
conclude that mass or extension cannot be ranked as the first of things; Non-
Extension and Unity must be prior. We must begin with the One and conclude 
with the Many, proceed to magnitude from that which is free from magnitude. 
Magnitude is a unity not by being Unity-Absolute, but by participation and in 
an accidental mode: there must be a primary and absolute preceding the 
accidental, or the accidental relation is left unexplained.261  
 
The spatiality of a thing is a secondary reality. It follows the expansion of the unity into a 
multiplicity of parts. This body remains an individual thing only because it is sustained by 
participation in that original unity which, by giving its identity to this thing, can be 
considered its essence. However, this spatiality of a thing has a price; it loses in power what 
it gains in extension:  
 
Consider the thing that has taken extension; broken into so many independent 
items, it is now those several parts and not the thing it was; if that original is to 
persist, the members must be collected to their total; in other words, a thing is 
itself not by being extended but by remaining, in its degrees, a unity: through 
expansion and in the measure of the expansion, it is less itself; retaining unity, 
it retains its essential being.262  
 
The phenomenon of expansion (its procession) causes the thing to gain distance from its 
own essential unity. As procession gains in multiplicity, it loses in power, since its 
immanence is relaxed. For Plotinus, one principle has more creative efficacy as it acts 
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less.263 Thus the hypostasis of Soul, which is the sphere of process and action, has less 
creative efficacy than the hypostasis of Intellect which, in its turn, has less creative efficacy 
than the One.  
 Thus the unity of body is unity only in an accidental way. Having denied the true 
existence or reality of the extension, Plotinus concluded that it is a mere illusion of sense 
perception:  
 
But how account, at this, for this extension over all the heavens and all living 
beings? There is no such extension. Sense perception, by insistence upon which 
we doubt, tells of Here and There: but reason certifies that the Here and There 
do not attach to that principle; the extended has participated in that cosmos of 
life which itself has no extension.264  
 
And again in another passage: “For what passes for the most truly existent is most truly 
non-existent – the thing of extension least real of all – while this unseen First is the source 
and principle of Being and sovereign over Reality.”265 It is important to recall here that the 
denial of extension was characteristic of the One of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides 
of Plato. Here Plotinus is projecting this feature to everything because the One is immanent 
in every existent thing.  
 The truly real or the authentic existent does not have any kind of extension. Plotinus 
liked to compare it to a geometrical point in the centre of a circle. The line and the circle 
are produced by this centre and are like images of it.266 This centre is then the source of 
generation of extension. We can use the sign of the geometrical centre, as it represents the 
negation of magnitude and as such it is a symbol of the unextended unity.267 It is because 
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132 
 
the centre is said to be immanent that it is considered the source or maker of extension 
(lines and circumferences) outside extension.  
 Yet we cannot say that unity is situated in the extension created. In fact, what happens 
is the opposite: extension is contained within its creator, but the creator, in its turn, is 
nowhere, since it is prior to extension which is created by it (and this extension is the 
condition of the existence of space). Thus Plotinus explained:  
 
Everything brought into being under some principle not itself is contained 
either within its maker or, if there is any intermediate, within that: having a 
prior essential to its being, it needs that prior always, otherwise it would not be 
contained at all. (…) That Source, having no prior, cannot be contained: 
uncontained by any of those forms of being, each held within the series of 
priors, it is orbed round all, but so as not to be pointed off to hold them part for 
part; it possesses but is not possessed.268  
 
Thus as it is not contained in any limited thing we can say that the source (or the unity) 
transcends everything. And in this sense it is said to be nowhere. However, because that 
unity is the creator, it is the cause of all existent things and so it is said to be immanent. In 
this sense it is said to be everywhere. 
 The One cannot be said to be situated in any place, but contains everything, thus its 
paradoxical omnipresence. It cannot be said to be remote from things because it contains 
and is the cause of them, but at the same time it is not possessed by them: “… but that prior 
principle has nothing in which to be: the First is therefore in nothing, and, therefore, 
nowhere. But all the rest must be somewhere; and where but in the First? This can mean 
only that the First is neither remote from things nor directly within them.”269  
 As Plotinus said, things are not contained directly in the One. There are 
intermediaries: the soul is contained in the Intellectual Principle and is the container of 
body. The Intellectual Principle, in its turn, is contained in the One. We know that the 
Intellectual Principle is simultaneously self-intellection and intellection of the All, a notion 
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which allows the possibility that the self-intellection of the particular individual eventually 
reaches the intuition of the All.270 This is the basic notion in the foundation of the theory 
that considers the individual soul as a micro-cosmos (each individual thing is itself and at 
same time the All). This basic theory, of Pythagorean origin, combined with the doctrine of 
the Parmenidian One is the foundation of Plotinus’ doctrine of perception. It implies action 
in distance, in the self-sympathetic whole. The presence of space is ineffective and the 
theory of impressions is also rejected. The omnipresent and immanent One, which is 
outside space, achieves the connection necessary for perception. It is this One which brings 
about possible action at a distance, precisely because it is out of Space. It is, in the last 
resort, the entity that causes the unity of the soul of the Cosmos.  
 I would like to suggest that we can better understand the immaterial nature of the 
One, and the other two hypostatic entities in the light of our discussion to date. The infinity 
of the One as well as that of the Intellect and the soul cannot be the infinity of space 
because, as Plotinus said, space is a secondary and derivative reality and it has, in fact, a 
dubious reality. He explained this immateriality in accordance with the tradition of Greek 
philosophy. As we have seen, the Pythagoreans (not to mention Heraclitus) defended the 
idea that a certain fire is the centre and origin of everything, the monad itself. Plato 
compared the Good to the Sun in the Republic. Aristotle stressed the activity of the 
substance, or its character as energeia. Plotinus followed them. He offered the similar 
notion that infinity of the First, the One, is infinity of power: “All its infinitude resides in its 
power ...”271 The First Reality in the form of the Good is compared with a flowing of power 
which is the cause of intelligence: “It is The Good since, being a power (being effective 
outwardly), it is the cause of the intelligent and intellective life as of life and intellect” 272 
Like Plato he also used the metaphor of light, or the light from the sun: “The only 
reasonable explanation of act flowing from it lies in the analogy of light from a sun.”273 
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 In fact, in Plotinus the question of infinity of power is linked with that of freedom and 
limitation. He said that because the Intellect has itself as object it has a “self disposal”, it 
has its own possession, or in other words, it is autonomous. The soul is not a thing which 
can be divided into an infinity of parts. But it is infinite in the sense that it has infinite 
power and as such, it is free from any limitation (complete freedom). If a particular soul 
seems to be limited it is because it chooses to use only a share of its power. Plotinus 
explained:  
 
But what becomes of the Soul’s infinity if it is thus fixed? The infinity is a 
matter of power: there is question, not of the soul’s being divisible into an 
infinite number of parts, but of an infinite possible effectiveness: it is infinity in 
the sense in which the Supreme God, also, is free of all bound. This means that 
it is no external limit that defines the individual being or the extension of souls 
any more than of God; on the contrary each in right of its own power is all that 
it chooses to be: and we are not to think of it as going forth from itself (losing 
its unity by any partition): the fact is simply that the element within it, which is 
apt to entrance into body, has the power of immediate projection any whither: 
the soul is certainly not wrenched asunder by its presence at once in foot and in 
finger. Its presence in the All is similarly unbroken; over its entire range it 
exists in every several part of everything having even vegetal life, even in a part 
cut off of the main; in any possible segment it is as it is at source.274  
 
Thus, we have here the theory of soul explicated above, now explained in terms of power. 
It is the condition of true unity and it is what allows the characteristic omnipresence of soul 
in each part of a living being:  
 
Consider the life in any living thing; it does not reach only to some fixed point, 
unable to permeate the entire being; it is omnipresent. If on this again we are 
asked how, we appeal to the character of this power, not subject to quantity but 
such that though you divide it mentally for ever you still have the same power, 
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infinite to the core; in it there is no Matter to make it grow less and less 
according to the measured mass.275  
 
Thus, in filling the body as a power, the soul imitates the omnipresence of God in the 
world. It is present everywhere in the body, at the same time as a wholeness and infinity, 
because it is not lessened by any division, as is a mass or extension. 
 This omnipresence means that the source of the power (or light), the One, is not 
separated from beings and is available to everything. The souls, as rays of light, Plotinus 
affirmed again, take from the source in the measure of their capacity, in a kind of self-
limitation:  
 
But are we to think of this Authentic Being as, itself, present, or does it remain 
detached, omnipresent in the sense only that powers from it enter everywhere? 
Under the theory of presence of powers, souls are described as rays, the source 
remains self-locked and these flung forth to impinge upon particular living 
things. Now, in beings whose unity does not reproduce the entire nature of that 
principle, any presence is presence of an emanate power: even this, however, 
does not mean that the principle is less than integrally present; it is not sundered 
from the power which it has uttered. All is offered, but the recipient is able to 
take only so much.276  
 
Truly the omnipresence is necessary for the harmony and sympathy of the whole, but at the 
same time the existence of multiplicity implies a certain self-limitation, otherwise all 
multiplicity would disappear in the omnipotence and unity of God.  
 
Sympathy and Perception – Leibniz 
 
The theme of sympathy is adequate to compare the notion of Leibniz with regard to 
Plotinus and some references to the Stoics. With both Plotinus and the Stoics he said that 
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this universe is perfect since it reflects a perfect cause. To Leibniz this is already the best 
possible world. He also used the same analogy used by Plotinus of the painting to explain 
that what seems to be ugly is so because we pay attention to the detail instead of looking for 
the harmony of the whole picture.277  
 The idea is that the whole is perfect and has already its complete plan made from the 
beginning. The Soul of the World, which is the whole ruling the cosmos, merely executes 
the pre-established plan. In this aspect it encompasses the ensemble of seminal principles 
which together have the plan of development of all individuals. Leibniz followed the same 
scheme. Individuals have a complete concept which is their plan for development. Plotinus 
attributed to the Soul of World the government of this All, the Universe, by the plan 
ultimately created in the Intellect Principle. As the Soul is itself the All, Leibniz said that 
the governing cause is the “coordinating All.” In Leibniz this coordinating All is the pre-
established harmony. 
 For Plotinus, each particular thing is affected by all else. Thus everything is related to 
everything in some way. In this sense he even admits the possibility of such action at a 
distance as in the case of magic. But Plotinus said these “beings thus coordinated are not 
the causes; the cause is the coordinating All.” For Leibniz equally each monad is affected 
(reflected) by all other monads, even if what they represent is far away in distance. 
Distance, in fact, is irrelevant, because space has no real existence, it is only an ideal 
entity.278 But what coordinates the totality of “interaction” between the monads is the pre-
established harmony. 
 In Plotinus, the work of ordering the All is ruled by number (or law of justice), in 
such a way that nothing is left to chance. For Leibniz too, nothing is left to chance because 
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of his Principle of Sufficient Reason. He also seems to have tried to configure the 
perceptions of the monads mathematically. Because of these ideas both Leibniz and 
Plotinus were forced to detail how liberty can be consistent with these views. 
 The doctrine of sympathy in Plotinus is based on his conception of soul, following a 
way of interpreting the Timaeus. There the soul is said to be an intermediary entity and 
consequently is at once an indivisible and divisible essence. As indivisible, the soul is, 
somehow, present in the whole world. As divisible, it is present in every point of the world, 
but its divisibility is not the fragmentation of extended things. It is present as a whole in 
each part. However, the perception of the presence of the whole by the individual souls, 
which are entities of process, is not simultaneous, but follows an order of successiveness. 
 In Leibniz’s philosophical scheme the monads are also totalities. They are equally 
concentrations of the whole. The entire world is, somehow, present in each of them. Thus 
direct interaction between the monads is unnecessary and in fact, does not exist. The 
monad, somehow, has perception of the whole world. However, the perception of the world 
is not simultaneous (as such perception pertains only to God), but follows an order of 
successiveness. Plotinus’ idea of the World Soul did not exist for the mature Leibniz. This 
World Soul may, perhaps, not be considered as a universal soul that makes the link between 
individual ones. Plotinus seems to suggest this with the phrase: “... it is the identical soul 
that is present everywhere, the one complete thing, multi present at the one moment; there 
is no longer question of a soul that is apart against a soul that is an all.” Leibniz reflected 
that, given such features of the soul, it was not necessary in any way to conceive any World 
Soul. Thus the presence of the Soul of the All in each individual can be translated by the 
idea that the individual concepts already have marks of everything that happens in the 
world. Plotinus says: “The soul is not a thing of quantity; we are not to conceive of the All 
Soul as some standard ten with particular souls as its constituents units ... The Ten could 
not be (essentially) a unity (the Soul would be an aggregation, not a self standing Real-
Being) …” Leibniz seems to have made a different use of this argument, since he seems to 
have used it to totally deny the existence of the Soul of the world. As with Plotinus, the 
point is to deny that the soul can be a thing of aggregation, or is similar to matter or 
extension:  
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There is no soul of the world, because a continuum cannot be composed of 
minds, as it can be composed of spaces. You will say that such a soul does exist 
in a certain way, in so far as minds sense themselves. I say that a soul cannot be 
an entity by aggregation, but that universal space is an entity by aggregation.279 
 
 The link between all individual substances is assumed by the unity of God and 
Leibniz consistently said that we see all things in God. It is God who, providing the pre-
established harmony, and choosing the best set of compossibles, makes the links between 
them. Thus the Leibnizian correlate view of Plotinian sympathy rests in the idea of 
individual concept. This is an idea already present in Plotinus and the notion of pre-
established harmony is akin to the idea of providential World Soul. The resulting view is:  
 
For my view; there is nothing in the whole realm of created things which does 
not require the concept of other things in the totality of things, since all things 
exercise a reciprocal effect on one another, and we can consequently think 
nothing moved or modified without thinking the whole present state of the 
universe transformed.280 
 
 In the theory of perception the points of the contact between Plotinus and Leibniz 
turn on the concept of soul. The first point is their assertion of the necessity of an absolute 
unity of the subject as a condition for perception. This substantial unity was for Leibniz, as 
it was for Plotinus, the soul. In a letter to Arnauld, Leibniz wrote:  
 
In natural perception and in sensation it is sufficient that what is divisible and 
material, and is to be found dispersed in a number of entities, should be 
expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity, or in a substance 
possessing genuine unity. There can be absolutely no doubt of the possibility of 
a good representation of several things in one single thing; for our soul presents 
us with an example.281  
                                                 
279 LEIBNIZ, De Summa Rerum, p. 81. 
280 LEIBNIZ, Leibniz to De Volder, July 6, 1701, Wiener, p. 170. 
281 LEIBNIZ, Leibniz Philosophical Writings, trans. Parkinson, p. 72. 
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The postulation of this immaterial unity was demanded by the defence against materialism 
in the theory of impressions. Plotinus argued against the proponents of this theory, the 
Stoics and the Atomists (and in some sense also Aristotle). In his time Leibniz opposed the 
postulation that knowledge comes by means of sensation which was defended by the 
English empiricist Locke and earlier by Hobbes. Hobbes, for example, claimed that 
sensation was caused by motions or pressure from bodies. The solution adopted by Leibniz 
is radically antagonistic to empiricism, for he said that as monads have no windows, they 
do not really interact with each other. The more problematic aspect of this assertion is 
obviously the question of perception, since we usually consider that this faculty is our 
window to our environment. 
 Although Plotinus did not affirm expressly that the individuals are solipsistic entities 
or entities closed in themselves, he did affirm that the activity of perception depends mainly 
on the interpretative activity of the subject. In some sense everything is happening in the 
world (which is the All). However, the subject only has perceptions of some events because 
its perceptions are determined by its nature or essence.  
 Plotinus also put perception in the same category as magic (sympathy). Both 
phenomena are dependent on the theory of sympathy of the parts of the whole. Perception, 
as well as magic, can only happen because the soul of the subject has the presence of the 
whole in itself. The subject can only have the representation of a thing because the thing 
itself is already present, as part of the whole, in his mind. The magician, equally, acting 
only in himself, manages to produce an effect in the “external world”. On the other side, the 
comparison Plotinus drew between the soul and the mirror (that does not receive anything 
from outside) again approximates the idea of the monads without windows.  
 Perhaps the same coexistence of points of view can be seen in Leibniz. His ideas 
began from a perspective where he did not deny that we can have contact between 
substances, as can be seen in section 27 of the Discourse of Metaphysics:  
 
In this same sense we can say that we receive our knowledge from without 
through the ministry of the senses, because certain external things contain or 
express more particularly the reasons which determine our soul to certain 
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thoughts. But when the exactness of metaphysical truths is involved, it is 
important to recognize the compass and the independence of our soul (….) But 
… it is always false to say that all our notions come from the senses which are 
called external, for the notions which I have of myself and of my thoughts, and 
consequently of being, of substance, of action, of identity, and many others, 
come from an internal experience … 
 
and he continued in section 28 “In the rigorous sense of metaphysical truth there is no 
external cause which acts upon us except God alone …”282 Thus both Plotinus and Leibniz 
denied any decisive role to impressions coming from the environment. The basis for their 
explanation of perception is the same: the doctrine of immanence of the One (or All). 
 
Space and Force – Leibniz 
 
Bertrand Russell said that the dynamic of Leibniz was constructed in direct opposition to 
Descartes. Descartes also propounded two substances: mind and extension, (but he avoided 
an absolute dualism separating them when he affirmed that God was the true substance 
behind these two). Furthermore, he equated extension with matter. Leibniz, on the contrary, 
maintained that matter is not a substance and that the essence of matter is not extension, 
which, in its turn, is not substance either. He believed he had proved that force was the 
fundamental concept for dynamics and that it was ultimately the essential activity of 
substance.  
 Russell said that Leibniz may have discovered that the essence of matter is force by 
1672.283 He mentioned that Leibniz may have based this discovery on some reasoning 
about the nature of space, or in a philosophical theory of the Eucharist. However, Leibniz 
had arguments from the philosophical tradition to support his view. Although Aristotle 
discussed the theme of energeia, and Zeno, following Parmenides, denied the existence of 
motion and space, I consider that it is in Plotinus that we see the clearest exposition of the 
                                                 
282 LEIBNIZ, Philosophical Papers and Letters, Loemker, pp. 320 and 321. 
283 RUSSELL, Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 77. 
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idea of force considered as fundamental to substance and at same time opposed to the 
notion of extension.  
 To refute the idea that extension is the essence of matter, Leibniz argued, as did 
Plotinus, that the appearance of the extension of a thing is not a real thing. In the Discourse 
of Metaphysics he wrote: “that the concepts which are involved in extension include 
something imaginary and cannot constitute the substance of the body.”284 The extension 
cannot be substance because it has not a truly substantial unity.  
 For Leibniz, as for Plotinus, extension was a relation and not a substantial unity. 
Extension, he said, is like number considered detached from things and its repetition or 
continuous multiplication represents the thing whose quality is spread.285 Thus, extension 
presupposes multiplicity and multiplicity presupposes numbering and unities. Plotinus 
translated the conception of the Pythagoreans in the form of his own doctrine of procession. 
Thus the dyad or the principle of many, which is configured by extension itself, is produced 
by the fluxion of the unity or monad. Plotinus said: “We inevitably conclude that mass or 
extension cannot be ranked as the first of things; Non-Extension and Unity must be prior. 
We must begin with One and conclude with the Many, proceed to magnitude from that 
which is free from magnitude.”286 Leibniz said, in a similar fashion:  
 
Extension is quantity of space. It is false to confound extension, as is commonly 
done with the extended things, and to view it as substance. If the quantity of 
space is continuously and uniformly diminished, then it becomes a point which 
has zero magnitude.287  
 
Because it deals only with numbers, Leibniz claimed that manipulation of extension can be 
restricted to the field of mathematics and mainly to geometry. 
                                                 
284 LEIBNIZ, Discourse, section 12, Loemker, p. 309. 
285 “If we distinguish extension from the extended things, it is something abstract like duration or like number 
considered detached from things, in which the connection of the parts is just necessary as with extension. 
Extension is, furthermore, a relative concept, for it is related to a determined nature whose spread it 
represents; duration is related to a continually persisting subject.” Leibniz to De Volder, Dec. 27, 1701, 
Wiener, p. 175. 
286 Sixth Enn. I, 26. 
 287LEIBNIZ, Metaphysical foundation of mathematics, 1715, Wiener, p. 202.  
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 But extension, as a purely geometrical entity, cannot be confused with the extended 
thing itself: “The best proof that body differs from space or extension is derived from this: 
that one cannot, from extension alone, or from the notion of length, breadth, and depth, 
demonstrate impenetrability, i.e., demonstrate that two extended things cannot be in the 
same place ...”288 We cannot account for something extended in nature without introducing 
the qualities, as for example, the diffusion of whiteness of milk and the diffusion of yellow 
hardness in gold, which are the main reason for these things appearing as extended and 
tangible. And this is the reason of the importance of the doctrine of monads or substantial 
active unities that Leibniz thought could better explain extension. According to Leibniz, 
activity makes the matter substantial and the perceptions are the acts of these active 
principles, the monads. These perceptions are connected or even equal to forces or are 
confounded with them because the passage from one perception to another is made by a 
power of transition that he calls appetition. Donald Rutherford explained that he sometimes 
seems to consider only the existence of a modification, the perception.289 We can suppose 
that in this case the appetition is reduced to the infinitesimal perceptions that make the 
transition between one clear perception and another one. The argument perhaps follows the 
identification that Plotinus makes between intellection and will. We can find an example 
that he may consider that the perceptions and appetition are, in some sense confounded, in 
the following passage:  
 
What usually drives us are those minute insensible perceptions that we cannot 
be aware of, if the notion of suffering did not involve awareness. These minute 
impulses consist in our continually overcoming small obstacles – our nature 
labors at this without our thinking about it.290 
                                                 
288 LEIBNIZ, Summa Rerum, p. 111. 
289 He quoted this passage: “The soul … though entirely indivisible, involves a composite tendency, that is a 
multitude of present thoughts, each of which tends to a particular change according to what it involves and 
what is found at the time by virtues of its essential relationship to tall the others things in the world.” 
JOLLEY, The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, p. 137. 
290 LEIBNIZ, New Essays, p. 188. Also the passage “These minute perceptions … cause that disquiet which I 
show to consist in something which differs from the suffering only as small from large, and yet which 
frequently causes our desire and even our pleasure, to which it gives a dash of spice” New Essays 56. And it is 
the continuation and accumulation of these semi-sufferings, which are at same time semi-pleasures, that lead 
eventually to whole pleasure, the effect confounded with the summation of petite perceptions into a clear 
perception. 
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 The importance of the infinitesimal summation effect of the perceptions for his theory 
of extension is that it can explain the phenomenal specific qualities that we see in diffusion. 
Diffusion presupposes that these qualities are continually acting (they are appetitions) and 
these actions cause spreading. Leibniz called this resulting substantiality “secondary 
matter.” These extended things, such as milk and gold, are examples of this secondary 
matter. As well-founded phenomena these extended things result from a set of monads 
considered as forces. But this substantiality of extension can only be understood in a 
relative way, since the real substances are the monads. Extension, for Leibniz, is a relative 
concept and cannot be conceived only by itself. It is derived from other concepts and so can 
be further analysed in notions like multiplicity and co-existence. He said, for example:  
 
I do not believe extension alone constitutes substance, since its conception is 
incomplete. Nor to my mind can extension be conceived in itself; rather it is a 
further analyzable and relative conception. For we can analyze it into plurality, 
continuity and co-existence (that is simultaneous existence of parts). Plurality 
has to do with number, and continuity with time and motion; co-existence, on 
the contrary, is the only thing that approaches extension. Accordingly, there 
must always be presupposed something which continually acts or spreads, as 
the white color of milk, the glitter, malleability and weight of gold, the 
resistance of matter. For continuity in itself – extension, is namely, nothing but 
a continuum with the character of simultaneity – is no more capable of 
constituting a complete substance than plurality or number require the presence 
necessarily of the things counted, repeated and continued. Hence I believe that 
our thought of substance is perfectly satisfied in the conception of force and not 
in that of extension.291  
 
 In this passage the object of attack is clearly the idea sustained by Descartes that 
impenetrability belongs to the essence of extension. And Leibniz propounded the use of the 
Cartesian analytic method of searching for clear ideas to prove its inconsistency. He began, 
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144 
 
as we said, by defending the idea that his substantial unities, the monads, have a primitive 
force which is to be considered similar to a feeling or appetite.292 But he added additional 
clarification, maintaining that monads are not only an active force but also a passive power. 
These two forces are conceived in a certain animist fashion or following a psychological 
analogy. The passive force was also called primary matter and was conceived as the 
obscurity or confusion of perceptions of the monad. The infinite in number enters here 
because it accounts for the confusion of perceptions of the individual monads. This passive 
power is not extension but is the necessary presupposition for the idea of extension. Being 
itself a power, the primary matter is the ultimate cause for resistance to action, resistance 
which implies the impenetrability and inertia that we see in extended things.293 This 
happens because it is the cause of the body’s resistance to penetration and external motion 
and consequently it establishes the conditions for an extended thing to exist. Ultimately 
extension results as a consequence of the repetition of the material prima of a great or 
infinite number of monads. Matter then has this aspect of tangibility or “appearance of 
materiality” because of the predominance of the passive faculty of its constitutive monads, 
which is nothing more than the obscurity or unconscious character of representations of 
these monads, an inertia which precludes them from reaching a new level of perception. 
Leibniz thinks that without this quality, the passive force, it would be impossible to have an 
extended surface or a cohesive body. Without this inertial force we have no cohesion and 
everything would be radically dissipated in consequence of extreme fluidity:  
 
For it can be demonstrated that extension without the addition of other qualities 
is not capable of either action or its passive receptions. That everything 
                                                 
292 “I thence found that their nature consists in force, and that from that there ensues something analogous to 
feeling and appetite … I call them perhaps more intelligibly, primitive forces which do not contain only the 
act or the complement of possibility, but further an original activity.” LEIBNIZ, New System of Nature and of 
the Communication of Substances, as well as of the Union of Soul and Body, 1695, Wiener, p. 108. 
293 “Monads are the grounds not only of actions but also of resistances or passivities, and their passions reside 
in their confused perceptions. This also comprehends matter or the infinite in numbers …” Leibniz Selection 
Wiener, p.189. The action of the monad is never impeded by the action of another monad but only by its 
internal resistance or its passions that precludes new perceptions: “A substance acts as much as it can, unless 
it is impeded; even a simple substance, however is impeded, but not naturally unless internally by itself. And 
when a monad is said to be impelled by another, this is to be understood of the representation of the other in 
itself.” RUSSELL, B. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, 1964, p. 268. 
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becomes fluid in the most extreme way, that is becomes vacuous; that then the 
cohesion of bodies and what is felt as solid in them cannot be explained.294 
 
 In Leibniz’s scheme the secondary matter is a body or mass of the aggregate that 
results from a set of active monads: “Therefore body is extended activity.”295 A given body 
has a substantiality that is conferred by the monads, but even then it has no true unity. Its 
unity is a unity of aggregate similar to a heap of stones or an army of soldiers.296 Only in 
the case of living beings can the matter be said to be unified in the organic body, because 
there is a subordination of the body’s monads to a single power which is the dominant 
monad.297 In this case, the extension shaped in the form of the animal is dependent on the 
activity of the dominant monad, which sometimes Leibniz said can be conceived as the 
substantial form of the body.298 But even in this case bodies do not have a true unity. If they 
have a certain appearance of unity, this is derived from the unity of the soul: “If a body is a 
substance, and not a mere phenomenon like the rainbow, not a being united by accident or 
by aggregation like a heap of stone, it cannot consist of extension, and it is necessary to 
conceive in it something which we call a substantial form, and which corresponds in some 
way to a soul.”299 Plotinus equally claimed that the unity of the body is a consequence of its 
participation in unity of the soul. He maintained that the soul has omnipresence in the body 
but keeps a character of indivisibility even if it covers the infinity of points of the mass of 
the body. To achieve this it has the property of manifesting in itself the contrary nature 
without losing its character of unity. The body has a derived unity and, consequently, is not 
a true unity.  
 Plotinus maintained that substance is power, and that power is prior to extension. 
Taking into account this character of power we can understand some paradoxical properties 
of the substance conceived as unity. Thus, because the substance is the primordial entity it 
cannot be situated in space, otherwise it would not be substance. Because it cannot be 
                                                 
294 LEIBNIZ, On true Method in Philosophy and Theology, 1686, Wiener, p. 63.  
295 LEIBNIZ, On true Method in Philosophy and Theology, Wiener, p. 64. 
296 “The body by itself apart from the soul, has only unity of aggregation.” RUSSELL, B. A Critical 
Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 152. 
297 “It is to be held as proved that every body is actually subdivided into other parts (…) the reality of a 
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being acted.” Leibniz Philosophical Writings, Parkinson, p. 81. 
298 LEIBNIZ, Correspondence with Arnauld, Loemker, p. 338. 
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situated in any space it transcends everything. But because it is the cause of all particulars it 
is said to be omnipresent. However, it is a peculiar aspect of the theory of Leibniz that the 
essential feature of the monads, the series of their perceptions that makes them acquire their 
individuality, is dependent on a certain notion of space. Thus the monads acquire their 
individuality from their points of view of the cosmos, which implies the notion of 
spatiality. In this case the main characteristics of the substance are dependent on what 
comes after the monad, space. This seems to constitute a vicious circle. It seems that 
Leibniz wanted to avoid the view that perception presupposes the logically prior existence 
of things to be perceived, since these things are supposedly already spatially placed. At the 
same time, it was difficult to sustain that only the subjective act of perception could account 
for the fact of perception. Thus, it was necessary to explain in what way the accidents or 
perception of the monads could express spatiotemporal relations. 
 Catherine Wilson suggested that Leibniz hinted at the solution of this problem 
although he never developed it to its full extent.300 Mathematical space may be constructed 
by the imagination of the solipsist monad using the non spatial notions of point, line and 
plane. Perceptual space would be constructed in the same way using, instead of 
mathematical concepts, the material provided by perception. We have seen that Plotinus 
discussed the conception of soul as a “numerical principle”, or its “nature a self-increasing 
number” and thus, as a principle of number, the Soul can achieve an “adding of extension”. 
In both cases, the source seems to be the Aristotelian discussion of intelligible matter along 
with the Pythagorean discussion of the generation of mathematical objects. In this sense 
Leibniz said, in 1716: “For that reason the ancients were right in calling a space outside the 
world, that is, space without bodies, imaginary.”301 However, he had been thinking about 
this subject long before then. In the text On the Origin of Things from Forms of 1676, there 
is a passage which shows that Leibniz conceived this imaginary space as the explanation of 
the omnipresence of God, which, as we saw, is the idea behind the conception of the monad 
as microcosm: “Clearly, in the same way, the divine mind is to our mind as what is called 
imaginary space (for that space is supremely real, since it is God himself in so far as he is 
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considered everywhere, or, is immeasurable) is to place, and to various shapes that arise in 
the immeasurable.”302  
 I would like to suggest that Leibniz intended to say that space is an ideal thing, and 
instead of being situated in space the monads have position (situs) in this imaginary space. 
The distance of one monad from other monads is its ideal relation of position in an order of 
coexistence; when the monad changes these relations it is the equivalent of saying that it 
changes its place.  
 
In this chapter I have attempted to show the important similarities between the philosophy 
of Plotinus and Leibniz. It is plausible to see that Plotinus was inspired by the first 
hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides (as well as Aristotle’s analysis regarding the unity) to 
create his doctrine of One. The doctrines of Intellect and Soul are, according to the 
scholars, based on the second hypothesis of Parmenides (which supports the Pythagorean 
notion of unity and ultimately the doctrine of All in All). Thus Plotinus took some features 
that Plato attributed to the One in the first hypothesis (that the One has no extension and is 
nowhere) and applied them to the unities of the realms of the Intellect and Soul 
(respectively second and third hypotheses). I do not consider that Plato would have 
approved this application, because in the Parmenides he showed that hypothesis I was 
totally different from hypotheses II and III. Aristotle would also have rejected this move 
because, as we have shown, he rejected the Pythagorean notion of unity. Leibniz, however, 
was following Plotinus’ analysis and system of, and therefore he endorsed such 
combination. Thus both of them arrived at the same conclusions: their doctrine of unity 
implies the denial of extension and in some sense the interaction of substances. 
Consequently, both Leibniz and Plotinus denied the doctrine of impressions, when they 
explain perception. Both of them asserted that perception happens by the immanence of the 
All in the subject in accordance with the doctrine of micro-cosmos.  
 In both Plotinus and Leibniz then, we also have the notion that force is fundamental 
to the substance and explains the doctrine of micro-cosmos. Force is also regarded as 
opposed to extension in the sense that it is not divisible. 
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Chapter V – Proclus, the Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz 
 
 
Proclus, perhaps the last great Greek philosopher (411–485 CE), systematically review of 
all Neo-Platonic philosophy. Nicholas of Cusa, in the fifteenth century, referred to him 
many times as an important authority.303 In this section I want to mention him because he 
opened a way for an interpretation of Platonism that supports the substantiality of space, a 
thesis defended by the Platonists of Cambridge. We saw in the last chapter that Leibniz 
followed Plotinus in considering space as non-real. Thus, in the first part of this chapter 
there is a short exposition about Proclus and how he differs from Plotinus. In the second 
part there is an exposition of the soul considered as the objective principle of mathematical 
extension. This theory was the basis of the view of the Platonists of Cambridge, who 
defended the substantiality of space, and concerning whom I present a short exposition in 
the third part of the chapter. In the last section I compare the Platonists of Cambridge with 
Leibniz.  
 Proclus still supported the theory of the One of Plotinus but in another sense he 
returned to a more genuinely Pythagorean position, in the sense that he put the Limited on 
the same level of Unlimited. Proclus affirmed, following the Pythagorean tradition, that all 
levels of reality, including the superior hypostasis (henads), the mathematical beings, the 
Soul, and even physical beings, are composed of Limit and Unlimited. Everything is 
therefore a synthesis or mixture of different degrees of these two terms. In this context, the 
Unlimited (dyad or the requirement of the infinite) corresponds to the moment of the 
procession, generating diversification and movement, whereas the Limit (structure 
requirement) corresponds to the conversion and the return, generator of identity and rest.304 
                                                 
303 Hegel also praised him: “... Proclus is hence much more detailed, and he went much further than did 
Plotinus; it may indeed be said that in this respect we find in him the most excellent and best that was 
formulated by any of the Neo-Platonist” In HEGEL, G. H. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Plato and 
Platonists, vol. II, Lincoln and London, University of Nebraska Press, 1995, p. 440. 
304 In a passage of the Commentary on Timaeus, Proclus explains these two terms: “Orpheus likewise delivers 
the very same things. For as Plato produces twofold causes from the one, viz. bound and infinity, thus too the 
theologist gives subsistence to ether and chaos from time; ether being the cause of bound everywhere, but 
chaos of infinity. And from these two principles he generates both the divine and visible orders of things; 
from the more excellent indeed, producing every stable, effective of sameness, and source of measure and 
connexion; but from the less excellent, everything motive, effective of difference, never failing progression, 
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These principles are the laws of realisation of reality and they condition their productions in 
diverse ways. Each one is inseparable from its opposite and necessarily assumes it. Isolated 
from the other, the procession would deteriorate in an inexhaustible incoherence, while the 
conversion, without its opposite, would be perverted into a barren and monotonous identity. 
Proclus elaborated these complementarities dialectically and thus there is no superiority of 
one of these principles with regard to the other. In this he is radically different from 
Plotinus, whose One was always superior to its emanation. 
 However, Proclus’ position was in another way close to Plotinus’ because he also 
considered that the Unlimited itself was a procession from the One. Thus, the Unlimited is 
the condition for existence of matter but the One is the foundation of its existence. 
However, against the Plotinian pessimism regarding the material world, Proclus affirms 
that matter cannot be evil. There is not any ontological sphere that can be deprived of the 
Good, therefore the divine is present in all the beings and all the levels of the Real. In so far 
as it originates from the infinite, matter is the last degree of manifestation of the abundance 
of the One. Or, as Trouillard said , “the mystery of matter would be the privileged 
expression of the mystery of the One, because it is its inverse replica.”305 Thus matter is the 
feminine receptivity which Proclus opposed to the virile and seminal power of the formal 
element. Using mythical vocabulary, he still called it: “Night”, “Chaos” and “Silence”, it 
being the sources of all infinitude, either of intelligible, psychic or material nature. But as 
we have seen, it only works in dialectical conjunction with its opposite. In this way, 
according to Trouillard, he recovered in the Homeric and Orphic hierogamies the thesis – 
according to which only fecundity appears in the conjunction of antithetic principles.306 
 Proclus’ theory of emanation, as we have said, is nonetheless similar to that of 
Plotinus in the sense that each one of the inferior subjects is produced and supported by the 
superior principle, that is, it can be said that everything is in One and One is in everything, 
according to the formula found in Timaeus. This principle is the basis whereon Proclus 
erected the monadological principle that each being expresses the entire universe according 
                                                                                                                                                    
the nature which is defined, and the last infinity by which matter is comprehended" PROCLUS, 
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305 TROUILLARD, J. Le néoplatonisme de Plotin à Damascios, in l’Histoire de la philosophie I de 
l’Encyclopedie de la Pleiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 130. 
306 TROUILLARD, J. Le néoplatonisme de Plotin à Damascios, p. 130. 
150 
 
to its particular law.307 Thus each point of the universe reproduces the standard of 
formation of the universe, that is, it reproduces the procession scheme, according to its 
proper perspective. And so the centre of the universe is everywhere, and in each point we 
can find it, in some sense, totally present.  
 Therefore, the unity is said to be simultaneously the maximum (in that it transcends 
everything) and the minimum (in that it is the substance even of the “minimum” being), 
since each unity of matter is unified by a subjacent unity. As minimum it is contained by 
the whole but as maximum it contains everything as it is the whole. It is, perhaps, this 
doctrine that makes the Neo-Platonic conception of matter so similar to the notion of One, 
an aspect recognised by Proclus. In fact, both matter and the One are unlimited or infinite, 
both are the potentiality of everything, both are formless, both are sources of power, 
dynamis. In The Elements of Theology, prop. 59, Proclus indicated the situation of matter 
(or the last being) in this way: “For the last being is, like the first, perfectly simple. For the 
reason that it proceeds from the first alone; but the one is simple as being above all 
composition, the other as being beneath it.”308 Dodds said that Proclus explained in the 
Theology Platonic III (vi) 127–9, that the One which is uncaused has maximal unity and the 
matter which is caused by the One has minimal unity.309 But this minimal unity, in fact, 
derives ultimately from the all embracing unity of the One. 
 The immanent principle or the One which is present in each being of the cosmos is 
referred in terms such as “One of the soul”, “top of the soul”, “centre of the soul”, “flower 
of our substance”, “seed of non being that there is in us” or still the “divine immanence in 
the sanctuary of the soul”.310 Proclus called the spirit the “monad” because of this 
immanence. All the three, spirit, soul and matter, are constituted of Unlimited and Limited 
(dyad and monad) as we have seen. But the denomination “monad” is more appropriate to 
the spirit (or intellect), because its procession is more concentrated, not advancing until the 
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last determination, and so it stays enveloped in itself. Proclus explained this distinction in 
this way:  
 
For the monadic alone pertains to intellect, on which account also intellect is 
impartible. But the dyadic pertains to body, whence in the generation of the 
corporal-formed nature Plato begun from the duad (...) the soul however, being 
a medium between intellect and body, is a monad and at same time a duad. But 
the cause of this is, that in a certain respect it equally participates of bound and 
infinity; just as intellect indeed, is allied to bound, but body rather pertains to 
infinity, on account of its subject matter, and divisibility ad infinitum.311  
 
 But Trouillard explained that it is not the spirit but the soul which is the best 
ontological sphere to represent the monadology of Proclus. This is because the soul is in the 
middle position and consequently it is in the best position to incarnate the unified 
Pythagorean principles of Limit–Unlimited. Thus, in the Elements of Theology, Proclus 
believed in the necessity of beginning with the soul to study the universal order, since it is 
in the soul that all the characters of the cosmos are determined in concentrated form. The 
soul, situated in the middle point, is the recapitulation of the entire procession, from the 
sphere of intellect to the matter.  
 
Every soul is all things, the things of sense after the manner of an exemplar and 
intelligible things after the manner of an image. (…) Accordingly it pre-
embraces all sensible things after a manner of a cause, possessing the rational 
notions of things immaterially, of bodily things immaterially, of extended 
things without extension; on the other hand it possesses as images the 
intelligible principles, and has received their Forms (…).312 
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 Proclus explained that the soul is substantially monad and dyad, unit and multiplicity, 
but it is unified before being divided though the soul does not subsist prior the plurality of 
its parts:  
 
If we affirm these things correctly, it is not proper to separate the soul from the 
union, dividing it, nor to consume the totality of itself in a generation of parts 
(…) It is necessary, therefore, that the whole remains always the whole; that the 
generation of parts is realized with the totality remaining; and that this is not 
consumed in the division of the parts. Therefore we must conceive, that the 
essence of the soul is one, and at the same time multiple, the whole remaining 
and being distributed in parts, and possessing continuity, and being, at the same 
time, divided.313 
 
 In this last line Proclus arrived at a conception of soul different from that of Plotinus. 
It is not a pure or non-dimensional unity any more. It can be distributed into parts (being 
multiple) while remaining one. Its character of multiplicity does not destroy its unity. 
 
2 – Psychic Vehicle and Imagination 
 
In Proclus’ scheme the imagination (phantasia), together with discursive thinking, occupies 
the intermediary place between the intuitive nous and sensation (aisthesis). Properly 
speaking, the scheme is nous-dianoia-phantasia-aisthesis. But, as we have seen, it is the 
soul which achieves this mediating status between mind and body. Thus these two faculties, 
dianoia and imagination, can be grouped together as upper and lower faculties of soul. In 
this way they achieve a graduated passage from the predominant unity of nous to the 
predominant multiplicity of sensation.  
 Proclus also called imagination the passive nous as it receives the projection 
(procession) of the content of the nous in its intelligible matter, through the dianoetic 
reason. Thus dianoia has the rational notions organised logically and discursively and 
imagination unfolds them, presenting them separately (as the dyad is a power of 
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separation), so that they are in a way presented figuratively or projected in space. Hence 
imagination is almost inseparable from dianoia. It is possible to illustrate their relation 
using the model form–matter. Thus dianoia contains the pure rational forms that are 
projected in the intelligible matter, forming an imagined notion. 
 But Proclus also assumed the intermediary character of mathematics between the 
intelligible world and the physical world, or in other words, that mathematics results from a 
mixture of the indivisible and the divisible, Limit and Unlimited, one and many. In this 
sense Proclus, as well as other Platonists such as Iamblichus, Xenocrates (who said that the 
soul is a self-moved number) and Speusippus (who said that the soul is the all-extended) 
was a conceptual realist or anti-abstractionist.314 Again, this is consistent with the 
Parmenidian notion that what is thought must be real. Consequently, Proclus believed in the 
full reality or subsistence of mathematical objects or mathematicals. Furthermore, because 
of the intermediary character of these two realms of being, he identified soul with 
mathematicals, a point of view also shared by the aforementioned Platonists. Thus, for him, 
the soul does not simply know mathematics, it is mathematics. However, this association of 
mathematics with the principle of life is certainly much older than the time of Proclus. As 
we saw in the first chapter of this thesis, it was a Pythagorean doctrine.  
 Thus, in the Commentary on the first Book of Euclid’s Elements the thesis is that the 
creation of mathematics confounds itself with self-creation or the self-constitution of the 
soul, following the circuit of procession and conversion when the soul, in a kind of 
substantial movement, projects and recoils again to itself. For Proclus, all branches of 
mathematics are generated within the soul through its faculty of imagination. He even said 
that the imagination is the mirror of the soul.315 Considering only geometry we come to 
know that the geometric equivalent of procession is the movement (fluxion) of a point 
creating a straight line, which, being extended indefinitely, is the expression of the 
generative power of the infinite. The corresponding geometric for conversion is the 
circumference, which is a movement that returns back to the centre the multiplicity 
previously generated, thus limiting and determining multiplicity. With only these two 
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movements, the line and the circle (or the curve), all possible objects of geometry are 
generated:  
 
For this reason the soul contains in advance the straight and the circular in her 
nature, so that she may supervise the whole array of unlimiteds as well as all 
the limited beings in the cosmos, providing for their forthgoing by the straight 
line and for their reversion by the circle, leading them to plurality by the one 
and collecting them all into unity by the other.316  
 
And since the two movements have the same origin in the point which contains both, they 
cannot be radically different and in some sense they can be identified. Thus, Proclus says:  
 
… so also the idea of the figure shows that circular lines are implicated in 
straight and straight in circular; that is, it projects its whole nature in 
characteristic fashion in each thing, and all of them are in all when the whole is 
simultaneously in all of them and in each separately.317.  
 
 Thus it is a living and substantial movement (kinesis or fluxion) that generates 
extension in the soul and gives to it a certain plasticity. Instead of imagining a space 
receiving the rational notion, we could view the whole process happening together: the 
space being created together with the procession of the rational notions. In addition, 
Aristotle also conceived that the properties of geometric figures were discovered through 
activity (energeia).318 In fact, ultimately, this movement results from the activity considered 
as thinking, since there cannot be thinking without moving from one thought to another. 
Hence thinking goes along with extension, because extension is a space created, in the 
intelligible matter, by this noetic movement, in a kind of process of becoming. The 
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continuous activity of mind which is connected with the notion of duration, or flux of 
consciousness, manifests itself in this growing imagined extension.319  
 For Proclus, the soul considered as principle of motion is inseparable from its 
mathematical character. And because the movement is not discrete, but continuous, we 
cannot consider this space composed of summed unities. This generation of extension by 
the soul follows the principle asserted about the soul that we have seen Proclus assert: “the 
generation of parts is realized with the totality remaining; and that this is not consumed in 
the division of the parts.” And so we conclude that this space was conceived preserving its 
unity. At same time, extension is generated, and so it is conditioned by the opposite realm 
of dyad, of more or less, of expansion and contraction. Although, since Proclus claimed that 
the soul is a union of monad and dyad, we can deduce that something of the extension (or 
of intelligible matter) always remains with it. 
 The following passage is a sample in which we can find the claim of realism about 
mathematics as a product of imagination, the plastic capacity of the soul: 
 
For imagination, both by virtue of its formative activity and because it has 
existence with and in the body, always produces individual pictures that have 
divisible extension and shape, and everything that it knows has this kind of 
existence. For this reason a certain person has ventured to call it “passive 
Nous’”. Yet if it is Nous, how could it be other than impassive and immaterial? 
And if feeling accompanies its activity, has it any longer a right to be called 
Nous? For impassivity belongs to Nous and intellectual nature, whereas 
whatever can be affected is far removed from the highest being. But I think he 
intended rather to express the middle position it occupies between the highest 
and the lowest types of knowledge and so called it at the same time “nous”, 
because it resemble the highest, and “passive”, because of its kinship with the 
lowest. (….) By contrast the imagination, occupying the central position in the 
scale of knowing, is moved by itself to put forth what it knows, but because it is 
not outside the body, when it draws its objects out of the undivided centre of its 
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life, it expresses them in the medium of division, extension and figure. For this 
reason everything that it thinks is a picture or a shape of its thought. It thinks of 
the circle as extended, and although this circle is free of external matter, it 
possesses an intelligible matter provided by the imagination itself. This is why 
there is more than one circle in imagination, as there is more than one circle in 
the sense world; for with extension there appear also differences in size and 
number among circles and triangles.320 
 
 This passage illustrates the plasticity of imagination which is associated with its 
formative or creative capacity. The “he” to whom Proclus referred is possibly Aristotle, 
who proposed the idea of passive intellect. Thus the imagination reproduces the intelligible 
species in its intelligible matter. But imagination is not only replicatory but can also 
diversify, producing variation in the forms, variation in sizes and even achieving 
combinations and compositions of different intelligible forms, since its plasticity is 
conditioned by its own will. In this sense, in the capacity of infinite variability it shows its 
relation with the Unlimited and, as Nikulin said, the imagination is enabled to imitate (or 
incarnate) the divine infinite creative power. 321 But the imagination, as a faculty of the 
soul, is itself also a mirror of two faces, as it replicates not only the reasons of intellect but 
also images (phantasmata) of the sense, which are in the last instance also appearances of 
other externalised reasons. The imagination is the only way to represent extended external 
objects and so it is the stance where the two kinds of images meet and interact. 
 Proclus considered the imagination as equivalent to the first vehicle or first body, 
being neither material nor immaterial. It is an intermediate between pure power and pure 
spatiality, and so has attributes of both. As Trouillard said, it is a passage from the intensity 
psychic to somatic extension.322 Each soul, he said, has attached to itself this first body 
which is co-eternal with the soul. In Prop. 196 we read: 
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Every participated soul makes use of a first body which is perpetual and has 
constitution without temporal origin and exempt of decay. For every soul is 
perpetual in respect of its existence (prop. 192), and if further by its very being 
it directly ensoul some body, it must ensoul it at all times, since the being of 
every soul is invariable (prop 191). And if it is so, that which it ensouls is on its 
part ensouled at all times, and at all times participates in life; and what lives at 
all times a fortiori exists at all times; and what exists at all times is perpetual: 
therefore a body directly ensouled and directly attached to any soul is 
perpetual.” 
 
 He said that this psychic vehicle or envelope of the soul (ochema), being always 
material, descends to the temporal sphere by addition of more material to itself, and so it is 
greater or smaller depending on the addition or removal of these vestments.323 This notion, 
Dodds remembered, can be traced back to the notion of a vehicle of the soul in Aristotle, 
the pneuma, also called the fifth element or quintessentia which is present in the divine 
bodies of the stars. In De Gen. Animal. 736b27 Aristotle said: “the spirit which is contained 
in the foamy body of the semen, and the nature which is in the spirit, analogous to the 
element of stars.”324 Porphyrius added that this substance, although of ethereal origin, is 
progressively thickened as it absorbs moisture from the air and that it alters its forms in 
response to the imaginings of the soul.325 Furthermore, the Stoics, sustaining their monism, 
regarded the pneuma not only as vehicle but as the soul itself. 
 As we have seen already, Plotinus had the conception that the emanation (dyad) of 
the One is light. But the quintessentia of Aristotle was also to be considered a kind of light 
as it was conceived as the substance of the stars. In fact, in Proclus we also find the 
identification of space and light in a lost work, On space, which is nevertheless mentioned 
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by the Neo-Platonist commentator of the sixth century C. E., Simplicius.326 And Proclus 
supported Porphyry’s idea that this light is the luminous vehicle of the world soul.327 
 In our discussion this concept has importance because it is the foundation of the 
substantiality of space as propounded by philosophers in the Middle Ages (for instance, 
Grosseteste) and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And with the Platonists of 
Cambridge we have the debate of substantiality of space with Leibniz. We will see that 
More said that it is the spirit (the soul) that is the cause of extended substance and that it 
occupies space. 
 
3 – Substantiality of Space Defended by the Cambridge Platonists 
 
Henri More, Ralph Cudworth and Barrow, the seventeenth-century Platonists of 
Cambridge, discussed the substantiality of space. Their premises were not radically 
different from those of Spinoza, as Leibniz himself recognised. 
 The idea that spatial extension is the same as corporeal extension appears in the 
Middle Ages. At that time the philosopher Robert Grosseteste propounded a metaphysics of 
light in which he adopted Proclus’ notion that light is the first corporeal form. It was also 
the first principle of motion, and the creation of the universe was regarded as nothing but 
the work of diffusion of the dimensional tenuous body of light. From this comes the 
importance given to the development of optics, the discipline wherein the science of space, 
geometry, meets with light.328 
 This idea of a tenuous spatial substance was radicalised by the Platonists of 
Cambridge. Henri More (1614–1687) who was the main figure of this movement exerted 
strong influence on the others of the group, and also on Newton, Clarke and Locke. He 
studied the Platonic tradition, including the works of the Italian renaissance thinker Ficino, 
but studied also and wrote about the cabalist theories, for example, his Cabalist catechism. 
As a Neo-Platonist, More defended the idea of an intermediary stance between God and 
matter, which is his Hylarchic spirit. Contrary to Ficino, he did not consider matter as being 
                                                 
326 JAMMER, Max. Concepts of space, the history of theories of space in Physics, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1969, p. 38 (Simplicius, Physics 612, 32).  
327 SORABJI, Richard, Matter, Space and Motion, Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1988, p. 109. 
328 CROMBIE, A. C., Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, Clarendon, Oxford, 1953.  
159 
 
produced by this spirit. For him, matter was essentially inert and different from spirit. But 
he nevertheless stated that matter is animated by spirit. In the preface to the Immortality of 
the Soul he called this spirit the invisible agent which is “the vicarious power of God upon 
the matter”, that is, the immediate plastic agent of God through which his will is fulfilled in 
the material world. He also called it the “universal soul of the world.”329 
 More was initially very interested in the philosophy of Descartes, with whom he 
exchanged letters. In some sense he reproduced, some years earlier, the intellectual 
itinerary of Leibniz. In the beginning, he was an enthusiast of the Cartesian natural 
philosophy, but his mood evolved in an opposite direction, and he developed a desire to 
refute Descartes. More based his arguments on notions taken from old philosophical 
tradition, mainly the Platonic doctrines as seen by a Christian reader. He thought that the 
Cartesian attribution of all phenomena to blind matter left almost no place for God and the 
spirit in the universe, which for him led to a dangerous materialism and atheism. And so he 
proposed a different definition of extension:  
 
By true extension you understand that which is accompanied with the faculty of 
being touched and possesses impenetrability. I admit with you that this is not a 
case with God, with an angel, and with the soul, which are devoid of matter; but 
I maintain that there is in angel, and in souls, just as true extension, however 
little acknowledged by the run of the schools.330 
 
 Thus More claimed that it is not matter but the spirit which truly has the essence of an 
extended substance: it is a substance because it occupies space and can affect matter. 
Differently from inert matter, the nature of spirit is to be indivisible, penetrable and self-
moving. Also, the spirit is a plastic power and so it is able to expand or contract in such a 
way that it can produce many phenomena in nature, like directing or moving parts of 
matter, making it cohesive and causing effects that cannot be explained mechanically. As 
he considered matter to be inert, so its forming atoms as well are only building blocks 
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submitted to a motion which is not generated by them. In a letter of 1649 to Descartes, 
More wrote:  
 
Lastly, since incorporeal substance has this stupendous power (virtus) that by 
its mere application it can bind together or separate, divide and project or 
control matter without the use of strings or hooks, wedges or fastenings, may it 
not seem likely that it can contract itself together, since nothing impenetrable 
impedes it, and the like?331  
 
Only Lady Anne Conway, the pupil of More, was to radicalise his ideas, denying real 
existence to matter, considering it merely a derivation of spirit.332 
 Thus his doctrine begins with the recognition that extension was the feature existing 
in both spirit and matter. The pervading spirit conferred extension to brute matter and 
consequently achieved the interaction between the two spheres of reality. More claimed 
that the whole space was spiritual or divine, a fact that guarantees its status as a very real 
thing. In the work Enchiridion Metaphysicum he identifies Space and God, eliminating the 
distinction between God and the Hylarchic Spirit or between Spirit and universe. He was 
accordingly somehow defending a doctrine with strong pantheist connotations. Thus the 
spirit is not only the moving force in the universe but also the immobile background to 
where the matter is moved:  
 
If after the removal of corporeal matter out of the world, there will be still space 
and distance, in which this very matter, while it was there, was conceived to lie, 
and this distant space cannot but be conceived to be something, and yet not 
corporeal, because neither impenetrable nor tangible, it must of necessity be a 
substance incorporeal, necessarily and eternally existent of itself; which the 
                                                 
331 HALL, A. R., Henri More and the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 
153. 
332 HALL, p. 7. 
161 
 
clear idea of a being absolutely perfect will more fully and punctually inform us 
to be the self-subsisting God.333  
 
The notion is based on the idea of the omnipresence of God, central as we have seen in 
Neo-Platonic thought, but is also present in the Jewish religious tradition, as we can see in a 
letter to Descartes.334 More says:  
 
you define matter or body in too broad fashion, for it seems that not only God, 
but even the angels, and everything which exists by itself, is an extended being; 
whence extension appears to possess no narrower limits than the absolute 
essence of things, though it can nevertheless be diversified in accordance with 
the variety of the same essences. Now the reason which makes me believe that 
he is omnipresent, and fills immediately the whole universe and each of its 
parts; for how could he communicate motion to matter, as he has done betimes, 
and as he is actually doing according to you, if he did not have immediate 
contact with matter … God is therefore extended and expanded after his 
fashion; whence God is an extended being.335  
 
Thus, if this extension communicates motion to nature it does not do it irregularly or 
miraculously. It does it in such an orderly way that we can acquire scientific knowledge of 
it. The gravitation of planets was supposedly to be explained by this agency, as was the 
resonance between musical strings and the formation of the animal foetus and development 
of plants.336 Thus the working of this principle is not only the blind necessity of mechanical 
causation. Nonetheless the principle can have its effects predicted: “the only thing 
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mechanical about the spirit of nature is that it acts in predictable ways in its interaction with 
matter.”337  
 Another point of disagreement between More and Descartes concerns the absolute or 
relative character of space. This will be important for us as we look to Leibniz’s work. 
According to Hall, Descartes considered the recognition of motion to be dependent on the 
position of observer – each observer having an account of space that is necessarily relative 
to himself and so different from the position of other observers, it being impossible to 
discern a best choice between the alternatives.338 Against this relativist vision, More 
defended the idea of a privileged observer, who was obviously God, who could have a 
unified vision of everything. 
 Newton defended the same notion of absolute space. Many historians of science (for 
instance, Hall, Westfall and Koyré) presumed that this conception of Newton was due to 
the influence of More, directly, or by means of Barrow. Referring to the concepts of 
absolute space and absolute time of Newton, Alexandre Koyré says that they are: “the 
selfsame concepts for which Henry More fought his long-drawn-out and relentless battle 
against Descartes.”339 And the conception is sustained as a consequence of metaphysical or 
theological motivations of Newton, to which he also added axioms necessary to his 
dynamics. But the presence of theological assumptions is clear, since the idea of absolute 
space is to be connected or explained by the idea of the omnipresence of God. Thus 
Newton says: “God is one and the same God always and every where. He is omnipresent 
not as in virtue only, but as in substance. In him the universe is contained and moved, but 
without mutual interaction, for just as God has no feeling of the motions of bodies, so 
bodies feel no resistance from the omnipresence of God.” 340 
 The second most important Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), 
published his massive The true intellectual system of the universe in 1678. In this book he 
developed the notion of Hylarchic spirit derived from More, which he calls “plastic spirit”. 
It suffices here to stress a few points from this work.  
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 Cudworth also claimed that the principle is present strongly in the history of 
philosophy. In most cases, however, he stresses the intermediary nature of what he calls the 
Plastick principle:  
 
And as Hippocrates followed Heraclitus in this (as was before declared) so did 
Zeno and the Stoicks also, they supposing besides an Intellectual Nature, as the 
Supreme Architect and Master – builder of World, another Plastick nature as 
the Immediate Workman and Operator; which plastick nature hath already been 
described, in words of Balbus, as a thing which acts not fortuitously, but 
regularly, orderly and artificially (…) Lastly, as the latter Platonists and 
Peripateticks have unanimously followed their Master herein, whose vegetative 
Soul also is no other than a Plastick nature, so the Chymists and Paracelsians 
insist upon the same thing, and seem rather to have carried the notion on 
further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own, 
The Archeus.341  
 
In the case of the Stoics, the principle is presented in a monist way, and for this reason 
Cudworth called them atheists.342 
 Cudworth mainly developed the idea that nature acts like an artist, but it acts without 
explicit consciousness. Cudworth, like More, asserted that the plastic nature does not act 
blindly by necessity of mechanism or by fortuitous chance: “Nature is art as it were 
incorporated and embodied in matter, which do not act upon it from without mechanically, 
but from within vitally and magically.”343  
 Again we have the same reference to passages of Aristotle that inspired the thinking 
about unconscious teleology:  
 
How the Plastick Nature is in general to be conceived, Aristotle instructs us in 
these words: If the Naupegical art, that is the art of shipwright, were in the 
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timber itself, operatively and effectually it would there act just as Nature does 
(…) And thus we have the first general conception of the Plastick Nature, that it 
is the art itself, acting immediately on the matter., as inward principle.344 
 
In many places he discussed the unconscious work of the Plastick Nature and it suffices 
here to only mention a short passage: “there is in the next place another imperfection to be 
observed in the Plastick Nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason of its own action, 
so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth …”345 
 But for nature to act in this way, Cudworth said, it must follow a program inserted in 
its seeds, as the Stoics propounded: “Nature is a habit moved from itself according to 
Spermatick Reasons or Seminal Principles, perfecting and containing several things, which 
in determinate time are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was 
secreted.” Thus in Cudworth we have the meeting of the idea of plastic nature, which is the 
shaping extension, with the Aristotelian notion of energeia/entelecheia which notion is, in 
its turn, coloured with meanings of Stoic origins: the seminal principles. To all this is also 
added the idea of the presence of the unconscious work. In other words, all that Plotinus 
presented as an attribute of his non-extended soul, was established by More and Cudworth 
as properties of the extended or plastic soul. 
 It should be also mentioned here that Leibniz recognised the link between the 
doctrines of More and Spinoza.346 He quoted in the same text in which he discussed the 
Platonists of Cambridge the doctrine of Spinoza that “thinking substance and extended 
substance are one and the same, known now under the attribute of thought, now under that 
of extension.” For Spinoza, the principle of continuity precludes that extension can be 
regarded divisible and thus only by a superficial approach can account for such 
divisibility.347 
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4 – Leibniz 
 
Leibniz followed the Platonic tradition represented by Proclus in some aspects, but in 
others he modified it. He acknowledged three levels of objects of knowledge: sensible, 
imaginable and intelligible. And he said, like Proclus, that “Mathematics is the science of 
imaginable things” and that geometry is the science of universal imagination.348 He also 
considered the space of imaginable objects as an ideal thing, like the intelligible matter of 
Aristotle. Proclus, however, assumed the notion of intelligible matter but his concept of 
imagination is substantial, as it guides the plasticity of soul when it informs matter. In 
contrast, for Leibniz, the imagination is only an ideal entity of the mind. 
 Thus for Leibniz we see the extended thing and then the mind obtains a 
dimensionless idea of that extension. But the extended thing we see is not really substantial 
extension. As we saw in the last chapter, its extension is a well-founded phenomenon that 
results from the harmony of the set of monads. Thus the extension we see is not a real 
continuum. It is not real, but is a creation of the mind. In this sense extension is an entity of 
reason. As abstraction it is an imagined entity and so in this sense, surfaces or spaces and 
lines are also imagined things. In a letter to De Volder he explained this point:  
 
For space is nothing but the order is the existence of things possible at the same 
time, while time is the order of the existence of things possible successively 
(…) extension is an abstraction from the extended and can no more be 
considered substance than can a number or a multitude, for it expresses nothing 
but a certain non-successive (i.e., unlike duration ) but simultaneous diffusion 
or repetition of some particular nature, or what amounts to the same thing, a 
multitude of things of this same nature which exist together with some order 
between them; and it is this nature, I say, which is said to be extended or 
diffused.349 
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The two orders result from relations among a plurality of discrete things. Because they are 
abstractions, these two orders are only an extrinsic denomination and indifferent to the 
things from which they were abstracted. Number and time also have the same status of 
things of the imagination, as they are abstracted from numbered things. In this case, they 
are an order of succession, whereas spatial objects pertain to the order of coexistence. Thus 
Leibniz sustained that space and time are not substantial: “space and time are order of 
things but not things.” Space and time are well-founded phenomena and can be explained 
in terms of perceptions of the souls. 
 In both cases, the order of co-existence and the order of succession, the unities are 
organised in relations by perception, that is, by the understanding or imagination. In this 
sense, Leibniz wrote in the New Essays:  
 
It may be that dozens and score are merely relations and exist only with respect 
to the understanding. The units are separate and the understanding takes them 
together, however scattered they may be. However, although relations are the 
work of the understanding they are not baseless and unreal. The primordial 
understanding is the source of things; and the very reality of all things other 
than simple substances consists only in there being a foundation for perceptions 
or phenomena of simple substances.350  
 
Thus, although the relations are only in the understanding they are not altogether unreal. 
Their reality is guaranteed by the fact that they are present in the understanding of God.  
 It is because of this process that Leibniz maintained the constructive character of a 
perception. In some sense, this is the second function for imagination, which is also a 
function of the understanding: to bestow unity to sensible things. Thus the sensible world, 
as a phenomenon, does not have true unity: “a body is not a true unity, it is only an 
aggregate, which the Scholastics call a being per accidens, a collection like a herd. Its unity 
comes from our perception. It is a being of reason, or rather, of imagination, a 
phenomenon.”351 
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 These thoughts about imagination, extension and phenomena are associated with 
Leibniz’s conception of matter. Leibniz rejected the Cartesian idea of matter as a perfect 
fluid or as equivalent to extension. The idea of a perfect fluid is to be opposed as being as 
absurd as the idea of the perfect hard atom which cannot be split. All matter must be 
something between these two extremes of absolute cohesion and absolute fluidity, and so 
even liquids have some kind of cohesion. Leibniz thought that matter must be a kind of 
elastic fluid, since it can be separated. Consequently, it must be discrete in its deepest 
nature. The ultimate foundation of the physical world must be these discrete entities or 
unities. Thus liquidity is equivalent to divisibility, so matter is not a true continuum as 
abstract space is, but can be divided to infinity:  
 
Rather, we would think of space as full of matter which is inherently fluid, 
capable of every sort of division and indeed actually divided and subdivided to 
infinity … That is what brings it about that matter has everywhere some degree 
of rigidity as well as of fluidity, and that no body is either hard or fluid in the 
ultimate degree – we find in it no invincibly hard atoms and no mass which is 
entirely unresistant to division. The order of nature, and in particular the law of 
continuity, equally pull down both alternatives.352  
 
 The argument Leibniz used for explaining elasticity is this: a body must be made of 
smaller parts and the elasticity is due to the movement, caused by tension, of these parts in 
a subtle fluid which permeates them. This fluid, by its turn, is composed of still smaller 
parts that themselves float in a fluid. This process goes on to infinity.353 Thus the elasticity 
(or fluidity) that the Platonists of Cambridge used to support the idea of continuous 
extension (because it can be stretched in many forms without losing its unity), was 
transformed by Leibniz into an argument for the discrete nature of matter and of the 
universe as whole.  
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 But Leibniz rejected the idea of plastic natures for another reason. As Wilson points 
out, Leibniz believed that the idea of plastic natures was not the idea of an internal agent 
but of an external one. In fact, there is a dualism when More defended the idea that plastic 
nature always acted on inert matter.354 But this is not the only way of seeing these matters. 
As we saw in our exposition of Proclus, the duality of acting principle and acted-upon 
matter can be seen as both parts of the soul. For this reason Lady Anne Conway and 
perhaps Cudworth were even closer to Proclus than More was. The soul is then considered 
as having the dual ontological level that makes a perfect continuous link between the unity 
of Intellect and multiplicity of matter. We have presented the arguments that the Platonists 
of Cambridge used to sustain it. But also Paracelsus and Van Helmont, following the idea 
of world Soul, postulated the existence of a certain spiritual and spatial medium for the 
possibility of transference of accidents from one subject to another. By means of this 
conception, all types of bodily extension are somehow united by a connecting field, “the 
Light of Nature”, that conveys images inside the World Soul. None of this exists in 
Leibniz, as he always denied both the existence of the World Soul and the transference of 
accidents. He interpreted this notion of “Light of Nature” not as a real entity, but only as 
the access to the contents that we have in our own mind:  
 
But the light of nature, as it is called, involves distinct knowledge; and quite 
often a ‘consideration of the nature of things’ is nothing but the knowledge of 
the nature of our mind and of these innate ideas, and there is no need to look for 
them outside oneself.355  
 
The corresponding immanent imagination, the plastic faculty that acts as demiurge and 
provides the extended form for the body, is also naturally ruled out. 
 For Leibniz, the monads are non-dimensional and immaterial beings and 
consequently they cannot interact with anything extended. Beside, because the soul is this 
immaterial unity, it is outside space and any extension is only a phenomenal appearance of 
an aggregate of monads. In fact, Leibniz thought that he could replace the extended plastic 
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natures by his own conception of an infinity of discrete monads. Thus in a writing of 1705, 
entitled “Considerations on Principles of Life, and on Plastic Natures” he agreed with 
Cudworth that the laws of mechanics alone could not form an animal. But he said:  
 
Thus I have no need to resort with Cudworth to certain immaterial plastic 
natures, although I remember that Julius Scaliger and other peripatetics, and 
also certain partisans of the Helmontian doctrine of Archei, have believed that 
the soul manufactures its own body. I may say of it non mi bisogna, e non mi 
basta, for the very reason that pre-formation and organisms ad infinitum will 
furnish me the material plastic natures suited to the requirements of the case; 
whereas the immaterial plastic principles are as little necessary as they are little 
capable of satisfying the case.356  
 
Therefore, Leibniz said that the soul is always accompanied by an organic body. This is 
similar to the plastic natures, with the difference that it is formed by an infinity of discrete 
elements, other monads. 
 Leibniz had another reason for rejecting the plastic natures. According to him, the 
science of mechanics proves that the interaction between the soul or plastic natures and 
matter was impossible. Bodies can only interact with bodies. He reported that Descartes has 
well established the law of nature that the same quantity of force is always preserved. 
Consequently, the soul could not increase or diminish the force of bodies. Leibniz thought 
that he had proved that even the total direction of the forces of bodies could not be changed 
by the soul (contrary to what Descartes believed). Thus these two levels do not interact. 
The souls, he said, must follow their own law of final causes, following a progressive series 
of perceptions according to good and evil and the bodies or extended things must follow 
their own laws, the efficient causes or the mechanic laws of motion. The two levels are 
synchronised by the pre-established harmony.357 Thus, by constructing a metaphysics partly 
based on the results of the still-young science of Mechanics, and partly based on Plotinus’ 
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doctrine of the soul (dimensionless soul) he ended by creating a very sharp dualism very 
similar to the Cartesian one, where the substance of matter cannot interact with the 
substance of mind. 
 Leibniz remained a strict supporter of mechanism and rejected non-mechanical 
causes, as can be seen in his letter to Clarke. He rejected the explanation provided by the 
theory of gravitation of Newton on the grounds that it did not fit into the theoretical 
framework of the new science of mechanics. The movement of bodies, he says, must be 
linear otherwise it would be miraculous:  
 
If God wanted to cause a body to move free in the aether round about a certain 
fixed centre, without any other creature acting upon it, I say it could not be 
done without a miracle, since it cannot be explained by the nature of bodies. 
For a free body naturally recedes from a curve in the tangent. And therefore, I 
maintain that the attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous thing, 
since it cannot be explained by nature of bodies.358  
 
 Leibniz insisted that extension is divisible presumably as any bit of common sense 
can verify. However, the Platonists of Cambridge (and perhaps Spinoza too) maintained 
that the extension to which they referred is a kind of basic and primeval spiritual extension. 
This spiritual extension represents the proper omnipresence of God and follows the Platonic 
tradition. As Koyré pointed out, Newton’s concepts of absolute space and absolute time are 
the same as those of Henry More and possibly are derived from him.359 And, as Halls 
claimed, Henry More was a decisive influence “in assisting Newton to repudiate Cartesian 
mechanism.”360 Thus Newton rejected the main axiom of Descartes’ science that one body 
can only act on another by direct contact. In fact, gravitational attraction was a good 
example of non-mechanical action. In convergence with More, Newton wrote in the last 
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edition of Principia about the universal, subtle and elastic spirit that is the main cause of 
coherence, gravity, optics and electricity, as well as of animal sensation.361 
 
In this chapter we have seen that in the Neo-Platonic tradition there was a branch that 
defended the substantiality of extension. Proclus is important in this tradition because he 
tried to explain how the soul, being a principle, Limited and Unlimited, could be the 
objective basis of this extension. His theory also attempted to explain the immanence of 
mathematics in nature, quite different from the nominalism of Aristotle and Leibniz. His 
later followers were the Platonists of Cambridge.  
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Chapter VI – The Tradition of Studies in Optics: al-Kindi and 
Grosseteste. 
 
 
In the previous chapter we showed a medium that explains the substantiality of space. In 
this chapter the idea is to show that the same medium was used to explain the interaction 
between substances, a theory rejected by Leibniz. However, this chapter attempts to show 
that this tradition of 0ptics was important for Leibniz concerning certain aspects of 
Monadology: the principle of the origin of diversity, the use of the metaphor of mirrors and 
the appearance of the principle of least action. I will put forward a general view that the two 
main figures in the origin of this tradition were al-Kindi and Grosseteste.  
 We saw in the chapter on Aristotle that his explanation of sensation and the idea of 
interaction with the environment implicit in his teleological functionalism seemed to 
conflict with the notion that the organism develops depending only on the internal 
principles of change already present in its essence or in its substantial form. Aristotle’s 
theory of knowledge was in this sense opposed to Plato’s theory of reminiscence of, 
because it puts great importance on the interaction with environment. The form or species 
travels in the environment until it reaches the soul of the knower, causing not only 
sensation but also abstract thinking.362  
 Thus the idea that the objects of perceptions (or intellectual understanding in some 
cases) generate their forms or species and that these species travel in a medium until they 
reach a receptor was basically Aristotelian (but also defended by the Atomists). The Stoics 
adopted this scheme and it was in some sense also present in the Neo-Platonists. We have 
mentioned also that the quintessentia of Aristotle was to be conceived as the substance of 
the stars. In On the Generation of Animals (736b), he suggested that it was from this starry 
material that the cover of soul, the pneuma, was formed. Proclus, as we saw, developed the 
theme of imagination as a proper faculty of the soul. It is the middle or intermediary link 
between intellect and matter. Following this a line of research appeared, first in the Arabic 
world and afterwards in Europe, that connected some of these conceptions of knowledge of 
Aristotle with the mathematical studies of Euclid and created a tradition of what we can call 
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philosophical and scientific research in optics (also called perspectiva). To these two main 
theoretical elements we need to add the Neo-Platonist doctrine of micro-cosmos. In this 
chapter we will examine some aspects of two representative thinkers of this tradition, al-
Kindi and Grosseteste, with some references to others such as Roger Bacon.  
 al-Kindi lived in Baghdad between 805 and 873 A. D. and is regarded as the father of 
Islamic philosophy. He was also a scientist, and produced a commentary about the Optics 
of Euclid.363 He almost directly influenced the mediaeval European philosophers, Robert 
Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, and also the Renaissance men: Ficino, Bruno and Paracelsus. 
 I will focus on some parts of the small work called The rays; theory of magical arts 
(or De radiis stellarum).364 In that work, al-Kindi reworked and organised the material 
furnished by Aristotle, but also coupled it with Euclid’s science. From the Neo-Platonists 
al-Kindi took the conception that this world is a mere reflection of the superior realm, the 
Intellectual realm. This realm is made equivalent to the celestial (he refers to it as celestial 
harmony) and therefore is called the sidereal sphere (from Lat. sider – star), and it is from 
there that the sensible world (or world of elements) takes its paradigmatic form. Thus each 
individual in the sensible world is achieving its own process of emanation, like the stars. In 
this respect al-Kindi said:  
 
Thus, (…) the world of elements is an image of the sidereal world ... and it is 
manifest that each thing of this world, whether it is substance or accident, 
emits, at its manner, the rays as the source, i.e., the stars. If it were not this way 
this world will not fully represent the sidereal world.365  
 
He said that each thing is an image of the sidereal world. He also explained this notion in 
terms of mirrors and harmony: “Inversely, the state of each individual thing of this world, 
fully known, would reflect the total state of the celestial harmony as a mirror, since each 
thing of this world is like an image of the universal harmony.”366 
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 From Euclid’s Optics al-Kindi adopted the theory that the emission and diffusion of 
light radiation happen according to geometrical laws, the most basic rule being the notion 
that rays follow a rectilinear path. For al-Kindi the emanation of all substances is a certain 
kind of light radiation and consequently all events and transformations in reality occur 
according to the laws of optics. The science of optics, going beyond the mere study of the 
laws of visible light, becomes a kind of paradigmatic science that comprehends all 
transformations in nature. The importance of this science is based on the understanding of 
the idea that all causal actions happen according to a method of “irradiation” following 
mathematical conditioning. For instance, he said that “The angle of incidence more or less 
great of a luminous beam involves itself also a difference in the effect of the rays.”367 A 
careful study of the mathematical laws of light radiation is consequently necessary for 
understanding the causality working in nature. 
 The use of mathematics then allows the precise measurement that is necessary to 
quantify all radiations in general, which includes not only the sensible but also the invisible 
radiation of the astral or spiritual spheres. This is why al-Kindi used the expression “magic” 
to designate his science. He wanted to imply that not only manifest but also occult radiation 
is governed by the laws of science. Thus, magic for him is not any miraculous suspension 
of laws of nature or action against these laws. Magic is the deepest science because it 
elucidates by means of ultimate laws the complex network of relationships and causal 
actions behind or occulted by the appearances of Nature. Thus magic, to be efficacious, 
needs to follow the precise laws of mathematics.368  
 In the conception of al-Kindi, the occult rays have a physical consistency, a kind of 
imperceptible or subtle materiality, but despite this subtlety their effect will be certainly 
sensible and manifest in nature. This subtle and dynamic materiality is the energy itself or 
virtus, the causal link between the subject which is the emitting cause and the subject which 
receives it and manifests it as effect. The rays are thus the mediating entity or the being 
intermediary between the emitting cause and the effect produced, according to Proclus’ 
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idea of intermediary entity. The ray is also a middle entity in the sense that it is at the same 
time the vehicle of transformation and its own content (thus it unites the opposites, matter 
and form). The effect is the transformation that the rays bring about on the receiving 
subject. As the content of the rays is linked to the nature of the emitting cause, all three, 
cause, mediating ray and effect, are linked as a unique reality. 
 The effects are, however, dependent on many circumstances. Principally, the effect is 
conditioned by the quality of the subject agent, which means that the rays transmitted 
convey something of the agent’s own nature. In fact, al-Kindi follows the notion present in 
Aristotle that every entity projects its own nature (its forms or species) outwards by means 
of rays which transmit this nature to all other entities: “we can say that everything that 
exists actually in the world of elements emits rays in all directions, which fill in their 
manner the ensemble of this world. It follows that each place of this world contains the rays 
of everything that exists in act.”369 The idea is that each individual reproduces the emissive 
pattern of the stars. Each generates its own images. Thus al-Kindi amplified the Aristotelian 
doctrine (following the Neo-Platonists), and conceived each being as a centre from which 
rays emanated at all times and in all directions, thus causing its own peculiar effect in 
everything in the world. Usually the emission is involuntary, since it is without any 
conscious direction or purpose. In the words of Travaglia: “Causal power is emitted from 
everything and though it is not aimed at any particular target, it nevertheless always 
produces effects. It rather seems that being a cause means exactly this capacity of 
expanding, even involuntarily, outwards.”370 Furthermore, because each being emits rays 
and at the same time receives radiation from all other beings, it is both active and passive: 
“Because the things are so united they act and suffer reciprocally one in relation to the 
other, thanks to the diffusion of rays, and they produce one in the other a movement in 
function of the exigency of nature active or passive, as it is evident in numerous cases.”371 
The world is this network of radiations coming from each being towards all others. Thus 
the general effect that each being suffers has its origin in the mutual interaction of all 
causes of the cosmos. A linear and restricted interaction of one single cause and one single 
effect is an impossible thing.  
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 We have additional complications because each emitting subject is already the effect 
or product of a constellation of rays received. Furthermore, the emitting agent suffers the 
effect produced by the causal reciprocity coming from the recipient subject. This infinite 
complex network of causes means that the effects produced in the world should be always 
new, as the same causal pattern can never be reproduced twice. Determinism still exists, but 
is conditioned by an infinite combination of variables. 
 The wise man, however, knowing the laws that rule the dynamism of these rays, can 
voluntarily intervene and direct the rays for a particular purpose. He will know the 
principles by which the rays interact, how they can be increased by combination and 
decreased or weakened when they are not in agreement, achieving in this way a 
manifestation of a certain effect. Magic can happen when the radiations are consciously 
manipulated with the purpose to produce a desired effect. 
 The magician does not possess a special or privileged power, but rather his efficacy 
comes from his conscious knowledge of how to use the powers appropriately that would 
otherwise work unconsciously and in an unfocused way. He knows that the intentionality of 
man, which associates imagination, desire and faith, is able to produce rays that may affect 
and even move things in the material world. Finally, the capacity of man to intervene 
directly in the world is based on the notion that he himself is a micro-cosmos: “The man 
thus, by having its being correctly proportioned, is like the world itself. This is why we call 
him micro-cosmos and that he receives, as the world, the power to induce a movement in 
one matter appropriate to his action, under the condition of having elaborated in his soul an 
imagination, an intention and a particular certitude.”372  
 Thus the magician can make his soul into a clear mirror reflecting the entire world 
and have the ability to produce clear images, which are those that project stronger rays. 
Thus magical practice implies that the magician must first produce the necessary change in 
himself.373 This change will be the production of a clear image of the reality that he wants 
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to make real: “Hence, when the man conceives by imagination a corporeal thing, this thing 
receives an actual existence according to the species in the imaginative spirit.”374 
 As a corollary of the theory that he is a micro-cosmos, the change represented in the 
image will be reproduced in the external world. The intelligible or imaginative matter in the 
mind of the magician is the same matter which is the foundation of exterior reality. This 
continuity between the matter of the soul of man and the matter of the universe is the same 
substantial matter that Henri More discussed centuries later, that makes possible the 
doctrine of micro-cosmos. Thus, the real image reflects the mental image, since they are in 
fact equal: 
 
... the mental and the real image follow together because they are of the same 
species, provided that their respective matters have the inclination to receive 
this form and that the other accident necessary for the engendering of this thing 
contribute, in function of the place and time. Right, the first and main accident 
necessary to the generation of the thing thanks to the model of mental image is 
the desire of the man who imagined that the thing exists.375  
 
 This is a very radical theory of interaction, because it begins by allowing not only 
action at a distance but ultimately that the whole cosmos is a mere extension of the 
individual, and subject to her or his will. 
 
Grosseteste: Follower of Kindian Elaboration. 
  
In the Middle Ages, long before More, the English bishop Grosseteste, following the 
Kindian lead, stressed the metaphysical role of light as a source of extension and also of all 
causal action.376 In fact, for Grosseteste, God was the primordial fountain of light or the Lux 
Suprema. At the same time, the light was taken as the instrument used by Him to produce 
the Universe. There is, therefore, a simultaneous presence of two different meanings of 
light in Grosseteste: the religious accent and the scientific intention. Both these motivations 
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are also behind the whole tradition of scientific optics in Europe: from Roger Bacon, 
Witelo, Dietrich, Pecham, Leonardo da Vinci until the time of Kepler and Newton.  
 Grosseteste equated light with the prime matter discussed by Aristotle. He considered 
light as the first corporeal form, and thus the basis for extension and spatial dimensions.377 
Like prime matter, it is the most simple thing and consequently not subject to further 
impressions, being for this reason incorruptible and immutable (that is, perfect).378 
 Thus, the essence of Light is simplicity and, considered as omnipresent prime matter; 
this simplicity assures the unity of the whole cosmos. But this unity, being a characteristic 
of the divine and perfect oneness also, somehow, accounts for the perfection of the 
processes of nature. Furthermore, this simplicity also has methodological consequences. 
Grosseteste was interested also in the principle of economy, lex parsimoniae, a principle 
which he took from Aristotle and it was later called Ockham’s razor.379 Thus, for 
Grosseteste, to explain the workings of the universe the simpler hypothesis must be chosen 
and this hypothesis is light, whose nature is also to follow the simplest way, the minimum 
path. Thus light (or lux, which has a broader sense than our visible light), is to be 
considered the general and simplest cause behind the multiplicity of phenomena in nature. 
It is the principle of unity and perfection in Nature, but also of differentiation and diversity: 
the species et perfectio of all beings.  
 To explain the manner in which light, being a simple entity, could produce a diversity 
of phenomena, Grosseteste, following al-Kindi, appealed to the mathematical behaviour of 
light. The laws of optics should account for all scientific explanation. But optics, in its turn, 
necessarily required the study of geometry, for light propagates according to strict 
geometrical laws. He wrote:  
 
                                                 
377 GROSSETESTE, On Light, Milwaukee, Marquette U. P., 2000. Those are the characteristics that Aristotle 
attributed also to his quintessence, with the difference that Aristotle relegated its entity only to the superlunary 
world. CROMBIE, A. C., Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1961, p. 116. 
378 In fact, the connection of these terms is present in Ptolemy, as the later commentator Simeon Seth wrote: 
“Ptolemy says in his Optica that the visual pneuma is something of ether, belonging to the quintessence” 
LINDBERG, David C., Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 15. 
379 CROMBIE, p. 145. Using the same words of Grosseteste, Bacon said: “Aristotle says in the fifth book of 
the Metaphysics that nature works in the shortest way possible, and the straight line is the shortest way of all.” 
According to Crombie this principle appears in Comm. Post, i, 17, f, 17 vb. 
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The usefulness of considering lines, angles and figures is the greater because it 
is impossible to understand natural philosophy without these. They are 
efficacious throughout the universe as a whole and its parts, and in related 
properties, as in rectilinear and circular motions. They are efficacious also in 
cause and effect (in actione et passione), and this whether in matter or in the 
senses, and in the latter whether in the sense of sight, where their action 
properly takes place, or in other senses, in the operations of which something 
else must be added on top of those which produce vision … For all causes of 
natural effects have to be expressed by means of lines, angles and figures, for 
otherwise it would be impossible to have knowledge of the reason (propter 
quid) concerning them. This is clear in this way: a natural agent propagates its 
power (virtutem) from itself to the recipient (patiens), whether it acts on senses 
or on matter. This power is sometimes called species, sometimes a similitude, 
and is the same whatever it may be called; and it will send the same power into 
sense and into matter, or into its contrary, as heat sends the same thing into the 
sense of touch and into a cold body.380 
 
 Thus the explanation of phenomena required a clear recognition of two factors: the 
agent and the recipient, of action and passivity. The light or power coming from the agent is 
qualified in many ways by lines, angles and figures to achieve its proper effect in the 
recipient. Basically the idea is that light, which is both power (virtus) and form (species), 
travels in straight lines and varies its action according to the angle at which it reaches the 
recipient surfaces. Light is both species and power, conception which is in accordance with 
the Neo-Platonic framework which describes the ultimate reality by the double One/Good 
and the related human faculties understanding/will (aspectus/affectus). 
 The patiens is the recipient of the power, and acquires the character of obstacle that 
produces the repercussion of the rays of light. In this way all the effects in nature are 
produced. Thus Grosseteste explained the nature of an echo (as he took sound as light 
incorporated in subtle air), the rainbow, and the reflection of light from a mirror as 
                                                 
380 Quoted by CROMBIE, p. 110. 
180 
 
examples of repercussion of lux, an explanation which is an example of the use of lex 
parsimoniae and of the hierarchical subordination of sciences:  
 
But the echo is the repercussion of sound from an obstacle, just as the 
appearance of images is the repercussion of a visual ray from the surface of 
mirror and a rainbow is the repercussion or refraction of the rays of sun in a 
concave aqueous cloud.381 
 
 The appearance of images in the mirror can only happen because there is dispersion 
of rays from all things (the radiation sources) in all directions, achieving the multiplication 
of the original essence. In fact, the theory of Grosseteste supposed that a single point of 
light, by auto-diffusion, could propagate itself instantaneously in straight lines in all 
directions without loss of substance, by means of radiating lines.382 The visible images, 
which are nothing more than reflection of the rays in that obstacle which is the surface of 
the mirror (speculum), only makes manifest that virtual multiplication of the source of light. 
Thus, for Roger Bacon, knowledge of the laws that produce the multiplication of species is 
necessary and “the laws of these multiplications are known only through perspective.”383 
The optical appearances or images in mirrors, and in the souls considered as mirrors,384 are 
determined by their position and so the differences are a consequence of such geometrical 
factors as the distance of the object and the angles of incidence of the rays.385 It is clear that 
the multiplication occurs not only because there are multiple centers of irradiation, but 
because each recipient, being like a mirror, reflects the received radiation in its turn. Thus 
all subjects are, like a mirror, active and passive at the same time; they are cause as well as 
effect (actione et passione). 
                                                 
381 CROMBIE, p. 113. 
382 This propagation would consequently generate bodies in the form of spheres of light of any size. 
Grosseteste says: “For light of its very nature diffuses itself in every direction in such a way that a point of 
light will produce instantaneously a sphere of light of any size whatsoever, unless some opaque object stands 
in the way.” LINDBERG, p. 97. 
383 Bacon discussed the multiplication of species of different kinds, heat, magnetism, light. LINDBERG, p. 
99. 
384 Grosseteste mentioned as an example the senses in the previous quotation. 
385 CROMBIE, p. 144. Roger Bacon wrote: “Every multiplication is either with respect to lines, or angles or 
figure.” Opus Majus, iv, ii. 2. 
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 Grosseteste understood vision as follows. He thought that the soul, by means of the 
eye, must receive forms of the visible object. Thus Grosseteste understood sight as a 
passive power, since the forms coming from the environment were impressed on the soul. 
In this case the aspect of a mirror that is stressed is the capacity of reception of the visible 
image by the mirror. We can see this in a passage of Avicenna, a follower of al-Kindi:  
 
The eye is like a mirror, and the visible object is like the thing reflected in the 
mirror by the mediation of air or another transparent body; and when light falls 
on the visible object, it projects the image of the object onto the eye ... If a 
mirror should possess a soul, it would see the image that is formed on it.386  
 
 But the soul also projects an out-going visual radiation, and therefore vision is a 
process both active and passive.387 When vision is considered an active power, the 
supposition is that some visual rays are emitted by the eyes onto the object, to achieve the 
process of perception. Perception cannot be only a passive process because it implies that 
everything in the field of vision is seen at the same time and equally. Thus an active part of 
the process was necessary to explain the selectivity and acuity of the object seen within the 
visual field. But the active part of the process can also be compared to a mirror. In this case 
what is highlighted is not the reception of rays, but their reflection. In fact, as is the case 
with concave mirrors, they can reflect or refract rays so as to converge them in such way 
that they may be concentrated at a specific point, the focus. Thus rays gather strength, 
producing an increase or intensity in light or heat and making more evident their character 
of power or virtus. Thus the burning mirror concentrated the rays to a point to produce fire. 
In this respect Grosseteste praised the triangle as the best figure, because it represents the 
focusing of a radiating force.388 The concave mirror is therefore a useful analogue for the 
process of perception since it implies the active powers of soul, that is, it can be understood 
                                                 
386 LINDBERG, p. 49. 
387 LINDBERG, p. 101. 
388 McEVOY explained it better: “Nature is sparing and finds simpler means better. As for figures, the 
pyramid represents the strongest and the best action. Compared with individual, straight lines of force 
radiating from every point on the surface of the agent to the nearest point on the surface of the patient, the 
pyramid, whose base is the entire surface of the agent, has great effect, as it focuses its whole virtus into a 
cone which finds its point on the patient's surface, and consequently acts on it with greater force.” McEVOY, 
James, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p. 170. 
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in terms of will, intention, appetite and outgoing energetic power: intentio, extensio, 
protensio, appetitus (etc).389  
 In fact, Grosseteste recognised that it is due to this intentionality in the process of 
perception that the soul’s capacity to understand (aspectus) is inseparable from the dynamic 
dimension of mind (intentio, appetitus, affectus, virtus).390 This is manifest in the account 
that understanding implies the abstractive (or selective) process or the use of virtus 
intellectiva, or nous. The nous is an Aristotelian concept and so it is not a surprise that 
Grosseteste believed that he was following Aristotle.391 Thus selection (abstraction) goes 
together with affectus and goodness is always attached to understanding.392 
 Grosseteste understood that he was developing a theory of Aristotle, as we have 
already mentioned. It is well known that Aristotle taught that the sensation is already a first 
degree of abstraction, since the organ apprehends the specie sensibilis without taking in the 
matter of the object. In the soul the abstracting process (by the virtus of the nous) continues, 
and even the most abstract thinking is impossible without the species (images or 
phantasms) whose very origin is sensation.393 Aristotle also stressed the importance of the 
medium or intermediary stance between the object and the observer.394 Thus, material 
bodies irradiate the sensible forms or species in this medium and afterwards these species 
reach the sensible organ and then the soul. The sensation implies this common medium in 
which the forms or species selected travel until they reach the percipient.395 Obviously this 
medium implies a previous continuity that allows that in the soul the external appearances 
(which are already the species sensibilis) may be translated into phantasmata, the images or 
phantasms of the soul. As reflections in the mirror of the soul, the phantasmata imply a 
                                                 
389 McEVOY, p. 349. 
390 In this sense Couliano said that Ficino gave to the radiations of al-Kindi the name of Eros. COULIANO, I. 
P., Eros et Magie a la Renaissance, Flammarion, Paris, 1984, p. 166. Perhaps a more modern term could be 
conativity 
391 He saw this theory in De generatione animalium, LINDBERG, p. 136. 
392 In this sense McEVOY wrote: “An important expansion is given to the notion of intelligentia later in the 
Hexaemeron when it is diversified into the memoria, intelligentia and amor of De Trinitate, …” p. 304. And: 
“Here already one can distinguish the beginning of a trend which was to achieve its perfect expression only in 
the Ecclesia Sancta, namely to stress the strongly affective character of intelligentia, and to identify its 
activity with the summit of unitive love.” p. 305.  
393 McEVOY, p. 262. 
394 He said in Anima419a 12–22: “For vision occurs when the sensitive faculty is acted upon; as it cannot be 
acted upon by the actual color which is seen, there only remains the medium to act on it, so that some medium 
must exist; in fact, if the intervening space were void, not merely would accurate vision be impossible, but 
nothing would be seen at all.” Quoted by LINDBERG, p. 7. 
395 McEVOY, p. 340. 
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certain unity between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. In this sense 
Grosseteste is following what Randall called “Aristotle’s empiricism”. Randall explained: 
“For Aristotle, knowledge comes from observing the world and reflecting upon what can be 
observed, not as the Platonists held, from an immediate inner “intuition” or intellectual 
vision of a supposed intelligible realm.”396 Randall quoted the following passage from De 
Anima (432a7–9) to support this view: “Without sensation a man would not learn or 
understand anything: at the very time he is actually thinking he must be seeing a sense 
image.”397  
  These notions are consistent with Grosseteste’s framework, which implies that all 
things are originated from the same first corporeal form, which is light. This commonality 
of origin provides a basis for the postulation of continuity between the subject and object. 
This continuity McEvoy explained thus: “There is a point where matter meets the 
immaterial. In sensation, a material form generates a species in a sense-organ, and both 
form and species are united in a judgment by the purely immaterial intentionality of the 
soul.”398 The object or material thing is itself an emanating entity, and as such it is made of 
the same corporeal form (the light) as the subject. The light is at the same time the species 
(form) and the medium (matter) that conveys the species until and through the soul without 
disruption of continuity. The perception is thus constitutive of the subject, as Parmenides’ 
precept stated, that to think is to be, and its version in Plotinus, that to contemplate is to 
create.  
 Thus, for Grosseteste, the implication is that the soul and the body, or soul and 
external world, must form a continuous entity and not simply two strange beings 
juxtaposed. And he consistently followed one aspect of Proclus’ Platonism and supported 
the idea that mathematics is not only an external abstraction from aspects of the physically 
real, but it is also in the very internal texture of the natural world. In any case abstraction 
achieved by the soul cannot be interpreted as negation of the immanent mathematical 
structure of reality. In fact, if the abstract thought is really accompanied by the phantasms 
                                                 
396 RANDALL, p. 95. 
397 Aristotle’s doctrine is, however, full of difficulties. How to conciliate this notion with the doctrine of 
separate intellect? He seems to have been going in the opposite direction also when he evaluated the theory 
that thinking has the same characteristic of sensation in Anima 427a 17: “Indeed the ancients go so far to 
identify thinking and perceiving; (...) They all look upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving, and 
hold that like is known as well perceived by like ...”. 
398 McEVOY, p. 381. 
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(or by phantasia, imagination) whose origin is the species sensibilis, the whole process is 
dependent on the continuity between the two spheres, the subjective and the objective or 
external world. Thus the doctrine of species achieves continuity between the intellect (the 
abstract) and the senses or between the corporeal and spiritual. In this sense Roger Bacon 
says:  
 
And this power is called “likeness”, “image”, and “species” and is designated 
by many other names, and it is produced both by substance and accident, 
spiritual and corporeal ... This species produces every action in the world, for it 
acts on sense, on the intellect, and on all matter of the world for the generation 
of things.399  
 
 Ultimately the doctrine of micro-cosmos can be explained in terms of the theory of 
multiplication of species. I found this in a short quote from Leonardo da Vinci. He 
expounded in two phases the doctrine of multiplication of species: “each body by itself 
alone fills with its images the air around it, and ... the same air is able, at the same time, to 
receive the species of countless other bodies which are in it.” And from this fact that each 
object sends its species in all directions and the following consequence that all images 
converge at each point of the medium, he then enunciated the doctrine of All in All (the 
doctrine of micro-cosmos) so important for the Neo-Platonists: “... that the species are 
throughout the whole and all in each smallest part; each in all and all in the part.”400 Thus 
Leonardo explained the Neo-Platonic doctrine of All in All, in terms of multiplication of 
rays across a medium. In fact, this view is the very opposite of that notion that Plotinus 
defended and Leibniz shared. In Plotinus, as we have seen, the medium does not play a 
role. In his doctrine, it is the unity of individuals (or individual souls) that makes them like 
micro-cosmos because of their analogy with the unity of the All. 
  
                                                 
399 LINDBERG, p. 113. Although this theory is inspired by Aristotle, it is not exactly what Aristotle thought. 
He evaluated the theory that thinking has the same characteristic of sensation in Anima 427a 17: “Indeed the 
ancients go so far as to identify thinking and perceiving; (...) They all look upon thinking as a bodily process 
like perceiving, and hold that like is known as well perceived by like ...”. 
400 LINDBERG, p. 156. 
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Leibniz 
 
The tradition developed by al-Kindi of studies that take light as an object of both 
metaphysical and scientific interest has many interesting aspects to compare with Leibniz’s 
philosophical project . Thus, the world pictured by al-Kindi is a network of radiations 
coming from each being towards all others and the general effect in each being is the 
mutual interaction of all causes of the cosmos. The determinism is therefore produced, but 
is conditioned by an infinite combination of variables. The world presented by al-Kindi is 
very similar to the picture presented by Leibniz in his Monadology, although I did not find 
any explicit reference to al-Kindi in my readings of the German philosopher. Leibniz 
obviously tried to avoid the consequent determinism, on the grounds that it destroys the 
liberty of both God and man. In Leibniz’s view all depends ultimately on the freedom of 
God to choose the best world. It is because of this dependence that even Leibniz’s principle 
of sufficient reason, which says that nothing happens without a cause, cannot be considered 
to be a statement of complete determinism. But once God had chosen which world to 
create, the world created will be an infinite collection of compossible individuals. This 
infinity precludes the access of human knowledge of the precise causes of things. But 
according to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, this impossibility is due more to the 
complexity of an infinite combination of variables than any basic principle of uncertainty 
ruling the world. However, because the world is such a network of compossibles there is no 
strong basis for the affirmation of the freedom of individuals that Leibniz desired to make. 
In this sense H. W. B. Joseph said:  
 
Leibniz endeavored in his theory of substance to exalt the independence of the 
individual: but the unity of the world to which divers substances belong could 
then only be retained by abolishing, in ordine ad Deum, or between the notions 
of these individuals, the independence ascribed to them in their existence.401  
 
Besides, and as a consequence of this last idea, Joseph defends the thesis that the system of 
relations between the monads is independent of the creative act of God. 
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 This rigorous network of relations is, in some sense, that presented by al-Kindi. In al-
Kindi, however, it is the idea of imaginative matter that explains the continuity or 
connection between any individual and the external world (other individuals), a continuity 
that allows for the effectiveness of magic. This is a theory that tries to explain the causality 
of magic in this mundane world.  
 This problem is related to another point of contact between al-Kindi and Leibniz. al-
Kindi made an appeal to optics (perspectiva) to account for causal explanation and 
diversification. This is a very important and constant theme in Leibniz. As early as 1676, he 
referred to mirrors as a metaphor for the creative activity of God: “The most perfect being 
is that which contains the most. Such being is capable of ideas and thoughts, for this 
multiplies the varieties of things like mirrors.”402 However, in the Monadology it is the 
monads that are like mirrors. In paragraph 56 Leibniz wrote.  
 
Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to 
all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, 
and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe (Theod. 
130, 360.). 
 
We have also the associated notion of monads as points of views and or subjects with a 
specific perspective of a city.403 Thus Leibniz continued, in paragraph. 57”  
 
And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and 
becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement]; even so, as a result 
of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many 
different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] 
of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each monad 
(Theod. 147). 
 
                                                 
402 LEIBNIZ, Selection from Paris notes, 1676, Loemker, p. 159. 
403LEIBNIZ, Monadology, paragraph 56. “Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and 
of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and, consequently, 
that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)”.  
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 We have seen Grosseteste affirming that souls are affected according to the same 
rules of optical geometry and so are similar to the device of a mirror. As a mirror the soul is 
a place of “echo”, which at the same time receives rays (is passive) and reflects them (is 
active). We see the strong presence of the optical analogy in Leibniz as early as 1670:  
 
If God did not have rational Creatures in the world, he would have the same 
harmony, but devoid of Echo, the same beauty, but devoid of reflection and 
refraction or multiplication. On this account, the wisdom of God required 
(exigebat) rational Creatures, in which things might multiply themselves. In this 
way one mind might be a kind of world in a mirror, or a diopter, or some kind 
of point collecting visual rays.404  
 
 This view is amplified in the Monadology where not only rational creatures but all 
substances are compared to mirrors. There, as we have seen, they reflect their different 
position, like different perspectives of a city (§ 57). But the meaning of this idea of living 
mirrors is a rather elaborated notion of perspective. We have seen that, for Grosseteste, the 
theory of vision has two dimensions: the perception has a passive aspect, which implies that 
everything is in the field of vision at same time and equally and an active aspect, which 
explains the selectivity and acuity of the object seen within the visual field. 
 In some sense this conception also occurs in Leibniz’s notion of a living mirror. It 
was a central notion in Leibniz that the monad, being like a mirror, reflects the whole 
universe. For this reason he needed a theory of the unconscious, since for the monad this 
totality, which is the infinite world, must be perceived confusedly. But all monads have, 
however, a set of privileged perceptions which constitute their individuality or point of 
view. Sometimes Leibniz seemed to be saying that perceptions are like (a focusing) mirror 
that concentrates rays, thus forming a distinguished perception. Thus, in the Principles of 
Nature and Grace he said:  
 
But when the monad has organs so adjusted that by means of them the 
impressions which are received, and consequently also the perceptions which 
                                                 
404In MERCER, p. 218, from Elements of Natural Law 1669/1670. 
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represent these impressions, are heightened and distinguished (as for example 
when the rays of light are concentrated by means of the shape of the humors of 
the eye and act with great force), then this may amount to sentiment, that it is to 
say, to a perception accompanied by memory – a perception of which there 
remains a kind of echo for a long time, which makes itself heard on occasion.405  
 
This example of perception is valid for animals, or a monad called soul. But Leibniz went 
further. He said that in human perceptions there is present a distinct characteristic called 
apperception, and we may interpret this as being their principle of intentionality. Thus, also 
in the Principles of Nature and Grace, he differentiates the perception, the state of the 
monad representing external things, from the apperception which is the reflexive 
knowledge of this internal state: “So it is well to make a distinction between perception, 
which is the inner state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which 
is consciousness or the reflective knowledge of this inner state itself and which is not given 
to all souls or any soul all the time.”406 The apperceptions are only part of a human 
experience of perception, because when, for example, they are sleeping, a person has only 
perceptions.407 Also, as he explained on many occasions, a clear perception is made of 
many imperceptible petite perceptions.408 We then have three kinds of monads: those with 
bare perceptions; those with feeling and those with apperceptions. In all these three kinds of 
monads individuality is achieved by a precise position or a precise point of view that a 
monad occupies, which is its perspective. 
 It is in this emphasis on perspective that Leibniz can be posited as a true follower of 
that doctrine that mediaeval philosophers called the multiplication of species. In Leibniz, 
the notion of perspective is useful because, together with the affirmation of the production 
of diversity it introduces also the implicit idea of mathematical ordering. He said in 
paragraph 58 of Monadology: “And by this means there is obtained as great variety as 
possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it is the way to get as much 
                                                 
405 LEIBNIZ, The Principles of Nature and of Grace based on Reason, 1714, Loemker, p. 637. 
406 LEIBNIZ, The Principles of Nature and of Grace based on Reason, 1714, Loemker, p. 637. 
407 What is not in the field of human consciousness (or attention) is also perception. 
408 “A great stupefying roar, as for example, the murmur of a large assemblage, is composed of all the little 
murmurs of individual persons which are not noticed at all but of which one must nevertheless have some 
sensation; otherwise one would not sense the whole.” LEIBNIZ, Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single 
Universal Spirit, Loemker, p. 557. 
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perfection as possible.” (Theod. 120, 124, 241 sqq., 214, 243, 275.). Thus the idea is that 
the greatest diversity comes from the interplay of reflections of living mirrors, and in this 
case also diversity is created by the mathematical laws of perspective (the laws of optics). 
From this union of greatest diversity and order we have perfection or goodness. This notion 
is related to an idea dear to Leibniz, that God looks for the greatest effect with the simplest 
mean or for the maximum effect with the minimum effort. Thus the title of section V of the 
Discourse is: “Of what the rules of the perfection of the divine action consist; and that the 
simplicity of the means is in balance with the richness of the effects.”409  
 Thus, while the idea is of Pythagorean inspiration, it seems that Leibniz connected it 
with the lex parsimoniae, first enunciated by Aristotle but discussed in Grosseteste. Leibniz 
has an important role here because he gave mathematical expression to this principle. It is 
the mathematical principle of optimal form, called the principle of least action, which was 
made known to the public by Maupertius (who claimed to be its author).410 
 The association of the principle of economy with the behaviour of light is, however, 
as we have seen clearly, present in Grosseteste, who in turn is following the indication of 
other thinkers linked to Aristotle, for example, Ptolemy. The basic ancient idea was that 
nature selects the shortest way, and so, in the case of reflection, light passes from any point 
in its course before incidence, to any other in its reflected course, by the shortest path. 
Leibniz improved this conception. He denied that nature selects the shortest and fastest 
route, but maintained that it selects the easiest way, which should not be confounded with 
the other principle. The resistance with which the light passes through the different 
transparent media serves to measure this easiest way. The ray always pursues that route in 
which the sum of the computed difficulties is the least; and, according to this method, de 
maximis et minimis, he found the mathematical rule which is confirmed by experience. 
Leibniz thought that because the laws of refraction and reflection describe the best path, 
                                                 
409 In the section he said : “When the simplicity of God's way is spoken of, reference is specially made to the 
means which he employs, and on the other hand when variety, richness and abundance are referred to, the 
ends and effects are had in mind.” LEIBNIZ, Discourse, section 5, Loemker, p. 296. 
410 In this respect, Catherine Wilson said: “Maupertius presented himself in 1746 as the discoverer of the Law, 
which he regarded not simply as regulative or heuristic principle, but as proof for the existence of God. 
Although his statement of it was elaborated in better detail than Leibniz's remarks on the importance of 
maximum and minimum quantities in physics, Leibniz had clearly anticipated Maupertius in a published 
paper of 1682 and in numerous statement thereafter, including the Specimen Dynamicum, the first of which 
had been published in 1695, where he argued that the ‘architectonic’ qualities of theories provided evidence 
of a divine architect and a realm of final causes” in JOLLEY, Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, p. 454. 
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which is the behaviour of light, these laws are themselves the best choice of law among an 
infinite number of possible laws. 
 This route is the optimal route chosen by nature, having as its criterion the principle 
of economy, from a set of many other less perfect possibilities. Loemker said that Leibniz 
believed that this was a mediating knowledge between the truth of reason and truth of facts, 
and that this middle knowledge was primarily God’s, the mathematical formula of maxima 
and minima being a mere analogy of it. Leibniz thus conceived of this mediating 
knowledge as the architectonic principle used by God to construct the world. Unlike the 
idea of geometric determination, where contrary means contradictory, the contrary of this 
architectonic determination is still possible, but implies imperfection. 
 Leibniz, and afterwards Maupertius, thought that this principle could account for the 
presence of finalism in nature. In Leibniz, this is discussed clearly in the work about optics: 
Tentamen anagogicum: an anagogical essay in the investigation of causes of 1696.411 In 
both authors we have the suggestion that this principle is behind the finalism that we see in 
the forms of plants and animals. Concerning the dispute of the principle of final causes 
sustained by the ancient philosophers and rejected by moderns like Descartes who defended 
mechanical explanations, Leibniz insisted the laws of mechanism are themselves derived 
from finalist principles. Thus the ideas of the best possible world, finalism and mechanics 
are all associated in Leibniz to provide a scientific explanation of the world consistent with 
theological premises. In this sense Loemker says:  
 
The principle of the best possible is therefore not merely a pious assumption but 
a principle of mathematical necessity which provides a telic element in our 
scientific methods and principles. It rests on the perfection of God and the 
limitation necessary in a spatial and temporal order. Since not all possibilities 
can be actualized, the best possible compossibles will exist, that is, the greatest 
possible perfection with the least qualifying conditions.412  
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477. 
412 LEIBNIZ, Loemker, p. 27. 
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This is true but it needs to be added to the passage of Loemker that, for Leibniz, God 
chooses the best possible freely and not necessarily.413 Consequently, the finalism of 
Leibniz, as we have already seen, cannot be considered to have been derived from blind 
necessity, but only from spontaneous creative intelligence.  
 But in the sense that he associates finalism with perfection, Leibniz is very similar to 
the tradition we just discussed. Grosseteste said that light is ‘species and perfectio’, for it 
accounts both for the form and the perfection of this form. The light is an instrument of 
God responsible for the form of the subject and will select the best, given the set of 
influences of a certain subject at a certain time and location. In fact, this set of influences is 
itself projecting species (the formal dimension of light) that, therefore, strikes a subject 
from all sides. In both Leibniz and Grosseteste we have a re-statement of the functionalism 
of Aristotle, in which the function and form of the animal is determined by the animal in its 
relationship with the environment. And this relationship is formed by means of the species.  
 Leibniz said that this kind of relationship is contingent. But we can see that it is a 
contingent event only in the sense that is impossible to discern all the variables or the 
infinite configuration of rays that determine that event and because this possible world 
depends ultimately on the free choice of God. God could have created a different universe 
in which there would be a different configuration or a different system of relations between 
the substances. But, as Joseph showed, once a certain world is created, its system of 
relations is determined, since it does not leave space for random causation, that is, causes 
that could be outside the network of causes. Probably Leibniz would not accept this 
interpretation because it removes again his distinction of necessary (blind) and intelligent 
(finalist) causes.  
 The principle of least action gained importance in modern science as it is said to be 
the foundation of both theory of relativity and quantum physics. Even here we again have a 
discussion about final causes. In this sense Max Planck, the discoverer of quantum of 
action, wrote:  
 
                                                 
413 LEIBNIZ: “… God assuredly always chooses the best, this does not prevent something less perfect from 
being and remaining possible in itself, even though it will never happen, for it is not impossibility but 
imperfection which causes God to reject it.” LEIBNIZ, Discourse of Metaphysics, Loemker, p. 310. 
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Thus the photons which constitute a ray of light behave like intelligent human 
beings. Out of all possible curves they always select the one which takes them 
most quickly to their goal....It [the principle of least action] made its discoverer 
Leibniz and soon after him his follower Maupertius so boundlessly enthusiastic, 
for these scientists believed themselves to have found in it a tangible evidence 
for a ubiquitous higher reason ruling all nature.414  
 
The sympathy of Planck towards Leibniz is also explained because Planck posited the 
principle of uncertainty which says that contingency is the basis of all events in reality, a 
principle which was not, however, accepted by all physicists. Einstein, for instance, a 
reader of Spinoza, did not accept it.415  
 The position of Leibniz concerning the doctrine of multiplication of species seems, 
however, to be very complicated. It is totally in opposition to the doctrine that “monads 
have no windows”. As an exposition of the doctrine of perception and abstraction in 
Aristotle, it is in opposition to the Platonic theory of reminiscence, which seems to be more 
in accordance with the theory of monads. It is clear that Leibniz rejected any kind of influx, 
as is shown in those passages where he treats the communication of substances. In a text of 
1696 he said: “the way of influence is that of popular philosophy; but as we cannot 
conceive of material particles which can pass from one of these substances to another, we 
must abandon this idea.”416 In another passage he wrote:  
 
I don’t assent to the vulgar notions that the images of things are conveyed by 
the organs of sense to the soul. For it is not conceivable by what aperture or by 
                                                 
414 PLANCK, M., Scientific autobiography and other papers, trans. Frank Gaynor, New York, Philosophical 
Library, reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1968, p. 178. 
415 The remark of Einstein: “God doesn’t play dice with the universe,” is well known. It is quoted, for 
example, in Max Born “Einstein’s Statistical Theories” In Albert Einstein Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Paul 
Arthur Schilpp, New York, Tudor, 1953, pp. 161–177. Einstein made many references to Spinoza, for 
example: “Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality and intelligibility of the 
world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order. The firm belief, which is bound up with deep feeling, 
in a superior mind revealing himself in the world of experience, represents my conception of God, which 
may, therefore be described in common parlance as ‘pantheistic’” (Spinoza). EINSTEIN, The World As I See 
It, London, 1955, p. 131. 
416 LEIBNIZ, Second explanation of the system of the communication of substance, 1696, Wiener, p. 118. 
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what means of conveyance these images can be carried from the organs to the 
soul.417  
 
He explained that the monads do not need such influx and he turns to the doctrine of 
essence (derived from Aristotle) to justify this point:  
 
I don’t believe that a system is possible, in which the monads act on each other, 
because there seems no possible way of explaining such action. I add that an 
influence is also superfluous, for why should one monad give another what it 
already has? For this is the very nature of substance, that its present should be 
big with the future …418  
 
Interestingly, Leibniz recognised that Aristotle was the ultimate origin of the doctrine of 
impressions and in this case he put himself on the side of the Platonists, whose doctrine of 
reminiscence is more consistent with his notion that monads do not have windows. He said 
in the Discourse:  
 
Aristotle preferred to compare our souls to tablets that are still blank but upon 
which there is a place for writing and maintained that there is nothing in our 
understanding which does not come from the senses. This conforms more with 
popular notions, as Aristotle usually does, while Plato goes deeper.419  
 
Thus in Leibniz himself we can see the same tension that we pointed out in Aristotle: a 
defence of the doctrine of the essence and at same time a defence of the doctrine of final 
causes (heavily dependent on the environment). 
 Besides, it is possible that Leibniz also considered light as the principle that explains 
forms and finalism in nature but this position seems to also contradict the general 
framework of his system, because he espoused a dualism of mechanism and immaterial 
non-interactive monads. Leibniz’s reply to Clark’s fifth letter is worth quoting here, as 
                                                 
417 Quoted by RUSSELL, B., A critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz, p. 135. 
418 Quoted by RUSSELL, p. 262. 
419 LEIBNIZ, Discourse of Metaphysics, section 27, Loemker, p. 320. 
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Clark was trying to defend Newton’s theory of attraction (gravitation) . Almost at the end 
of his life, Leibniz regarded any explanation involving any intangible or non-mechanical 
causes in a very ironical and hostile way:  
 
Or are perhaps some immaterial substances or some spiritual rays, or some 
accidents without substance, or some kind of species intentionalis, or some 
other ‘I know not what’, the means by which this is pretended to be performed? 
(…) That means of communication, says he, is invisible, intangible, not 
mechanical. He might well have added inexplicable, unintelligible, precarious, 
groundless and unexampled.420 
 
 Leibniz seems, however, to have admitted that abstract thought is accompanied by 
material images. But he never attached himself to a true continuity between the two and 
rather, appealed to a certain parallelism between mind and body to explain this matter:  
 
I find … that there is never any abstract thought which is not accompanied by 
some images and material traces, and I have established a perfect parallelism 
between what happens in the soul and what takes place in matter. I have shown 
that the soul with its functions is something distinct from matter but that it 
nevertheless is always accompanied by material organs and also that the soul’s 
functions are always accompanied by organic functions which must correspond 
to them and that this relation is reciprocal and always will be.421 
 
In this chapter we have seen how the tradition of optics studies initiated by al-Kindi and 
Grosseteste had an ambiguous impact on the thinking of Leibniz. On one side, it was the 
basis for his doctrine of the diversification of monads (monads considered as mirrors of the 
universe), and is even related to his creation of the principle of least action. But on the other 
side, this doctrine of rays and reflecting entities (mirrors) seems to be in direct 
                                                 
420 LEIBNIZ, Leibniz’s reply to Clark’s fifth letter, section 45, Loemker, p. 716. 
421 Quoted by COUDERT, p. 150. The text is Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit, from 
1702. 
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confrontation with his central principle of the incommunicability of substances (“monads 
have no windows”). 
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Chapter VII – Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz 
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss some notions of Nicholas of Cusa, the last philosopher I want 
to examine in the comparative study of Leibniz. I will argue here that Cusa consistently 
developed consequences of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the micro-cosmos that Leibniz 
could not attain, due to Leibniz’s compromise with the principle of contradiction. Cusa 
opened a path that led to Bruno, Spinoza and ultimately to Hegel. 
 Cusa is only one link between mediaeval Neo-Platonism and renaissance Neo-
Platonism. Other important philosophers are part of this transition. But Cusa is present in 
this dissertation because he provides central notions that can be used for the analysis of 
certain key aspects of the philosophy of Leibniz. Chronologically, he comes before Henri 
More, but for the purposes of this thesis he is to be treated here for the purpose of 
conclusion.  
 D. J. B. Hawkins, who wrote an introduction to Of Learned Ignorance, tells us that 
with his notion of coincidentia oppositorum, of reconciliation of the contraries in God, he is 
representative of the philosophy of paradox.422 Hawkins said that the notion is evidently 
derived from Meister Eckhart. This may be true, but we have seen that Proclus recognised a 
striking paradoxical similarity between the notions of One and of Matter. Thus the 
convergence of these two concepts was recognised well before Eckhart. Cusa insists on the 
paradoxical nature of his investigation because its object, the ultimate reality or the 
maximum absolutum, which is infinite, is totally incommensurable with the experience of 
limited beings, and therefore is ultimately incomprehensible. 
 Of Learned Ignorance was conceived in three parts. The first relates to the maximum 
absolutum, which is God; the second is concerned with the sum of all limited entities which 
he calls maximum contractum and the third part is dedicated to the entity that achieved the 
identity of maximum absolutum and maximum contractum; this is the human nature by 
means of Christ, the Incarnated Word.  
                                                 
422 CUSA, Nicholas of, Of Learned Ignorance, Translated by German Heron, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1956. p. x. 
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 Basically, Cusa thought in terms of the two Pythagorean/Platonic incommensurable 
realities: the realities of the sphere of dyad (degrees of more or less, subject to number) and 
realities of the sphere of monad (equality, truth and the ultimate reality, God). For Cusa, all 
things of the universe, as limited beings, are without the perfect equality or unity of God. In 
their case, the equality is a matter of degree. Number, Cusa said, “owes its existence to our 
power of comparing and distinguishing.”423 Things are consequently subject to the category 
of numbers, and this explains the importance given by Pythagoras to quantity and 
proportion (1, 1), since these qualify a limited thing:  
 
… for this reason the infinite as infinite is unknown, since it is away and above 
all comparison. Now while proportion expresses an agreement in some one 
thing, it expresses at the same time a distinction, so that it cannot be understood 
without number. Number, in consequence, includes all things that are capable 
of comparison ... That is why Pythagoras was so insistent on maintaining that in 
virtue of numbers all things were understood.424  
 
Thus, because the universe implies a plurality, it necessarily implies the necessity of 
numbers, since without numbers, we cannot have distinction, hierarchy, relationship or 
harmony, factors that organise the plurality of things in the universe.425 
 Nicholas of Cusa argued that there is no gradation from the finite to the infinite and 
so the maximum cannot be found between the thing of more and less. Thus, although the 
connection between species is made by degrees, the maximum, God, is never reached. For 
the same reason, in the world there is neither a maximum nor a minimum in perfection. In 
fact by the doctrine of coincidence of opposites, only in the infinite does the act also 
coincide with the potency.426 In this sense Cusa wrote:  
 
We find that one thing is more in act, another more in potency; yet these 
differences of degrees do not exist without ever reaching an absolute maximum 
                                                 
423 CUSA, Of Learned Ignorance, p. 16. 
424 CUSA, p. 8. 
425 CUSA, p. 14. 
426 CUSA, pp. 129 and 112.  
198 
 
and the absolute minimum, for the maximum and the minimum act are 
identified with the maximum and minimum potency; they are the Absolute 
Maximum properly so called ...427 
 
Thus the role attributed by Aristotle to matter, which is to be the potency of everything, 
Cusa attributed to God which he said is the unity or complication of all reality. The world is 
only the explication of the limited forms of the same reality.  
 Cusa adopted the solution given by the Neo-Platonists to the problem of One-Many: 
each individual entity of the universe is a micro-cosmos, each part of it is a contracted form 
of the All. To explain this he used the simple formula: “God is in all things in such a way 
that all things are in him” but he elaborated.428 He wanted to suggest that God, by the 
intermediary of the universe, is in all things:  
 
Only by the way of contraction is the universe in things; in fact it is restricted 
by each actually existing thing to be actually what each thing is. Everything 
actually existing is in God, for He is the act of all. Act means perfection and 
realization of what was possible. Since the universe restricted is in each actually 
existing individual, then evidently God, Who is in the universe, is in every 
individual and every individual actually existing is, like the universe, 
immediately in God. To say 'that everything is in everything' is the same as 
saying that God, by the intermediary of the universe, is in all things and that the 
universe by intermediary of all things, is in God.429 
 
                                                 
427 Cusa explains this coincidence also on p. 95: “In consequence, they (the Peripatetics) have said that all 
things are contained potentially in absolute possibility. The boundless infinite character of absolute possibility 
arises at once from its having no form, and from its aptitude for all forms; e.g., the possible forms that may be 
given to a piece of wax are limitless: the form of a lion, hare or anything at all. Yet it is an infinity that is 
opposite of God's, for it is through want that it is infinite whereas God's infinity is by abundance, since in God 
all things are God in act. We, on the contrary, have discovered ... that it would be impossible for possibility to 
be absolute ... Absolute possibility, in consequence, in God is God and outside him there can be no question 
of absolute possibility; for all, apart from God, is necessarily limited, so that no thing could be found which is 
absolute possibility.”  
428 CUSA, p. 83. 
429 CUSA, p. 84. 
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 It is this doctrine that, as we have seen, was basically present in both Plotinus and 
Proclus. But Cusa also openly asserted the notion of the coincidence of opposites. Cusa 
deduced that the minimum in the Universe will ultimately be (paradoxically) the maximum, 
or God, and so they cannot be really opposites. In the sphere of infinite or unlimited, the 
opposites of extreme greatness and extreme littleness must coincide, and this is the same as 
saying that the All must be immanent in the minimum. Cusa wrote:  
 
Consequently the absolute maximum is one and is all; all things are in it 
because it is the maximum. Moreover, it is all things for this reason that the 
minimum at once coincides with it, since there is nothing that can be placed in 
opposition to it.430  
 
Thus he affirmed that the plurality or diversity of things is mathematically determined (or 
limited) and, as limited, they are incommensurable with the infinite (totality). But at the 
same time he affirmed that as far as the infinite is immanent in things, they must in some 
sense coincide with it. These are not contradictory statements because Cusa had already 
warned of the paradoxical character of his enquiry. 
 For this reason it was important for Cusa to show the paradoxical sense of the 
concept of unity to prove his point. The minimum in number, he said, is the smallest 
possible and this is a unity, since there is nothing less than it (the minimum implies already 
that we must consider it as infinitely small). But on the other side, the unity is also the 
maximum because the maximum excludes the possibility of duality, which implies 
division, and consequently the existence of any other similar being (thus negating its 
character of maximum). It is all that it can be, and consequently it is perfection, similar to 
God or God himself. Thus in the concept of unity we see that the minimum coincides with 
the maximum.431 
 Cusa also illustrated the principle of coincidence of opposites by using geometrical 
analogies. For instance, he said that in the infinite the maximum of straightness coincides 
with the minimum of curve. In the infinite also the line does not differ from the point. Like 
                                                 
430 CUSA, p. 9. 
431 CUSA, p. 15. 
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the point, the line also has the character of indivisibility. This is important, as the infinite 
line is the essential explanation of all lines:  
 
The essential explanation of the finite line is the infinite line and there is no 
doubt that in the infinite line there is no difference between the two-feet line 
and the three-feet line. In consequence, there is only one essence of the two 
lines and the diversity of things or of lines is not essential (for there is only one 
essence) but accidental, arising from the fact that they do not equally share the 
essence.432  
 
Here again we have the idea that numerical diversity disappears in the realm of the infinite 
or totality. Cusa wanted to assert that in the infinite we do not have any kind of dualities, as 
they are merged in a comprehensive unity. 
 The doctrine of the coincidence of opposite was also important for Cusa, because it is 
the basis for convergence between Greek philosophy and Christian theology. He saw both 
as branches of the same tree, and discussed the convergence of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of 
“everything is in everything” and the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity.  
 In fact, for Cusa, to say that “everything is in everything” is equivalent to saying that 
“God is in all things in such a way that all things are in him”, which is, in its turn 
equivalent to: “the Father is in Me and I in the Father as the Son says” which is the dogma 
that he repeats when he is discussing his geometrical metaphors.433 For Cusa, the Father 
and the Son have a nature in common. The human nature is present in both of them, and so 
there is equality between them. Besides, the connection between them is achieved by the 
Holy Ghost, which he call Infinite Connection. Thus he explained: “... the beginning of a 
creature is due to God's being Father, its completion to God's being Son and its fitting in 
with the order of the Universe to God's being the Holy Spirit.”434  
 Cusa thought the minimum was equivalent to the Son, as he enunciated the notion of 
coincidence of opposites in terms of the Trinity and stressed the limitation of reason to 
understand this identification:  
                                                 
432 CUSA, p. 37. 
433 CUSA, p. 43. 
434 CUSA, p. 56. 
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It has already been most clearly established that the maximum is one, for the 
minimum, maximum and connection are one; unity itself is the minimum, the 
maximum and the connection; if that is so, it becomes evident that a philosophy 
which would understand the necessity of the maximum unity's being a trinity 
could only do so by means of simple intuition, for no help that the imagination 
and reason can lend would be any avail here.435 
 
In the third and last part of his book he developed the idea that the most perfect form of 
unity is the union of creator and creature, or the union of minimum and maximum in act 
(and not merely potency). He remembered that human nature was called the microcosm by 
the ancients and as the summit of creation it should be raised in union with the maximum. 
For Cusa, Christ was the manifestation of this union. But what I want to stress here is that 
the coincidence of opposites does not rule out the necessity of the connection (the Holy 
Spirit for Christians or World Soul for the ancients).  
 
Knowledge According to Cusa 
 
For Nicholas of Cusa then, God is the infinite unity, and this is what makes the ultimate 
reality paradoxical or even incomprehensible. The equivalence or the coincidence between 
unity and infinity is the principle that also allows the achievement of the equivalence 
between unity and plurality, identity and diversity, and distinction and non-distinction. He 
said, for example, that:  
 
The reconciliation of contradictories is beyond reason, so to every name reason 
naturally opposes another; e.g., reason naturally opposes plurality or multitude 
to unity. God is not called ‘Unity’ in this sense, but ‘Unity in which distinction, 
plurality and multitude are all identified’436  
 
                                                 
435 CUSA, p. 24. 
436 CUSA, p. 54. 
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In another passage he argued that absolute maximum is all things since it is one with the 
minimum and, consequently, it is the cause of diversity: “When we consider the diversity of 
things we are at a loss to see how the unique absolutely simple essence of all things is also 
the distinct essence of a particular thing; yet we know that it must be, for our ignorance that 
is learning has shown to us that, in God, identity is diversity.”437 
In the realm of discursive reason, which deals with limited things that are subject to degrees 
of more or less, we have grounds for making distinctions. But in the sphere of the infinite 
we are supposed to reach indifference between distinction and non-distinction. Cusa wrote:  
 
… instead of regarding distinction and non-distinction as contradictories in 
theology, we must previously consider them in their infinitely simple principle 
in which there is no difference between distinction and non- distinction. We 
will then have a clear idea of how trinity and unity are one and the same. 
Where, in fact, distinction is non-distinction, unity is trinity.438  
 
 Cusa said that the Maximum Absolutum is beyond our understanding, which is 
fundamentally unable by any rational process to reconcile contradictories. 
  But if the objective of all philosophers, the absolute truth, cannot be attained in its 
entirety, for the ontological truth is the truth about an ultimate paradoxical reality, 
nonetheless, a progress in the search of this truth is possible, progress which is endless, as 
its object is itself infinite. Cusa used a geometrical metaphor to explain this aspect: 
 
The relationship of our intellect to the truth is like that of polygon to a circle; 
the resemblance to the circle grows with multiplication of angles of the 
polygon; but apart from its being reduced to identity with the circle, no 
multiplication even if it were infinite, of its angles will make the polygon equal 
to the circle.439  
 
                                                 
437 CUSA, p. 102. 
438 CUSA, p. 43. 
439 CUSA, p. 11. 
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As limited things, belonging to the sphere more or less, our intellect is also a thing of 
degree, even when searching for the ultimate truth. This ultimate truth is in act only in God. 
 
Cusa and Leibniz 
 
Most of the time, Cusa deduced the consequences of the Neo-Platonist doctrine in a very 
consistent way. In this sense he is worth comparing with Leibniz, who was working with 
similar premises. In comparing the results of both philosophers, we see that Leibniz agreed 
with Cusa in important aspects but also sometimes disagreed with him. This is in a sense 
amazing, as Leibniz most probably read Of Learned Ignorance, which appeared more than 
a century before him. We can see a version of the doctrine of coincidence of opposites 
when Leibniz said, as an example of his law of continuity, that rest may be considered as an 
infinitely small velocity, or that equality may be considered as an infinitely small 
inequality.440 Also:  
 
... the Law of Continuity, first formulated by me, by virtue of which the law for 
bodies at rest is in a certain sense only a special case of the universal rule for 
moving bodies, the law of equality is in a certain sense a case of the law of 
inequality, the law of curves is likewise a subspecies of the law of straight lines 
...To this also belongs that method of proof, long famous in geometry, by 
means of which from any hypothetical assumption which is first made a 
contrary notion will immediately emerge, so that what was first viewed as a 
subclass of defined general class is shown to be contrary and disparate to it.441  
 
We have seen that the curve and the straight line are opposites in the Pythagorean table 
presented by Aristotle. In another text Leibniz was ready to supply another example in 
which he demonstrated the coincidence of these opposites. Mandelbrot referred to this text:  
 
                                                 
440 “... rest may be considered as an infinitely small velocity ... equality may be considered as an infinitely 
small inequality.” On True Method in Philosophy and Theology, 1686, Wiener, p. 67.  
441 LEIBNIZ, Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics, 1715, Wiener, p. 211.  
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In ‘Euclides Prota’ ... which is an attempt to tighten Euclid’s axioms, he states 
... ‘I have diverse definitions for the straight line. The straight line is a curve, 
any part of which is similar to the whole, and it alone has this property not only 
among curves but among sets.’442  
 
According to Mandelbrot, Leibniz, following this metaphysical line announced the 
beginning of topology. 
 Nonetheless, he warned that the expressions meaning that opposites coincide (or 
rather that the “extremes meet”) go too far.443 He also recognised, in section 9 of the 
Discourse of Metaphysics, that his theory of substance implied “notable paradoxes.” In 
Coudert’s book a phrase of Leibniz can be found that substantially recalls the doctrine of 
Cusa. In a document called Of Man, Happiness, God and Christ he wrote: “God, a 
maximum of infinity, a minimum of indivisibility … Christ the center of eternal life.”444  
 Despite these similarities, the factor which certainly moved Leibniz away from the 
principle of coincidence of opposites is his commitment to the Principle of Identity (or of 
contradiction), and certain theological relations attached to this Principle. It will be 
necessary to summarise this commitment to clarify his differences from Cusa.  
 We remember that it was Aristotle who related the principle of identity (or 
contradiction) to the inquiry of the being-as-such. We have already stressed that Merlan 
argues that the principle of contradiction was based on an ontological rather than an 
epistemological basis. Thus, to refute those who did not accept the principle of 
contradiction, (the Protagoreans), claiming the evidence of the ever-changing flux of the 
sensible world, Aristotle argued in the Metaphysics that above the realm of the sensible 
there is a realm free from change.445 And he argued also that its study is Theology, the true 
wisdom which deals with this realm of the changeless and immaterial. Thus, what cannot 
                                                 
442 HIRANO, Hideaki, Cultural Pluralism and Natural Law 1997. published on the Internet: 
<www.t.hosei.ac.jp/~hhirano/academia/leibniz.htm>. The reference is MANDELBROT, Benoit, 1977, 
Fractal Geometry of Nature, Freeman, 1977 p. 419. Even the differential equations invented by Leibniz can 
be seen as expressions of the doctrine of the coincidence of the opposites, since in this calculus the maximum 
effect is expressed as a function of the minimum. 
443He wrote: “Expression like “Extremes meet” go a little too far, e.g., when we say that the infinite is a 
sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere. Such expressions must not be taken too 
strictly or literally.” Extract from a letter to Canon Foucher, Journal des Savants, 1692, Wiener, p. 72. 
444 COUDERT, Allison, Leibniz and the Kabbalah, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, p. 129. 
445 ARISTOTLE, Met. (5, 1010a1–3; 25-35). 
205 
 
change remains in identity with itself and, therefore, the principle of identity was ultimately 
derived from the changeless Divine realm. According to Merlan the ontological formulation 
of the principle, “for the same thing is impossible to be and not to be”, would be translated 
in the epistemological terms “contradictory attributes may not be affirmed of the same 
object in the same respect and at the same time.”446 Leibniz, like Aristotle, the logician (and 
mathematician), was united to the theologian, in support of this principle, which he 
considered the highest principle of eternal truths. For in Leibniz, as he expounded well in 
his letters to Clarke, God is the perfect immaterial unity and therefore free from the 
multiplicity of space.447 He also has the most perfect mind and in his mind the principle of 
identity (or of contradiction) stands as the most important necessary truth. And we can say 
that this principle is the main foundation of Leibniz’s system, structuring both the truths of 
reason and truths of fact. 
 Concerning truths of reason, this principle is manifested in analysis, which consists of 
reducing the propositions to identities by a certain number of steps and thus achieving a 
demonstration. Thus, as Loemker explained, demonstrations are defined by the possibility 
of reduction to identity: “two terms are identical if one can be substituted for the other 
without distortion of meaning. If they cannot, the reason is either contradiction or 
inadequacy.”448 The inability to carry out this reduction would imply a falsity or 
contradiction (self-contradiction) and consequently it would be an impossibility. Thus 
identities result in truth and contradictions in falsity. This principle was claimed valid 
mainly for necessary propositions such as those used in mathematics: “The great foundation 
of mathematics is the principle of contradiction or identity, that is, that a proposition cannot 
be true and false at the same time and therefore A is A and cannot be non-A.” 449  
 But the principle of identity returns also in truths of fact to show that all predicates of 
a certain subject, its perceptions, are a coherent part of its individual and complete concept. 
Ultimately, by his doctrine of substance, all the chains of attributes would be predicated on 
only one subject. This means that the series of predicates of the subject or (perceptions of 
                                                 
446 MERLAN, p. 166. In his work Merlan, however, showed the problematic reading of Metaphysics, since 
Aristotle, in parts of the book, attacked the doctrine of opposites, so important for the Pythagoreans and Neo-
Platonist (and not very consistent with the Principle of Identity), and in other parts he seems to be supporting 
it.  
447 LEIBNIZ, Third letter to Clarke, section 3, Loemker, p. 682. 
448 LEIBNIZ, Loemker, p. 24. 
449 LEIBNIZ, Second letter to George Louis, Loemker, p. 677.  
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the substance) follows, like the law of a series, from the nature of the subject, and there is 
the identity of the entire series of predicates with the complete subject. Here the paradigm 
is also reduction to identity as performed by arithmetic, for example, when a simple sum 
can be understood as saying that the predicate “is the sum of two and two” is contained in 
the subject “four.” Leibniz used this logic of inclusion of predicates and believed that in 
this case a proposition is true if it is present in the subject. If it is not thus contained it may 
not finitely imply a contradiction, but only that the proposition pertains to another possible 
individual concept, and so will ultimately lead to a contradiction.  
 This theoretical strategy is important, for it allows us to understand that despite the 
fact that the substances have an historical dimension and therefore they are “capable of 
uniting inconsistent attributes and are thus capable of change (i.e., having an attribute at 
one time not at another) ...”, these transformations are nonetheless ruled by the concept of 
the individual, which is another aspect of the principle of identity.450 
 But here Leibniz took a short step away from the principle of identity, because he 
understood that a complete analysis was not always possible. The analysis of empirical or 
of truths of fact would imply an infinite number of steps necessary to reduce the 
proposition to identity and thus it could be possible only for an infinite intelligence, that is, 
God. But this possibility is the origin of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, which says 
that everything must have an explanation and nothing happens without a cause. Thus the 
process of analysis can begin with confused concepts and move in the direction of distinct 
ones, achieving a progress toward a better explanation. Leibniz created the principle of 
sufficient reason to maintain that all propositions can only virtually be reduced to identities. 
In recognising this progressive aspect of knowledge we arrive at a certain connection 
between Leibniz and Cusa, following the indication of Rescher:  
 
Analysis of certain propositions will not result in explicit identities; they are 
only virtually identical, in that their analysis comes closer and closer to 
yielding, but never actually yields, an actual identity. There can be no doubt 
that Leibniz’s views on this, however greatly indebted to his work on the 
infinitesimal calculus, were influenced by the teaching of Nicholas of Cusa (in 
                                                 
450 RESCHER, N., Leibniz: an introduction to his philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 1979, p. 13. 
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Chaps. i–ii of De docta ignorantia) that truly accurate reasoning about matters 
of fact would require an infinite number of inferential steps between the 
premises and the ultimately desired conclusion, so that the human intellect can 
only approach, but never attain, the ultimate precision of truth (praecisio 
veritatis).451  
 
Perhaps it would be more correct to say on this matter that the point of contact between 
Leibniz and Cusa is double: his infinitesimal calculus itself is nothing more than a 
sophisticated version of the Pythagorean problem of polygonal approximation of the circle 
mentioned by Cusa, and he followed Cusa in its applying this approximation as an analogy 
of the infinite and graduated progress of perceptions of the soul toward truth. 
 This seems to be sound. But Leibniz kept the domains of the principle of identity 
because these transformations are nonetheless ruled by the concept of the individual. 
Consequently, the principle of identity is used here to justify the notion of the concept of 
the individual, and his associated notion that it does not admit external denominations or 
external influx (or that the monad has no windows to the external world). 
 Loemker drew attention to the fact that Couturat found it very important to observe 
that Leibniz deduced most of his basic principles: sufficient reason, the identity of the 
indiscernible, the internality of denominations, continuity, the analytic nature of 
propositions, and his concept of individuality, from the law of identity.452 However, Wiener 
noted that the philosophy of Leibniz is full of dualities: the kingdom of nature and of the 
kingdom of grace; the contingent truth of fact and the necessary truths of reason; the order 
of mechanical causes and order of final causes; the empirical and the rational elements in 
knowledge, to which we can add the duality of dimensionless unity and extension, and the 
duality of the external and internal (the basis of his claim that the monads have no 
windows).453 I consider that these dualities are a direct consequence of his misuse or 
overuse of the principle of identity in the form that establishes the dichotomy: either A or 
non-A. 
                                                 
451 RESCHER, p. 23.  
452 LEIBNIZ, Loemker, p. 20. 
453 LEIBNIZ, Wiener, p. XLVI. 
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 After denying that the essence of a body is extension, Leibniz supported his point of 
view, insisting that extension is only a phenomenal or imaginary entity which results from 
the repetition of more basic substances, the monads, which are the real entities.454 Thus we 
have here a duality of appearance (phenomena) and reality. This duality is a fact even if 
Leibniz has assured us that appearance is a well-founded phenomenon. Concerning this 
position, Leonhard Euler (1707–83), the leading mathematician of the eighteenth century, 
made a fair diagnosis of the doctrine of extension of Leibniz. Thus he said that the partisans 
of the doctrine of monads are:  
 
… obliged to affirm that bodies are not extended, but have only an appearance 
of extension. They imagine by this they have subverted the argument adduced 
in support of the divisibility in infinitum. But if body is not extended, I should 
be glad to know from whence we derived the idea of extension; for if body is 
not extended, nothing in the world is, since spirits are still less so. Our idea of 
extension, therefore, would be altogether imaginary and chimerical (…) In 
effect, they (the monadists) admit that bodies are extended; from this point 
(they) set out to establish the presupposition that they are compound beings; 
and having hence deduced that bodies are compounded of simple beings, they 
are obliged to allow that simple beings are incapable of producing real 
extension, and consequently that the extension of bodies is mere illusion. An 
argument whose conclusion is a direct contradiction of the premises is 
singularly strange: The reasoning sets out by advancing that bodies are 
extended; for if they were not, how could it be known that they are compound 
beings – and then comes to the conclusion that they are not so. Never was a 
fallacious argument, in opinion, more completely refuted than this has been. 
The question was, Why are bodies extended? And, after a little turning and 
winding, it is answered, Because they are not so. Were I to be asked, Why has a 
                                                 
454 “For the extended signifies but the repetition and continued multiplicity of what is spread out, a plurality, 
continuity, and coexistence of parts, and consequently, it does not suffice to explain the very nature of the 
substance spread out or repeated, whose notion is prior to that of its repetition.” Wiener, p.104; “Extension is 
an attribute, the extended, however, or matter is not substance but a plurality of substance.” Wiener, p. 164. 
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triangle three sides? And I should reply that it is a mere illusion – would such a 
reply be a deemed satisfactory?455  
 
Thus extension is the starting point to prove the existence of the components, but once he 
has arrived at the idea of these components, the monads, Leibniz denies the reality of 
extension. This vicious circle described by Euler is a direct consequence of Leibniz’s 
insistence on maintaining the duality unity-real and multiplicity-unreal (imaginary) which 
is the basis of his Monadology.  
 But another inconsistency appears when Leibniz says that relations, which are the 
cause of the extension, are subjective and imaginary. In fact, if perception is of extended 
things, it is difficult to understand how such perceptions can be the foundation of 
individuality of monads. Thus, Leibniz says that only the monads are real but their 
individualities are based in their unique series of perceptions. However, the perceptions are 
subjective and imaginary and then it is difficult to see that what is not real (the imaginary) 
can be the cause of a real entity’s individuality. 
 Thus we can say that Leibniz did not follow his principle of identity to its fullest 
consequences, thus leaving his system full of those unsolved dualities. The consequence of 
these dualities is the resulting contradiction and inconsistencies. Thus in maintaining these 
dualities he failed to achieve his own definition of thinking: the perception of the unity in 
the diversity: “Thinking is nothing other than the perception of a relation or more briefly, 
the perception of many things at same time or the one in the many.”456 
 Cusa escaped these dualities when he affirmed the principle of the coincidence of 
opposites. He was also affirming an identity, but this identity is rather paradoxical, as it 
affirms two contradictory attributes at the same time. In doing this he escaped the “bad” 
contradiction of Leibniz. 
 However, Of Learned Ignorance would be more consistent if Cusa, like Leibniz, had 
not compromised with Christian theology. His careful differentiation between God and the 
universe (called by him maximum contracted) seems also to be influenced by his care to 
preserve Christian dogma and avoid the dangers of the heresy of pantheism. He says that 
                                                 
455 Quoted in BELL, J., The Continuous and the Infinitesimal in Mathematics and Philosophy, Polimetrica, 
Milano, 2005, pp. 104 and 105. 
456 In MERCER, pp. 320 and 321. 
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the universe must be finite, as its matter does not allow it to be infinite, an explanation in 
contradiction with the principle of the coincidence of opposites (by which matter or 
possibility must be also infinite).457 In fact, if the universe is the totality of minimum, this 
totality must be, in the last resort, coincident with the maximum. However, we can 
understand this tension in Cusa because the Christian orthodoxy, supported in the 
metaphysics of Aristotle, understood that God, the first cause, was perfect and, 
consequently, transcendent and separated from his creation, the world. Christian theology 
defended this thesis despite the fact that it is not very consistent with the doctrine of the 
Trinity, which implies that the divinity is immanent and so not altogether separate from the 
world. 
 Historically it was Giordano Bruno, who had great admiration the Cardinal Cusa and 
embraced the core of his doctrines, who deduced more plausible consequences for the 
doctrines developed by Cusa.458 Bruno not only affirmed the infinity of the universe but 
also assumed the pantheist corollaries of the concept of unity (or interpreting in this way 
the Christian doctrine of Trinity), and conceived of God as the universe itself, sometimes 
qualifying God as the active principle, which, together with the passive principle or matter, 
formed one only substance, the totality or universe itself.459 These are, in essence, the same 
points defended later by Spinoza, who also conceived of God as Nature (God sive Natura) 
                                                 
457 He said. on p. 71: “Therefore, from the point of view of God's infinite or limitless power, the universe 
could be greater; but from the point of view of possibility or matter, which is incapable of actual infinite 
extension, it cannot be greater” and on p 96: “Our conclusion is that there is a rational explanation and 
necessary cause of universe's being finite, which means that the world – merely a finite being – necessarily 
owes its existence to God, for He is the Absolutum Maximum.”  
458 In his review of Carriere’s book of, Whittaker said of Bruno: “His doctrine of the perfection of all things in 
relation to the whole and from the point of view of intellect is Spinozistic rather than Leibnizian. The 
principle of “the coincidences of contraries” derived immediately from Nicholas of Cusa, by which he 
combines the opposites terms of his pantheism – indivisible intellectual unity to which the mind aspires and 
the infinite multiplicity of a universally animated nature, has obvious resemblances with the dialectic of 
Hegel”, WHITTAKER, Thomas, “Review of Die Philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit in 
ihren Beziehungen zur Gegenwart of Morris Carriere”, in Mind, vol. 12, n. 47, Jul., 1887, p. 460. Regarding 
the relationship between Bruno and Spinoza, Hegel wrote: “Jacobi caused great attention to be paid to Bruno, 
more specially by his assertion that the sum of Bruno’s teaching was the One and All of Spinoza, or really 
Pantheism; on account of the drawing of this parallel Bruno obtained a reputation which passes his deserts.” 
HEGEL, Lectures On The History of Philosophy, vol. 3, p. 122.  
459Bruno wrote: “God is infinite in the infinite, everywhere in all things, not above, not without, but most 
present, as entity is not outside natural things, as there is no goodness outside that which is good”. Quoted by 
WHITTAKER, p. 456. 
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or as the active part of Nature, natura naturans and matter, the passive one, as natura 
naturata.460  
 But the interference of religious dogma seems to be more damaging for the 
philosophy of Leibniz than for that of Cusa. Cusa probably could have taken advantage of 
the ambiguity within Christian dogma. Thus when Leibniz said that the most eternal truth is 
the principle of identity: A = A and that it is false that A = non-A (forming a dilemma: 
either A or non-A is true), Cusa said that his fundamental philosophical truth, supported by 
the mystery of Trinity, is the principle of the coincidence of opposites A = non-A 
(equivalent to both A and non-A are true). This is, in some sense, the direct denial of the 
principle of contradiction: “for the same thing is possible to be and not to be”, and this was 
asserted as a fundamental metaphysical truth (a necessary truth) and not as a truth valid 
only for the realm of existence (a contingent truth). 461  
 Leibniz, in fact, considered both the ideas of infinite number or infinite whole to be 
impossible or contradictory. Thus, having defined that quantity is the number of parts, 
Leibniz will later deny that we can have an infinite number, that is, an infinite composed of 
parts.462 He says through the words of Philarete: “But one can doubt with reason if we have 
an idea of infinite whole or of an infinity composed of parts, for a compound cannot be an 
absolute.” 463 
 The theory of monads will not involve the contradictions of an infinite number or an 
infinite quantity, as Joseph explained, because monads will not constitute a true whole or 
unity. As discrete entities the summation of monads will always form only an aggregate. 
Thus we can say that Leibniz never really adopted the solution presented by Plato in the 
second hypothesis of Parmenides (where the division of the unity or whole produces other 
unities or other wholes). Joseph explained:  
 
If they (the monads) constitute a whole, it would be a whole in which you could 
never arrive to the original parts; and that is impossible, and is the paradox 
involved in the composition of the continuous. In the same way it is impossible 
                                                 
460 SPINOZA, Ethica I, prop. XXIX. 
461 A position that is similar to Heraclitus’ philosophy. 
462 LEIBNIZ, Dissertation on the art of Combination, 1666, Loemker, p. 76. 
463LEIBNIZ, Conversation of Philarete and Ariste … 1711, Loemker, p. 626. 
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there should be an infinite number of them, for a number implies that it have 
been counted. What we ought to say is that there are more than any number can 
express. Leibniz finds in the actual innumerability of the monads a reason why 
the world cannot be the body of God, or God the soul of the world; for it 
prevents them having a true unity.464  
 
Here we have again the nominalism of Leibniz, for numbers are not in things themselves 
but in the counting mind. But it is not this nominalism that is the problem here. We can see 
that it is the infinity of the monads (their innumerability) that prevents them from forming a 
true unity in the Whole. In this sense we can say that Leibniz did not accept the lesson of 
Cusa that infinity is only another aspect of unity.  
 Moreover, another consequence of the notion of the coincidence of opposites is the 
development that in the infinite the line does not differ from the point and, like the point, it 
has the character of indivisibility. Bruno followed Cusa in this aspect, and even extended it, 
asserting the doctrine that each dimensionless point is at the same time an infinite 
extension. This kind of paradoxical statement aroused scepticism among defenders of 
rationalism at the time of the Enlightment, obviously, because it goes against common 
sense. Thus Bayle said against the conception of Bruno: “Is anything more contrary to our 
understanding than to hold that an infinite extension is all present in each point of space and 
that the infinite number doesn’t differ from unity?”465 
 This notion that each dimensionless point is at same time an infinite extension is in 
direct contrast with Leibniz’s idea of dimensionless metaphysical atoms. The unit of 
Leibniz was necessarily dimensionless; if it were otherwise, it would not follow the 
principle of contradiction, which is the foundation of mathematics. 
 But Spinoza was following the same form of reasoning as Bruno when he defended 
the notion that extension is a substance and that it has an indivisibility required by the 
definition of substance. We remember that contrary to Descartes, Leibniz replied that 
extension is not substance (and therefore cannot be the essence of bodies), since by 
                                                 
464JOSEPH, Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 139. The reference of Leibniz quoted by Joseph for this 
subject is C. J. Gerhardt, Die philosophischen Schriften, von G. W. Leibniz, 1875–90, ii, pp. 304–5.  
465 BAYLE, M. P. The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Bayle, New York, London, Garland, 1984, p. 
157. 
213 
 
definition a substance must be a unified being and extension is infinitely divisible. What is 
divisible cannot remain a unity. This argument was his reply also to Spinoza: “it is 
astonishing also that Spinoza, as was seen above (...) seems to deny that extension is 
divisible into and composed of parts.”466 Leibniz was ready to accept that the abstract line is 
not composed. Such a line is only a relation of distance, and as a relation it is indivisible.467 
The problem appears, Leibniz said, because we confuse the sphere of the ideal with the 
actual. But the problem with this argument is that this duality cannot remain consistent (as 
the argument of Euler shows). By the doctrine of coincidence of opposites we are allowed 
to deduce that this duality does not exist. In our exposition about al-Kindi we explored his 
belief that the intelligible matter of the soul of an individual and the intelligible matter that 
was the substance of universe were the same. There was the belief in no separation between 
the external and internal. Following this notion, ultimately, the duality between the 
(Aristotelian) external impression and the (Platonic) internal intuition disappears. 
Ultimately, the notion of unity of Cusa is a return to the notion defended by the first 
Pythagoreans and later repeated by Melissus, that unity is at the same time infinity or that 
the Limited is at the same time Unlimited. Thus infinite multiplicity or divisibility cannot 
be used as an argument against unity, at least in a metaphysical discussion of the ultimate 
realities. This kind of argumentation is clear, for example, in Bruno who said, almost as the 
first Pythagoreans did:  
 
If act doesn’t differ from potency, in it necessarily the point, the line, the 
surface, and the body do not differ. For then that line is surface, since a line by 
moving can become surface; then that surface is moved and becomes a body, 
since a surface can be moved and by its flowing can become a body. 
Necessarily it follows that in the infinity point does not differ from body … 
And so the point, since it exists with the potency of being a body, does not 
differ from being a body, where potency and act are one and the same thing. 
Therefore the indivisible doesn’t differ from the divisible (...) If the point does 
                                                 
466 LEIBNIZ, Refutation of Spinoza, 1708, Wiener, p. 488.  
467 “Properly speaking, the number ½ in the abstract is a mere ratio, by no means formed of by the 
composition of other fractions, though in numbered things there is found to be equality between two quarters 
and one half. And we may say as much of the abstract line, composing being only in the concretes, or masses 
of which these abstract lines mark the relations.” Quoted by RUSSELL, p. 246. 
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not differ from a body, center from circumference, finite from infinite, 
maximum from minimum, we can securely affirm that the universe is all centre, 
or that the universe’s centre is everywhere and the circumference is nowhere 
...”468  
 
We can see in this quotation of Bruno that the unity of the point does not differ from 
extension, that is, that the indivisible doesn’t differ from divisible and that this notion has 
strong resonance with the Neo-Platonic doctrine of All in All, particularly Proclus’ version 
of this doctrine.  
 The doctrine of Leibniz was that the ultimate essence of reality cannot be extension 
and that it must be force, his substance being the principle of force and action. But the 
concept of Grosseteste and More (in some sense prefigured by the Pythagoreans and the 
Stoics and stated later by Spinoza) is that extension is a mind-like or ethereal (spiritual) 
extension. In fact, for the Platonists of Cambridge extension is associated with the 
explanation of the plastic nature that moulds an organic body. Thus this version of the 
notion of extension includes also the attribute of activity, an association that we can see in 
Cudworth, who named the plastic natures “entelechy”, using the same term used by Leibniz 
for his substances. Thus Cudworth understood that extension does not necessarily exclude 
dynamism as was claimed by Leibniz (and Plotinus). 
 Besides, Leibniz refused More and Newton’s notion that space was an attribute of 
God. In his letters to Clarke Leibniz adduced non-pertinent arguments like this: “I have still 
other reasons against this strange imagination that space is a property of God. If it be so, 
space belongs to the essence of God. But space has parts; therefore there would be parts in 
the essence of God, Spectatum admissi!”469 
 At least Leibniz was coherent in denying at the same time extension, the existence of 
the Soul of the World and communicability to monads. It is true that he said that every 
                                                 
468 BRUNO, G., Cause, Principle and Unity, trans. Jack Lindsay, London, Background Books, 1962, p. 137. 
469 LEIBNIZ, Fifth letter to Clarke, sections 8 and 9, Loemker, p. 702. Probably the expression comes from 
Spectatum admissi risum teneatis (You who are let in to look, restrain your laughter) which is Horace’s 
expression in Ars Poetica.. 
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substance has a trace of the divine omniscience and omnipotence of the Creator.470 Thus 
everything which a monad does has an effect on every other. But this imitation of divine 
omnipotence is not really possible because he sustained the belief that the substances did 
not interact, and that each one is a world apart, as he wrote in section 14 of the 
Discourse.471  
 In fact, it is extension considered as this ethereal substance that would make 
communication among individuals possible. If Bruno said that each point is at the same 
time infinite extension, this is equivalent to saying that it is connected with everything. This 
extension is then a concept that is related to other notions in which the theme of 
communication appears: the Pythagorean aither, the Stoic pneuma, the World Soul 
Platonic, the rays of al-Kindi. This association of extension, force and communication is 
also important in Grosseteste, for whom the light is at same time the principle of extension 
and the principle of connection between individuals (because light accounts for the 
emanation of species). For Cusa, this connection is achieved by the infinite connection, the 
Holy Spirit.  
 It is worth noting here that the scientific understanding that ether and space are the 
same thing was a major scientific event of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This 
means that space is not inert and that it participates and conditions the events happening in 
itself. Einstein, in this sense, said:  
 
Today it is possible to indicate the exact point of  H. A. Lorentz"s discovery: 
 the physical space and ether are nothing more than two expressions of the same 
thing. The fields are physical states of space ... Only the genius of Riemann, 
isolated, and not well recognised in the environment of last century, opens a 
way to arrive at the new conception of space. He denies its rigidity. The space 
can participate in physical events. This aspect of Riemann’s thought arouses 
admiration and precedes Faraday and Maxwell's theory of the electric field.472 
 
                                                 
470 LEIBNIZ, Discourse of Metaphysics, section 9: “It can even be said that every substance in some way 
bears the character's of God Infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates him as much as it is capable.” 
Loemker, p. 308. 
471 In section 14: “... each substance is a world by itself, independent of everything else excepting God.” 
472 EINSTEIN, Como Vejo o Mundo, Editora Nova Fronteira Rio de Janeiro, 1981, p. 170. 
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In this chapter we have shown how Cusa and Leibniz, both professing to be followers of 
the Neo-Platonic tradition, ended up with very different positions. Cusa’s principle of the 
coincidence of opposites goes against Leibniz’s defence of the principle of identity. Cusa 
seems more consistent with the tradition.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Part of the conclusion of this thesis has already been presented in the previous chapter, 
which described the failure of Leibniz to follow the consistent interpretation of the doctrine 
Neo-Platonic doctrine of “All in All”. Cusa competently derived these consequences many 
years before Leibniz, and from Cusa we can see a branch of the tradition that led to Bruno 
and Spinoza. 
 In some sense we can say that Leibniz failed in his eclectic project, that is, in his 
attempt to integrate modern science with ancient knowledge. This happened partially 
because he denied the reality of extension and partially because he remained inside the 
framework of Descartes’ mechanical science. He failed to follow the implication of 
Newton’s theory of gravitation of, which was connected with the branch of Neo-Platonism 
represented by Henri More, Cudworth and Barrow. Newton, in this aspect, achieved more 
success in realising the goal of uniting modern science with ancient knowledge, because he 
was able to see the limitations of mechanical philosophy and he saw that the theory of 
gravitation demanded a return to some ideas that the ancients had elaborated. Ultimately, 
Bruno, Spinoza and the Platonists of Cambridge were part of the same group in the sense 
that they all supported the substantiality of extension. 
 But the mistake of Leibniz was, perhaps, the result of a distortion prepared by the 
appearance of Parmenides’ philosophy, an event that influenced the entire path of 
philosophy. We cannot know if this was the intention of that philosopher but it seems that 
the notion that unity by definition must be necessarily non-divisible and consequently non-
dimensional appeared as a consequence of Parmenides’ poem. Aristotle was important in 
this move, because he ruled out as contradictory the notion of unity proposed by the first 
Pythagoreans, a unity that was formed by the union of the Limited and Unlimited. In the 
view of the Pythagoreans, at least with Philolaus, there was an equality of rights between 
Limited and Unlimited. With Aristotle, unity (in this case in the place of the limited), was 
supposed to have priority over multiplicity and this priority is the basis for his theory of 
substance. 
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 Consistent with this view was the theory of Aristotle that God (or the intellect agens) 
was separated (totally transcendent) from the world (like the monads that do not interact 
with the world), his doctrine of essence and also his stress on the principle of contradiction. 
 In contrast to Leibniz, Aristotle had his doctrine of perception, which was the basis 
for the theories of perception that admit the influx of one subject into another. 
 Plato, as we discussed in the first chapter, did not seem to have accepted Parmenides’ 
notion of unity of. In his Parmenides he seems to have shown the ambiguity in and the 
different consequences that one could derive from the conception of unity proposed by 
Parmenides. He showed in hypothesis I that some aspects of the unity proposed by 
Parmenides would produce an absolute one which would be not a whole of parts and 
therefore would be without parts (without extension). But in hypothesis II some aspects of 
Parmenides’ concept of unity would produce something like the unity of the Pythagoreans, 
a whole of parts.  
 Plato seemed to be criticising Parmenides, and therefore there is scarce evidence that 
he would agree with combining the two hypotheses in a system as did the Neo-Platonist 
Plotinus. Plotinus organised into a system the doctrine in which unity does not accept the 
conjunction with its opposite, a unity that he called the One (derived from the Hyp. I of 
Parmenides – akin to atomic unity) with the doctrine that unity does accept its conjunction 
with its opposite, a unity that he called the Intellect (derived from Hyp. II of Parmenides). 
This second notion of unity (the whole of parts) was, according to Cornford, like the 
Pythagorean derivation of numbers, and is related to the Platonic doctrine of “All in All” 
which appears in the Timaeus. 
 The combination of the atomic doctrine of unity (which is also Aristotelian) with the 
Platonic theory of “All in All” was a part of the eclectic effort of Plotinus. But the doctrine 
of “All in All” was logically related to the Pythagorean conception that things are equally 
Limited and Unlimited and this doctrine was strongly criticised as contradictory by 
Aristotle, and in some sense considered totally incompatible with the atomic notion of 
unity, as we showed in Chapter I.  
 Despite these incompatibilities, the synthesis made by Plotinus was accepted and 
taken to its final consequences by Leibniz. The result was the system of Monadology with 
its consequent characteristic doctrine of no communication of substances and denial of the 
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reality of extension. In Leibniz, consequently, we have also the same oscillation between 
two concepts that are ultimately incompatible, the atomic unity that originated with 
Parmenides (and was supported by Aristotle) and the system of the doctrine of the monad 
considered as a micro-cosmos (ultimately a Pythagorean idea). I do not see that it is 
possible to conciliate these two kinds of unity by the notion of coincidence of opposites. 
The Monadology, then, was in fact the eclectic synthesis of Plotinus taken to its ultimate 
consequences. 
 It was with Proclus that we have seen a subtle return to the first Pythagoreans with his 
theory that the soul, as a middle entity, is to be confounded with mathematical activity and 
therefore provides a basis to claim the substantiality of extension and immanence of 
mathematics in reality. Basically, it was this move that inspired the Platonists of 
Cambridge. Together with this trend we have the tradition of philosophical studies in optics 
of al-Kindi, Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, which was greatly inspired by Aristotle’s theory 
of perception. In al-Kindi we also have a system very similar to the Monadology, in which 
the universe is seen as an infinite collection of subjects that reflect or mirror each other. 
The only and important difference is that in this system each subject really influences all 
others. 
 In the chapter on Cusa we saw that, consistently following the consequences of the 
Platonic doctrine of the “All in All”, there is no sense any more in the affirmation of 
Leibniz that “the monads have no windows”, because in the infinite all dualities disappear 
and so the external–internal duality disappears as well. In this sense the Neo-Platonic 
doctrine of essence is perfectly consistent with the world view presented by al-Kindi. 
 It is a merit of Leibniz that he stresses the principle of individuation and from this 
principle he deduces the identity of the Indiscernible. This represents a valuation not only 
of individuality but also of diversity in Nature. In this aspect his philosophy is 
complementary to the philosophy of Spinoza, whose doctrines stressed the aspect of 
universality:  
 
While Spinoza asserted the universality, the oneness of substance merely … 
Leibniz, by means of his fundamental principle of individuality, brings out the 
essentiality of the opposite aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, existence for self, 
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the monad regarded as the absolute Notion, though perhaps not yet as the “I”. 
The opposed principles, which are forced asunder, find their completion in each 
other, since Leibniz’s principle of individuation completed Spinoza’s system as 
far as outwards aspect goes.473 
 
 Yet despite these complementary positions of Spinoza and Leibniz, Spinoza seems to 
be much more consistent. Spinoza maintained unity and continuity more consistently 
because he did not split the universe into an infinity of monads. Therefore, he was more 
convincing in other aspects; for instance, in his defence of pantheism and determinism. 
Consequently, Spinoza was nearer to the goal of Perennial Philosophy than Leibniz was. 
  
                                                 
473 HEGEL, Lectures on the History of Philosophy; Medieval and Modern Philosophy, vol. 3, Lincoln and 
London, 1995, p. 325. 
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